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In America, the elected chief executive faces pressures, ansing from roles the
officeholder must play, that can potentially push in different directions. He must
simultaneously be both a political figure who responds to and makes demands of other
members of the polity, and an administrative chiefwho sees that the law is executed in a
satisfactory manner The executive challenge is to reconcile these possibly competing
pressures successfully toward the end of providing leadership Leadership, in this thesis, is
the maintenance of a successful electoral coalition based on a stable, coherent program of
governance, which is implemented once the candidate is in office
Because politicians and thinkers have conceived of politics and administration
differently at different times, American politics has produced three broad conceptions of
the executive; the constitutional executive, the partisan administrator, and the popular
manager. Each conception of the executive also is a reflection of a broader political
culture that an officeholder is able to emphasize. Each of these conceptions has appeared
at both the national and state levels. This thesis examines the executive challenge using as
a case study the development of the Massachusetts govemorshtp from colonial and
Revoluttonary times through the present day. It then focuses on the political expenences
of Michael Dukakis as an in depth examination of each conception of the executive
The position taken here is that the governors who were most successful at
providing leadership were those who were attentive to competing political cultures and
who sought to lead a discussion including all members of the community. Executives are
most effective at exercising leadership when the officeholder remembers the legitimacy of
other constitutional institutions; when the chief executive remembers that carrying out the
law is a political activity; and when the president or the governor presents a vision while
also allowing sufficient opportunity for discussion within and about that vision
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INTRODUCTION
the executive CHALLENGE: LEADERSHIP.
The American elected executive,
sets of pressures, each of which
POWER AND POLITICS
national, state or local, faces several competing
may not push the officeholder in the same direction Over
time, various
.Amencan political thinkers have sought to reconcile these
different ways, resulting in different
pressures in
conceptions of the elected executive This thesis will
argue that conceptualizing the executive differently will have an effect on the chief
executive’s ease or difficulty m reconciling those
leadership
pressures and exercising effective
The Founders, the Jacksonians and the Progressives each conceived the nature of
the executive differently These different conceptions of the executive office affected the
ability of the officeholder to reconcile competing pressures The executive moved ffom
being a Constitutional leader and chief executive to being a partisan leader and
administrator and ultimately became a popular leader and manager
These conceptions of the executive have existed not only at the national level, but
also at the state level. This study will involve an elaboration of the various conceptions of
the elected executive and their effects on attempts to cariy out the executive office
Massachusetts politics generally, especially Michael Dukakis’s terms as Governor, will be
used as a case study The purpose of this project is to challenge, through examination of
Dukakis as Governor ot Massachusetts, the still predominant conception of the executive
as a popular leader and manager inherited from the Progressive tradition How can that
Progressive conception ot the office be modified to facilitate more effective leadership‘s
Challpno^
The executive challenge that of rernnriiio... , reconciling competing pressures, arises from two
of the roles of the American executive: the political rnl<- ti.p mea ole and the executive role. The first
role that this project will discuss is that of pol.tical leader In th,s role, the elected
execuuve ts one part of a poht.cal system, one ntentber of a group of officials whosejoh
,t
.3 to deal with pubhe concerns. ‘ The elected execut.ve shares w.th the legrslature and the
conns the responsibility to respond to public issues in some fashion The elected execut.ve
must act ,n concert w,th these institutions, often checking the actions of (or having his
actions checked by) others Partisanship, persuasion and compromise can be put to use, as
politics must be performed if any action is to receive broad consensus The executive,
along with everyone else m the system, has an agenda he would like to see instituted In
this role, the elected executive is one member of a political system and must pursue an
agenda to the polity’s satisfaction, given the opportunities and constraints of that system.
The second role of the elected executive that will be discussed here involves the
execution ot the laws The public executive must carry out assigned business, largely as
dictated by the legislature. He must pay attention both to how efficiently and how
effectively the law is carried out and to how the administrators of the law behave in
cariy-ing out their duties. The executive can carry out the public business either with (the
spoils system) or without (the merit system) followers of his own party in lower
administrative offices, but ultimately the chief executive is responsible for the proper
execution of the law.^
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Ye, .here is often a tension between what it takes to carry out these respective
roles Acttng poht.cally
.ay not be conrpattb.e wtth carry,ng out the law An execut.ve
-nay veto a proposed law. only to have the veto overridden He could then drag h,s fee, in
-nplententtng the law by tmpound.ng firnds, promoting his agenda, though no, fhifilhng h.s
duty A pantsan appo.ntmen, to a lower adm.nistrative office may result in poor execution
of the law
.f the appointee, though loyal, is incompetent Finally, an executive may give a
rousing speech in support of a program and m front of an enthusiastic public, only to lose
much public support when the program falters because of poor conception and/or
execution Thus, political action and execution of the law may well be incompatible
Despite the potential incongruity of these roles, an elected executive cannot ignore
either one, as fitifilling only the executive or the political role is not sufficient by itself The
executive who ignores the political role of the office runs the nsk of being labeled arrogant
and becoming unpopular and/or uninfluential with other members of the polity,’ Also, the
executive, while a member of a political system, does, after all, have a duty to execute the
law This aspect of the office is ignored at the risk of being labeled corrupt if abuses are
found and incompetent if programs falter/
This is the challenge that faces the American elected executive: the reconciliation
of pressures stemming from two roles that may be incompatible, yet neither of which can
be ignored. The executive does not face an either/or proposition, the officeholder will
suffer if either the political or the administrative role is given distinct preference. Rather, it
is a matter of balance or integration. Each public executive must integrate the roles of
political leader and chief executive. Through speech and action the elected executive
creates what the officeholder hopes ntentbers of the polity will cons.der an effective pubhc
executive An effective pubhc executive will be defined as one who can provide
substantive leadership, a term that is defined below The question then becomes: How
does the public executive go about the business of the office- How are roles that are not
necessarily complementary, pressures that may work against one another, integrated or
resolved- If the executive must be a strong political figure imJ a competent chief
executive, what is entailed In performing the tasks jointly and effectively- How do
definitions of these roles affect an elected executive’s ability to integrate them successfully
and thus be judged an effective leader^
Leadership
The central question ot this study, then, is how the elected executive can
successfully meet the executive challenge toward the end of providing effective
leadership ' Leadership here is not limited to specific, detailed policy leadership ' The
expectation that the elected executive will provide that form of leadership has certainly
arisen in the twentieth century and will not be ignored Neither is leadership taken here to
mean only charismatic public or rhetorical leadership. The executive has been conceived as
a public leader since the partisan period. Lately, however, parties have lost much of their
effectiveness as mediating institutions between the elected executive and the public and
that office now is directly representative of the public good 7 The role of public leadership,
embodiment of the “public will,” is expected of the elected executive, and this, too, will
not be ignored. The definition of leadership used here will not be solely administrative
leadership, either.^ Again, the expectation that the executive will be an administrative
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leader exists and should be taken into account, but is not the executive’s sole leadership
role
For the purposes of this study, leadersh.p is taken to mean an ability to win
elections based on a stable, coherent program of governance, which is then implemented
This definition of leadership takes into account other, more narrow leadership roles the
executive may play While this may entail each of, or some combination of, the above
leadership roles, it is not limited to any one of them Policy leadership, rhetorical or
charismatic leadership and administrative leadership must be considered parts of the
ultimate purpose of winning elections and implementing an agenda But, like Roosevelt in
19j2 or Reagan in 1980, those elections should be won based on an agenda of
governance. A victory based solely on negative attributes of opponents makes for a slight
mandate and a potentially weak coalition. Further, a record of achievement after an initial
election can provide a candidate with a basis for future campaigns
More broadly, two main forms of political tactics emerge, both of which must be
taken into consideration in an effective definition of leadership. One is coalition building
and bargaining while the other is more ideological, grandly partisan-type leadership.^ The
conception of leadership that this study utilizes ultimately employs both forms of political
maneuvering and notes that both are necessary for the exercise of a successful tenure as
chief executive. Strong, positive electoral coalitions, and results once the candidate has
attained office, ultimately indicate the presence of effective leadership. Leadership,
implementation of a program that, ideally, was the basis of the executive’s election to
office, requires both of these more narrow forms of political action.'®
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Power and Politir^
Leadership in this thesis involves power and must be exercised within a political
system. By virtue of possessing the veto power, and other more positive but less decisive
“weapons,” the elected executive may exercise a cenain power Power is generally
thought of in positive terms: A person possesses power if he can accomplish something "
Especially recently, an elected executive is seen as powerfiil if he can “push his program-
through the legislature. By virtue of possessing the power to carry out the law, and to
make budgetary and legislative recommendations, the elected executive does possess some
positive power. That positive power is largely hampered, however, as the executive
presumably must wait for laws to be passed before they can be executed. Furthermore,
though the executive may make recommendations, there is no guarantee that the
legislature will act on them This is not to dismiss positive power completely. The
executive must possess the authority to execute the law in order to be of any use. Also,
being able to originate legislation certainly provides the executive with the ability to set an
agenda. Executive power is substantially not of the positive variety, however. Rather, it is
based in the veto. Presidents and Governors have the power they do largely because they
are allowed to thwart the plans of the legislature. Executive power is a negative power,
the power to say, “No ” Ultimately, even the positive legislative power the President
possesses rests on his power to veto acts of the legislature, or the possibility that he may.’"
To speak of executive “power” is to speak largely of negative power, of the power to
prevent others from accomplishing what they wish to accomplish.
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Possession of the veto not only confers power on the elected executive, it also
locates the office wtthin a polit.cal system. The executtve must somettmes acquiesce if
laws are to be passed Thus, the possession and exercise of power in the American system
ultimately involves the activity of politics Politics entails attempts to exercise persuasion
over elected officials in the direction of affecting the means and ends of government The
ultimate end of politics is the public good, protection of peoples' rights In performing
politics, the executive must be persuaded, and must persuade other members of the
polity
Politics has shifted not only its nature but its location in Amencan civic life. Until
the 1830s, politics took place within and among Constitutional institutions." Without
popularly-based political parties, legislators, executives and judges sought to promulgate
policy with each institution representing a different facet of the polity The legislature
represented the consent of the citizens while the executive and the judiciary spoke in the
language of rights and jointly checked the legislature to insure protection of those rights.
In order to accomplish public business, policies had to satisfy the members of all
Constitutional institutions. Not only the consent of the people, but the rights of the people
had to be taken into account as well
By the 1830s, politics shifted its location from Constitutional institutions into the
electoral arena The development of mass-based political parties centered politics in the
organizations and conventions of party life.”^ Politics no longer principally entailed
Constitutional institutions checking one another. Rather, it became one party checking the
other Party loyalty became paramount. Maintaining at least an appearance of harmony
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within the party was necessary to establish
no longer the result of interplay amon«
respect and win voters The public good was
various political institutions Now the public good
became synonymous with the party good Electorally, each party claimed to be working
for the public good and that the other pany was merely a faction, inimical to the people’s
welfare Once a party had won an office, fulfilling public demands entatled satisfying not
only one’s own party, but also enough members of the other party to pass legislation
Thus, institutionally, moral issues, or issues of rights, were often ignored in the interests of
intra- and inter-party harmony. Where certain political institutions had spoken the
language of rights previously, the parties did not partake of that language. Politics became
the art of compromise between parties rather than discussion among political institutions.
The weakening ot political parties’ hold on .Ajuerican political life began with the
onset of the Progressive era in the late nineteenth century. Ultimately, the location of
politics shifted to the personal bond between voters and the individual candidate.'" Rather
than institutions or parties keeping one another in check, it now became the candidates’
job and the people’s task directly to keep other candidates and officeholders in check.
Politics was no longer Constitutional institutions attempting to interact for the public
good. Nor was it parties compromising for the public good Rather, it became individual
candidates debating one another, while compromise became more difficult to attain. The
public good came to be an abstraction rather than the result of political processes. Finally,
the executive came to be the direct embodiment of the public good, with nothing between
him and the people.^"
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Each of these notions of politics nlavc intr, ^F p ys into one of the conceptions of the executive
that this study will outline. The ultimate question is how the executive can exercise power
and perfo™ politics toward the end of becoming an effective leader The roles of the
office that the executive challenge encapsulates do not correspond perfectly to power and
politics, however Executing the law certainly involves power designated by virtue of the
office It is also, however, deeply political in the sense that it can be used to persuade
others as to the virtue of a law and is certainly affected by the political beliefs of the
executive Working within a system of separated powers and checks and balances to act
for public purposes certainly emails politics It also, however, involves acts of power that
could not be exercised by anyone except the individual holding office Thus, the executive
challenge is represented in the roles of the office more broadly than it is in the struggle
between power and politics or strength and weakness By investigating that challenge, one
can begin to address the concerns of executive leadership
Historical Reactions to the Executive Challenge
Several methods of dealing with the executive challenge have emerged over the
course of history. One way, historically the first, is the Constitutional executive This
image of the executive predominated, at the national level, from the framing of the
Constitution until the ISjOs. Under this conception, the elected executive is engaged in a
political system of Constitutional institutions that check him as he checks other
institutions. The executive can exercise power negatively, through the veto, necessitating
that members of the legislature take into account the executive’s wishes. At the same time,
the executive is accompanied by the courts in acting as a negative check on the
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legislature “ Separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances
if policies are to be instituted “ A policy has to be
make politics a vital activity
acceptable to all three branches of
remain law. In this system.
government, and thus many different interests, to become and
the executive is to exercise power through the veto, within a constitutional system of
institutions. He both restrains and is restrained by other members of the
system.
constitutional
Yet, government with an extraordinarily weak executive can too easily become an
awful sight, as individuals who experienced the Articles of Confederation could have
attested Under that system, orders would be issued, laws promulgated, with no one to
carry out the commands of the legislature The “energetic executive” fills this enormous
gap “ Here, an executive exists with power enough to carry ou, the law where none had
existed As a coequal branch of government, the executive is to insure the law’s execution
once It has been approved by the legislature, the executive, and possibly the courts An
executive, then, regards himself as among equals in the government, the chief of the
executive branch, with a duty to respect both the legislature and the courts while
executing the law
.Ajiother way that the executive challenge has been approached is through the
partisan administrator. During the nineteenth century, the locus of politics moved from
Constitutional institutions into the electoral arena where it came to be organized by
political parties Perceived elitism led to a call for a broader political base by members of
the polity who felt their needs were not being met.^^ The election of Andrew Jackson
marked the first major success of the popularly-based political parties that were the great
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development of nineteenth century American politics
Amencan politics, panicularly regarding the electoral
would run for office and candidates generally were ex
they were installed in their positions In contrast to i
Parties became the guiding force in
With this development, the elected executive became not only a creature of the
other important party members in formulating and implementing policy He was, while still
formally chief executive, a loyal member of a partisan team Where his role as executive
had been coequal to other branches of government, his role as administrator was first
among equals in a political party. Public opinion, as mediated by political parties, guided
the chief administrator as he worked with other members of the party to develop and
administer the law. Parties came between the President or the Governor and the carrying
out of the law Loyal party members expected to receive rewards for their services The
rewards most readily available to the elected executive at the time were appointments to
office These jobs would be given to those individuals who had demonstrated loyalty to
the executive’s party. Especially at the state and local levels, party machines developed
and thrived by winning executive offices and distributing patronage benefits to party
political panics, but beholden to patronage interests as well He changed from an
executive to an administrator By this definition, the elected executive played a role with
.embers The execunve's
.o>es had become a pa.y leader w,.h respec. for arrd loyaUy
to the partisan cause, and an ad^.nistrator who worked w.th other party ntembers to
implement the law
Eventually, the third, and current, method of conductina the 6xecutive office came
to predominate This was the popular manager On the national level, both the Founders’
separation-of-powers and the Jacksomans’ polit.cal pan.es frustrated the Progressives
Separanon of powers made leadership and action difficult.- A legislature that dealt w,,h
such minutiae as Civil War pensions and was able to hide such issues as deplorable
working conditions in committee cenainly was not conducive to social progress and the
amelioration of social problems
.According to the Progressives, the job of the executive
should be to lead the legislature rather than to check it. Because of their fragmentation and
reliance on patronage and compromise, political parties, according to the Progressives,
were not conducive to regulation, too open to corruption and too evasive of major
issues.
In keeping with previous thinkers, Progressives expected the elected executive to
be a leader. Yet his leadership was not to come through political power based on the veto.
Nor was it based in the strength of a partisan following. Rather, executive leadership was
to be popular leadership Previously, politics had shifted from Constitutional institutions to
political parties. Now its location shifted from political parties to the individual candidate.
It was asserted that the executive was the only official elected by all the members of a
given community. Consequently, he was the only one who could claim popular legitimacy
as the embodiment of the will of the people, without the political party (or, on the national
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scene, the electoral college) as an intermediatr ” Thus, he could take his case directly to
the people when tt required suppon The responsibility of the executive would be two-
fold He would be guided by public opinion. If the power of the office was to be rooted in
public opinion, the executive must obey
.t in some manner Yet the executive also had a
duty to educate public opinion If publ.c opinion was to govern ,t had to make tntelligent,
educated judgments Politics became vigorous, open debate and civic education."*
Enlightened administration and moral leadership on the pan of the executive would allow
greater cooperation on the part of the members of the political system Rather than
competition among members of Constitutional institutions or political parties, cooperation
was sought The executive was to facilitate that cooperation through enlightened popular
leadership
In this scheme, the elected executive became a manager rather than an
administrator The job here is not to work with other party members in carrying out the
law and distributing benefits Rather, it is to manage programs as efficiently as possible.^**
The executive’s role as manager placed him directly at the top of the public administration
hierarchy, with no intermediaries between him and the administrative agencies or the
executive office. The executive became not coequal, or first among equals, but first The
manager had to have a rational plan (representing the public good) and that plan was to be
carried out as efficiently as possible by an expert, neutral civil service and a fully staffed
executive office The executive-as-manager proposes his own programs and to sees that
they are passed and implemented properly, generally meaning efficiently. Partisan
patronage had been one means through which the administrator had handled the executive
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challenge. The rational, neutral civil
executive-as-manager. Through civil
service became the important device for the
service reform and reorganization of the executive
office, the executive was to be made the
social concerns. This image of the
initiator and head of programs in response to
executive is of a popular leader tutoring and bound by
public opinion, and a manager carrying out social programs efficiently.
Each of these conceptions of the executive has existed in Massachusetts polit.cs
The adoption of the Constitution of 1 780 followed the rejection of a Constitution with a
much weaker executive,"
.^s a result of the perceived tyranny of executive power before
the Revolution (especially a Royal Governor appointed by the Crown, no. responsible to
the local legislature), the Constitution that the General Court proposed in 1778 contained
a severely limited executive When that was rejected, one with a relatively more powerlul
executive was ratified This is not to say that the Governor approved in 1 780 was
powerful by twentieth century standards It was not Compared to the executives of most
other states and compared to the rejected executive, however, it was relatively
This early governor was conceived as the constitutional executive The partisan
administrator made its way to Massachusetts by the late 1830s or mid 1840s/" It
Strong.
predominated until roughly the 1960s Perceived corruption on the part of party
organizations led to efforts beginning as early as the 1850s to chip away at it However,
the governorship remained based in disseminating the rewards of the office for quite some
time. The partisan administrator remained the predominant concept of the office in
Massachusetts for the longest period of the three types. Indeed, the Massachusetts
governorship attained less of the centralized power than the governorship had elsewhere.
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The centralized power it did gam came later than elsewhere, ftnally becoming comparable
in the mid-1960s.'*'
Each of these htstorical types of the elected chief executive are still alive and
available to the governor or president Thus, they can be used to analyze a modern chief
executive Michael Dukakis is the major example of the publicmanager type of Governor
that Massachusetts has seen. To say that he was an exemplar of the Progressive-type
Governor is meant not mainly ideologically, but institutionally Seeking to make the
Governorship an expression of the public desire for a cleaner state government, Dukakis
was elected Governor based on pledges of neutrality and efficiency He promised to clean
up and cut down Massachusetts government Yet, Dukakis was ultimately unsuccessful in
his tenures as executive
Dukakis experienced two cycles of success and failure First, he was elected into
office in 1974 as a model of the progressive executive Yet
,
by 1978, when Dukakis lost
the Democratic nomination for Governor to Edward King, a more partisan-style
executive, it seemed that much of his political capital had been spent. Dukakis’s second
cycle occurred from his reelection as Governor in 1982 through his unsuccessful run for
the Presidency in 1988 By 1982, Dukakis had changed his style enough that he was able
to win oack the Democratic nomination from King, and be reelected. The question, then,
is how he had modified his strategy after his first term as Governor Further, had his
changed conception of the office allowed him to succeed where he had previously failed*^
Indeed, Dukakis experienced further success in the Gubernatorial campaign of 1986 when
he was resoundingly reelected What did Dukakis do differently the second time around
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tha. allowed iKls success^ Finally, wda. happened in .he debacle of .he „SS ca„p.,n,
Aga.n, Duha^s's a..en.p.s a. budding an effec.ve poh.,cal coaiiuon were ul.in,a.ely
unsuccessful His cycles of success and fa.lure,
.his
.hesis will argue, can be .raced to his
concept.on of the execut.ve office and ,.s roo.s in .he Progress.ve
.radiuon, 1, was his
concept,on of the execut.ve as a popular leader and a manager that led to Dukakis’s
ulumate political fatlure, while h.s greatest success came when he acted as a const.tu.ional
leader and a ch.ef executive. Finally, i. will be argued that Dukakis’s expertences a. the
State level led to his failure to conduct an effertivp • •u luuci tt c e and convincing campaign at the
national level
It should be noted that the “roles” of the executive are categones created for
analytic purposes by scholars and other political observers For the officeholder,
individual roles such as the political and the administrative are generally integrated, and
not as separable as they may appear to be in written analysis As indicated above,
however, dealing with the executive challenge involves resolving the cross-pressures
resulting from the roles of political leader and chief executive, so that they do successfully
support one another, A strict separation of the political and the administrative is not being
urged here For the purposes of this thesis, the roles of the executive are used to explicate
a typology to investigate the executive office These characterizations of the executive
arise out of American political development and follow a certain historical logic Each
conception of the executive is available for use by an officeholder, however, so that the
typology is also useful for the analysis of the executive office as it is currently conducted.
Therefore, this typology will be used for both historical and analytical purposes.
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Milical Culturesand
_Expecialion.i nf the OfflrphnlH^r
Wh.ie each conception of the executive delineated here ts available to the
officeholder. is not so much ,n its original form as in a political culture which the chief
executive can emphasize once in office Each conception of the office can be translated
into a broad political culture Political culture involves a set of expectations regarding the
government Citizens have certain expectations which they believe the members of the
government must meet These expectations include both how the members of government
are supposed to conduct themselves and what the government is expected to accomplish
through public policy As well, members of the government hold cenain expectations of
each other Depending on the nature of these sets of expectations, the political cultures
can be classified as either constitutional, group-based, or bureaucratic
The constitutional executive operates in what can be termed a constitutional
political culture The government responds to those individuals who are willing to follow
the laws defined in the Constitution. Citizens expect that members of the government will
protect their rights, as defined in the Constitution, and that members of government will
conduct themselves according to its tenets Individual members of government expect that
citizens will follow the law and will focus themselves according to their duties as defined
by the Constitution The focus here is on politics within Constitutional institutions and the
ability to conduct politics within a constitutional framework. Decisions regarding both
official behavior and the viability of public policy will be based on the constitutionality of
an action, on whether the individual or the government should or should not perform that
action based on the Constitution, and on institutional roles.
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b.»d .» how
..„ .. wdwid.., d„.,o„ „
a panicular political party Citizens expect that once they elect
into office, the positive benefits of politics (i.c..
s member of their group
appointive offices) will be theirs and that
polices will he enacted that confonn to the wishes of the group Members of government
expect that both citizens and other members of government will toe the party line,
respecting and obeying dictates of party elites Politics here takes place in the electoral
arena where parties vie for the favor of a majonty of the voters. Judgement of proper
policy and action is based on party doctrine and party standards
The popular manager represents a managerial, professional political culture The
focus IS on administration and the proper means of conducting government, so that
professional standards {,.e„ openness, honesty, neutrality, efficiency) will be the measure
of individual participation Members of the citizenry expect that government will be
conducted in a professionally competent manner, and that a properly conducted
administration can address any public problem Members of government expect that
citizens will be loyal to them personally, and that other members of government will serve
their constituents and will maintain standards of professionalism in their own political
conduct Politics here takes place in both the electoral and institutional arenas, with
professional standards such as openness, neutrality and efficiency being the yardstick for
the judgement of proper policy and action.
Of course, the existence of one political culture does not exclude the existence of
another. Rather, it is a matter of emphasis. One political culture may dominate and will
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often be challenged by
.he adherents of another For exatnple, devotees of a bureaucrat,
c
pohtical culture, such as Michael Dukak.s early-l960s Massachusetts, often react
aga,nst what they perce.ve as the corruption and
.nefticeney of a group-based poh.tcal
culture. Paralleling the conceptions of the executive, various political cultures have
dominated m Massachusetts and in the United States at vanous times
Another way of looking at changes ,n the notions about the elected executive that
have been documented here ,s to note that the expecat.ons of the officeholder have
changed The execut.ve performs d.fferent roles, or s.m.lar roles in a d.fferent
.nanner,
because
.nembers of the public and other members of the government expect him to do so
II political cultures are based around expectations, „ makes sense that expectations of the
executive would be different as one political culture rather than another comes to
dominate a polity.
In The Myth of the Modern Presidency^ David K. Nichols claims that people have
too long ignored the potential inherent in the Constitutional Presidency The potential for
what IS referred to as the “modern presidency” was always present in the Constitution,
Nichols argues, and growth in the roles of government actualized that potential.'*'^ To
indicate that Americans have ignored the potential of the Constitutional Presidency is to
sidestep the fact that the roles of the executive have been defined differently at different
times and that expectations of the office have consequently shifted as time has passed If
the potential for the modern” president, or executive, has always been present, this study
will try to make clear how various executives have sought to actualize that potential in
different ways
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The potential latent in the office may not have changed, but the expectations of the
2xe
a certain extent in the popular mind, there
officeholder and the public have If the e rmn/o hcutive has always embodied the government to
are now no intermediaries between that office
and the people If addresses to the legislature allow the chief executive to exercise
iegislative leadership that role has become much more detailed, with the responsibility for
budgeting and originating legislation falling to the executive. If the elected executive has
always been the head of the executive branch, that role has taken on a more complex
character as the executive branch has grown m size and importance
This thesis will argue that the constitutional executive is the conception of the
office that IS most facilitative of leadership given the current expectations of the office
The desire here is not to transplant two-hundred year old institutions into the present day
Naturally, that is unworkable Rather, the question involves translating those institutions
into our present conditions What would a constitutional executive look like given the
current expectations of the office’ Why would an executive who emphasizes a
constitutional political culture be more successful than one who emphasizes a bureaucratic
or a group-based political culture‘s
A Challenge, not a Problem
A central question arising from the literature on the elected executive is the
problem ot how an executive is to exercise leadership in a system that, while necessitating
leadership, is not particularly conducive to it. The American elected executive is berated if
he fails to provide leadership. Yet, authors recognize, the American political system and
the American polity generally do not make the provision of leadership easy. Seen in a
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positive light, that means that the system provides limits or checks on executive power,
which otherwise would become tyrannical Thus, while authors complain of the
“gridlock” which results from separation of powers and checks and balances, they also
recognize that leadership must be checked and made responsible The question is how the
elected executive, seen as the sole unifying force in a political community, can overcome
these obstacles and supply leadership within the limits of the constitutional system
Much of the literature on the executive does not recognize the challenge inherent
in the office, or, rather, does not treat the office as a challenge Most authors treat the
question of executive leadership as a problem that lends itself to a single solution
Strengthened political parties, strengthened administrative capacity, psychological
investigation of specific executives, or emphasis on the formal or informal aspects of the
executive office are examples of solutions that have been proffered to allow the executive
to exercise leadership
A number of authors, James Ceaser and Theodore Lowi for example, call for
invigorated political parties to correct perceived defects in the executive. Ceaser calls for
a strengthening of the parties to remedy defects in the Presidential selection system. Lowi
advocates a third party to allow the President to exercise more effective leadership
Certainly the role political parties have played in the selection and operation of the
executive has declined. Parties, however, tended to focus on the benefits of office and the
distribution of those benefits rather than overly programmatic matters. Advocating the
strengthening of parties also ignores the fact that party politics has generally produced the
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weakest executives in American polit.c, Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Jackson being
important exceptions.
Many authors advocate modified administrat.ve or managerial capact.es to allow
the executtve to exerc.se leadership The Brownlow Comm,
.tee Report, under Franklin
Roosevelt, is the grandest example of the emphasis on the adm.ms.ra.ive capacities of the
executive and the connection between them and the ability to exercise leadership Richard
Nathan has written sympathetically about Richard Nixon and the development of the
administrative presidency Stephen Hess recognizes many problems inherent in an over-
extended Presidency focused on reorganization of staff and bureaucracies He emphasizes
that the managerial role should be brought more into line with the capacities of the office
ot the President Walter Williams emphasizes the need for more effective analysts and
use of experts in the Presidency The problem here, which Hess raises effectively, is the
question of capacity. The executive can only accomplish so much and an extended
bureaucracy surrounding the executive can obscure responsibility and lead to bureaucratic
structures which may not be within the capacities of the executive to maintain
effectively.^’
Other authors have taken to examining the psychological make-up of individual
executives with the hope of obtaining the secrets of the executive office. The question
then is what does an executive is supposed to do if he is not that person. James David
Barber and Fred Greenstein, for example, both study individual executives to formulate
the “solution” to the office. Barber’s study yielded the “active-passive, positive-
negative” classifications and an emphasis on the attitudes of individual executives toward
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he.r work Greens,ein investigated Dwtght E.senhowefs Pres.dency and concluded that
Eisenhower had a personality that ntade h.nt adept at manipulat.ng the public and pnvate
aspects of the office Yet that leaves the question open of what to do if. an, not Franklin
Roosevelt. Dw.ght Eisenhower or any other tndividual who has served in the execut.ve
capacity successfitlly Examining individual executives can take one only so far if one is
not that executive Also, it ,s not solely the office holder who defines the executive office
Members of the legislative branch, members of the political party, other members of the
executive branch and members of the public also have an interest in and influence upon
how the office is defined and executed
Nor IS the problem of the execut.ve solely a formal/informal matter Richard
Neustadt argues that the presidency’s formal power is useless in and of itself and must be
backed up by personal power, so that the executive must rely on powers of persuasion.”
Neustadt misses the point, however, that there must be some power in the office,
otherwise no one would pay any attention to the incumbent executive. David K Nichols,
on the other hand, claims that scholars have ignored the potential inherent in the
Constitutional Presidency, i.e. the formal executive.” The seeming “modern executive” is
a result of the Constitutional executive in an age of heightened government activity. Yet,
as indicated above, this ignores the fact that the roles of the formal executive have been
redefined throughout history.
The formal power of the executive is, by definition. Constitutional. Without being
elected to office, and without the veto power, the executive is powerless. Indeed, there is
no executive power without the Constitution. However, the Constitutional executive is
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given certain roles, but those roles are far from strictly defined The point here is that they
have been redefined at several points throughout American political history In that sense,
this study will focus on the formal office Yet, the informal executive, too, has had its rol.
and expectations changed and redefined The informal office, the expectations that exist
about the way in which the executive will carry out the office have changed as well, and
must be taken into account. Popular expectation of moral, rhetonc^ leadership and the
expectation of detailed policy leadership are generally not written directly into the
Constitutional role of chief executives, but they are expected of the officeholder and are
Ignored a, the mcumbenfs peril A solution does not res. in strict emphasis on either the
formal or the informal executive Rather h lies in the recognition that certain roles and
aspects of the office can be defined and redefined The formal and the informal must be
examined together, as they influence one another directly and importantly
Thus, the question of leadership involves allowing the executive to exercise his will
while at the same time restraining the actions of the officeholder Various authors have
proposed specific solutions to the challenge of how the executive is to exercise effective
leadership While this study will make recommendations, it also recognizes that the office
is based in a challenge and that it lends itself to more than one answer In order to address
the issues of executive leadership, this thesis will indicate various answers that have been
proffered and will explore their consequences for the present era.
There are certain authors who do recognize the pliable nature of the office of the
executive. Ellis, Wildavsky and Genovese each sees the office of the executive as a
challenge with many potential ways of being addressed. Their understandings of the
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challenge each involve the location of •of the office m a political system ” Ellis and Wildavsky
locate the challenge in the necessity that the exen ,tn,„n cutive maintain a coalition in a system of
competing political cultures. Genovese indicates the position of the office in the American
political and economic system, one which makes leadership
Genovese, as the challenge
sll but impossible according to
However, the way in which Ellis. Wildavsky and Genovese portray the challenge
Ignores the question of a politically astute executive who presents a vision that ,s
administratively unfeasible, or who simply does not pay attention to the administrative
aspects of the office A president or a governor can present a vision, balance a coalition
and promote discussion and still be thought of as unsuccessful if his tenure is
administratively unsound Emmette Redford and Marian Blissett, for example, claim that
Lyndon Johnson, ceriainly a politically capable executive, was unsuccess&l in his efforts at
implementing his Great Society because the United States did not possess the
administrative capacity to handle Johnson administration’s proposals Martha Wagner
Weinber^ notes that Francis Sargent, governor of Massachusetts from 1969 until 1975
tended to focus on the “ceremonial" aspects of the office, at the expense of the
administrative ones, and his administration suffered as a result It is evident that
executives may successfully navigate the political system, that the president or governor
may do very well politically, while presenting an ultimately unsuccessful or unrealistic
program from an administrative standpoint. The challenge as defined here involves not
only the political aspect of the office, but also the necessity that the executive carry out the
law, the administrative role. It is the location of the challenge in these two roles of the
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office, not only the system in which th^ • jthe office resides, which impedes the ability of the
elected executive to provide effective leadership
^^feMchusetts_and Progressivi..v,
M imponant question involves the legitimacy of using a state and a specific
governor to study the
.American executive challenge Studying the elected executive on the
state level makes sense because Increasingly m the twentieth century, governors have been
making runs for the Presidency In the 1980s alone, three of the five men who ran for the
Presidency had sewed as Governor If the state level is where Presidents and Presidential
candidates are acquiring experience for the national-level office, it is useful to look at the
State level to see what that experience can tell ffiture Presidents
Funher. states are being asked to do more in American politics than they have in
years Members of the
.American polity have been suspicious of centralized authority since
the Revolutionary era While that suspicion has waxed and waned, general mistrust of “big
(centralized) government” has come to pervade American politics again, and this has led
to movement toward the transfer of functions from the federal government to the state
governments. It this is the case, presumably governors are going to be asked to do more,
and to take on more substantive leadership roles regarding public policy and governmental
activity. As states become more important in policy-related matters, it becomes more
important to understand the implications of gubernatorial politics.
The next question involves the use of specifically Massachusetts as a case study. Is
Massachusetts a suitable state for the study of executive leadership'!’ Massachusetts is
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suitable ,0 this study because it has a nch polit.cal histoty and the types of executive that
will be discussed have all extsted in the state at sonte point Mote specifically,
Massachusetts
.s also appropriate because of the nature of tts polit.cal culture
Massachusetts, for .ost of its h.stoty, has been a one-party state The Whigs dominated
.he state front their inception With the.r demise in the 1 S50s, the Republicans held power
in the state unt.l the late 1920s After tlutty years of two-party competition, the Democrats
took over by 1960 Their dominance continues in the state legislature and the
Congressional delegation, where party is generally more important than personality The
parties have rotated the hold on political power, but there has been little party
competition
-A lack of party competition was a Progressive ideal If this study is to show that
the conception of the executive which currently predominates in American politics, the
popular manager, should be modified to facilitate executive leadership, a Progressive
executive in a Progressive environment would be most effective as a case study In effect,
Michael Dukakis will be examined as a Progressive executive in an environment facilitative
of Progressivism, If Dukakis were unable to succeed as a Progressive in a state with a
notable lack of party competition, that says something about the nature of the Progressive
conception of the executive If he needed to change his conception of the executive in
order to achieve success in Massachusetts’s political environment, that says more about
the Progressive conception. Finally, Dukakis’s experiences at the state level led directly to
his experiences at the national level in 1988. His presidential campaign that year is noted
for its lack of vigor and ultimate lack of success. This lack of success above the state level.
27
th.s thes,s will seek to demonstrate,
,s due to Dukak.s's expenences in Massachusetts
politics.
It is necessary to say a word about Progressivtsm in Massachusetts. Progressivism
as an ideology, as a response to social problems assoc.ated with developing capitalist
culture, came to Massachusetts earlier than elsewhere in the nation,” Progressivism as a
means of conducting polit.cs, r.e, neutral, effic.ent, central.zed, came late to Massachusetts
If It came at all," It is often asserted that Massachusetts politics is still conducted
according to the rules of the nineteenth century The focus, it is said, is still on the rewards
ot holding office and the distribution of benefits to one’s friends and family,*' There is,
however, a Progressive niche in Massachusetts politics, largely in reaction to the nepotism
and lack of neutrality The conduct of politics may not always be Progressive, but there
is a reaction to it that exemplifies the impulses of institutional Progressivism. Dukakis, at
least in his first term, is an exemplar of those impulses in his reactions to what he saw as
corruption in the state’s political system.
Conclusion
The constitutional executive, the partisan administrator and the public manager are
the three principal methods by which executives have sought to exercise leadership in the
face of the executive challenge of reconciling the conflicting pressures of potentially
incompatible roles. Again, these are historical types, and their emergence follows a certain
logic. The constitutional executive is generally associated with the Framers of the
Constitution as one response to the Articles of Confederation. The constitutional
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executive predominated in Massachusetts aftpr tho ^sacnuse after the adoption of the Constitution of 1780
The pan,sa„ administrator arose w.th the end of the Virginia dynasty and the onset of the
Jacksontan era in American politics and continued through the Progress.ve era In
Massachusetts, the partisan adnt.nistrator ttnly took hold by the 1840s after a supply of
Revoluttonao- War heroes had been exhausted The pubhc manager was developed by
Progressives who sought stronger leadershtp regarding social problems Freeing the
ecutive from the grip of political parties was a vital part of accomplishing this. The
public manager came later to Massachusetts than to many other locations, though there
had been hints of it beginning before the Progressive era It came as a response to
ineft'iciency in administration and the perceived corruption and nepotism of political
parties
These formulations of the roles of the elected executive should not be read as
strictly historical, however As indicated earlier, they are also analytic tools, and can be
read as categories or ideal types Further, this is not to suggest that these categories
exhaust scholars’ analytic possibilities inherent in the American elected executive. As Max
Weber notes, categories of this type “are to be considered merely as border cases which
are especially valuable and indispensable for analysis. Historical realities, which almost
always appear in mixed forms, have moved and still move between such pure types,
Future executive may well concoct other methods of reconciling the competing political
and administrative demands on the president or the governor. Also, no conception of the
chief executive is exclusive of another, and they can be combined and mixed to create
more nuanced types than the three presented here. The point is that executives have
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conceived of several means of meeting the executive challenge, each of which is useful for
the purposes of analyzing the office. In fact, if these conceptions were strictly historical.
this typology would be of little use
Vanous concept.ons of the executive have predominated a. various times, because,
as Stephen Skowronek reminds us, certain times may make certain actions more
appropriate than others.^ The assumption here is that one can
.earn from the pas. While it
will be argued that the constitutional executive is the conception most facilita.ive of
effective leadership, i, is also ,™e that what has come before cannot be transplanted whole
cloth into our era What would that conception look like if it appeared in late the twentieth
century
.American political system, with its modified expectations of Ihe elected executive'-
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CHAPTER
I
the constitutional executive
Problems regard,ng .he executive entered Massachusetts politics with the
--
—setts Ba. Colon. ,n the seventeenth centu. Percept.ons oP
Sovemntenta.t„ spec, f,call, execuuve ,rann, plagued co,o„s.s
.on, the Pun.an
era through Revolutionary tintes. Governors such as John Winthrop and Thontas
Hu.ch.nson ran into problents when they at.etnpted to aggrandize what cCon.sts felt was
too ntuch polittca, power To counteract th.s, the Pun.an Era saw the development of
represen.a.,ve government, a b.cameral legislature and a wntten code of laws The
Anterican Revolut.on was a reacon aga.nst perce.ved tyranny under Bntish rule, notably
an executive not responsible to the people or controlled by elective political
.nstitutions
Jhe Puritan Fra
The chaner of the Massachusetts Bay Company, s.gned by England’s K,ng Charles
I on March 4. 1629, was exceptional in that it d.d not require that the company’s
headquaners be located in England Twelve men meeting on August 26. 1629 agreed that
given that exception, they should take their families and move the enterprise to the New
World. The original company charter delineated the form of government under which the
members should operate: The voting members of the polity, known as freemen, formed
the General Coun, which was to meet four times a year Their duties included choosing a
governor, a deputy governor and eighteen assistants from among themselves, and
admitting other freemen ^
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A year la.er, on August 23. 1630, the first nteet.ng of the Court of Assistants of
.he Massachusetts Bay Colony tooh place In Charlestown Intportantly, at th,s meeting
.he ass,stants voted that the Governor, Deputy Governor and four ass.stants were to be
Justtces of the Peace, thus combining governmental powers ^ Under the charter, the
urt had the power to make, ordeine, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable orders, lawes, statutes and ordinances, directions, and instruct,ons, not
contrane to the lawes of this our realme ,n England - The assistants directly violated the
chaner by keeping this power in their own hands, allow,ng the freemen only the power to
choose officals The assistants also breached the charter by havmg the General Court
meet only once a year They were able to accomplish this by hmiting who was able to
become a freeman and by keepmg the Royal Charter concealed ' In his journal for the date
of this initial meeting, the first governor under the charter noted simply: “We kept a
court
—n Winthro^ That first governor of the colony under the Massachusetts Bay
Charter was John Winthrop, Members of the Massachusetts Bay Company had named
Winthrop governor in October of 1629, and he had been in charge of organizing the
voyage to New England. He would continue as governor until 1634, and would serve
again for eight of the years between 1637 and 1649. A charismatic figure, Winthrop
sought to organize colonists around his own vision of Massachusetts Bay, a vision he
expressed in “A Model of Christian Charity,” a lay-sermon delivered aboard the ship
Arabella Winthrop would aggrandize much political power in the early days of the
colonial government. Serving as governor, or as deputy governor, effectively placed him
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in the legislative, executive and judicial cpatcc seats of government This accrtial of power on the
part of Wtnthrop and the other assistants would be the cause of a great deal of
consternation among the colonists.
The first significant challenges to Winthrop. power came in 1632. Most notably,
tesidents of Watenown protested a tax that had been levted on them without their
consent The assistants had approved a tax of eight pounds on the residents of Watertown
.0 help pay for the consmiction of a fortification against Indian invasion of what would
later become the town of Cambridge, Winthrop notes in his journal that 'The pastor and
eider, etc., assembled the people and delivered their opinions that it was not safe to pay
money after that sort, for fear of bringing themselves and posterity into bondage.”’ As a
result, the offenders were called before the Court of Assistants Winthrop noted a
satisfactory resolution to the event, stating that the townspeople had “confess[ed] freely
that they were in error '* They were mistaken, Winthrop tndicated to them, about the
nature of the government It was not a direct democracy, he claimed, as the colonists
seemed to think Rather, the Freemen of the General Couti had elected their offtcials, and
those officials were free to enact laws as the assistants saw fit Colonists could address
issues at the meeting of the General Coun, through their vote The concerned citizens of
Watertown “were fully satisfied, and so their submission was accepted and their offence
pardoned,” Winthrop writes.^
While Winthrop saw this as a victory for the few elected officials of the
Massachusetts Bay Government, it would only prove to be so in the short term. The
Watertown incident was the beginning of the introduction of representative government
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next Court to advise with the governor and assistants about the
as what they should agree upon should bind
attempting to limit the power of the
raising of public stock, so
all, etc Members of the polity were
governor through the introduction of a political
system, in which a broader base of ind.viduais would have a substantive say regarding the
actions of government officials
Colonists clearly resented the power John Winthrop had collected in his early years
as governor The General Court in May of 1634 was the firs, a, whtch the freemen d.d no.
elect Wmthrop Governor, though he retatned a posit.on as an ass.stan. A, that same
sesston, representative government became further ensconced ,n Massachusetts polit.cal
life Town representat.ves had asked to read the charter, and had realized the extent to
whtch leaders such as Winthrop had d.rec.ly vrolated that document in establishing the
ex.st.ng institutions The General Court, as a result, was now required to meet four times
a year rather than once, and towns were to send representat.ves to the meetings All
freemen part.c.pated in election of officials, while the representat.ves alone would attend
the other assemblies to “assist .n mak.ng laws, disposing lands, etc Local residents
could thus have a say in more than simply appointing officials and taxation questions They
attempted to curtail the power of the Governor and other elected officials through the
introduction of political institutions.
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May of 16.7, Winthrop tnumphed over Governor Henry Vane in a reelection to
.He sovemorsHtp Wntdrop. success was due, ,n ,ar,e pan, to tHe tuntult tdat Had Heset
.he colony when he was out of the governor's office In addition to a war wtth the
Pequot Indians, the colony ran into trouble wtth dissenters ,n the Roger Williams and
Ant.no.,an ,nc,dents. W.nthrop's reelect,on ca.e ,n the
.,dst of the Antinonnan
Hutch,nson banished from the colony Winthrop had sided against Hutchinson, while
Governor Vane had stood for her In a content.ous meet.ng, and an early manifestation of
the executtve challenge pitt.ng strength aga.nst liberty, Winthrop triumphed over Vane,
.ndtcating the preference of the freemen for stab.lity in the colony, albe.t stabihty w,th a
popular voice
As the Antinomian
.nc.dent indicated, Winthrop cenainly was not open-mtnded in
h,s notions of what constituted a proper political and religious establishment ,n the colony
The Puritan establishment was a theocracy: Church and state were a single entity, and
leaders, Winthrop especially, did not tolerate dissent from established views. What
discussion existed regarding proper policy was far from widespread and inclusive In
November of 1637, shortly after returning to the governorship, Winthrop oversaw the
banishment of Hutchinson, John Wheelright and other important members of the
Antinomian faction,'" From the beginning, Winthrop had attempted to institute his vision
of what the Massachusetts Bay colony should be. While this helped establish his authority,
and certainly earned him a great deal of respect, it was also what caused him to run into
trouble. In attempting to institute his own vision, especially through the aggrandizement of
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institutional power, he brought out the rebellious
The point of that rebellion was to establish
administering the government to
nature of many of his fellow colonists.
institutions which would force individuals
account to others for their behavior Again, this was an
early manifestation of the executive challenge
A further step to limit the power of the government came in the 1640's wrth the
draftmg of the
-Body ofL.bert.es,- a rudimentary code of laws Thrs emerged as a
response to the monopoly the assistants held on judicial power Th,s monopoly led to a
call for a written code of laws that could be used to hold the assistants accountable for
their decisions, a call colonists had been issuing since 1635,'^ The General Court
authorized various committees for this purpose over the next several years It was not
until 1 64
1 , however, after having submitted a potential code to the towns, that the General
urt established the Body of Liberties, according to Winthrop, “to have them fully
amended and established to be perpetual This covered
“ftindamental constitutional
principles as well as statutory laws and church-state relations As much as the Body of
Liberties covered, it was not satisfactory to many colonists, and demand for a
comprehensive system of laws continued, A full, extensive written code of laws which
satisfied the colonists generally would not be established until 1648,*'
A bicameral legislature developed in Massachusetts by 1644, two months before
voters demoted Winthrop from Governor to Deputy Governor.^* Establishment of a
bicameral legislature came as a response to the assistants’ having a “negative voice” over
the towns’ representatives, or deputies, in governmental business. The assistants and the
deputies sat together once representative government had been instituted. The charter
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requ.red
.he approval of a. leas, s,x ass.s.an.s in any action taken by the General Court,
body approved
,t. A paniai v.ctory for the deput.es cante in 1636, when mles were
changed so that a majority of each group was needed to pass any action.
After a dispute between a poo, elderly woman and a rich Boston merchant over a
murdered sow. however, the question Hared again Winthrop notes in March of 1644
“upon the motion of the deputies, it was ordered that the court should be divided in their
consultations, the magistrates by themselves and the deputies by themselves, what the one
reed upon they should send to the other, and if both agreed then to pass, etc,”*’ This
ag:
was a partial victory for each side.
.AJthough the assistants had retained veto power, the
deputies had attained a greater ability to check the actions of the assistants,
political system began developing in response to arbitrary rule of Winthrop
A rudimentary
and men in his
position.
Colonists ftinher challenged Winthrop's authority in 1645, when residents of the
town of Hingham petitioned the General Coun to hear a case against Winthrop, who was
then Deputy Governor “ Winthrop, the petitioners claimed, had a hand in trying to force
residents of the town into accepting a militia captain they did not want The question was
whether .Anthony Eames or Bozoun Allen should serve in that position Eames had served
in the mihtia for at least seven years, and magistrates had received a recommendation to
promote him The townspeople, however, preferred Allen, his subordinate After the
incident had caused a fracas to ensue in Hingham. the Reverend Peter Hobart had
appeared before officers of the General Court and acted in a particularly belligerent
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Deputy Governor rather than Governor.
power and infringing on the people’s liberties The nature of the H hdebates m the trial did not
evenly dw.ded Th.s d,v,s,on wnhm the deput.es delayed the case unt.l, in Us th.rd month,
bitration committee composed of six elders from the colony and six of the
deputies After the lengthy trial, the Court
Hingham faction
acquitted Winthrop and fined members of the
were two types of liberty: natural and
throp s Little Speech on Liberty” was his eloquent philosophical rejoinder to
the charges levied against him He insisted that there
evil or federal The former had no place in society. The latter could only be enjoyed under
a government with enough power to enforce its edicts The people had the power to
choose the members of that government, but, once they had done so, they had a duty to
submit to it. If they did not, they would become ungodly.^*
Broadly, Winthrop took a stand and presented a well developed philosophy of
government and authority As noted above, Winthrop was autocratic and generally
intolerant of dissenting points of view. Alternatively, however, when challenged he
addressed explicitly and intelligently the question of why governmental authority was
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proper and why it should undertalcf^ r •
, „
' H.S success in defend..
h.mself earned him respect
.hroughou.
.he colony and
.he voters elected h'im governor for
tne tour remaining years of his life.
under dohn Wtn.hrop, the first Governor under the Massachusetts Bay Colony
law, and tndeed carry out most functions of government, clashed w.th the political system
as .. developed
,n early Mew England
,.s representattve government and fatnt traces of
wHat would become separa.,on-of-powers and Itm.ted government crept tnto the colony
W.nthrop found h.mself more and more in a posh,on wh.ch necess.tated
.ust.ficat.on of h,s
repeatedly returned him to that duty, ind.cat.ng a great deal of respect for hts abihties. Yet
he was also expected to employ those abtli.ies wtth a cerra.n restraint, and voting members
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony fought to establ.sh
.nst.tutions that would ensure
moderation on the governor’s part
The Royal Governnr*;
The Puritan settlement in Massachusetts lasted slightly more than fifty years
time. Its colonists walked a line between remaining friendly with England and
mamtammg the sovereignty of its own government The colonists often ignored orders
issued from the mother country, while strife in England frequently prevented the King
from pressing his authority fttrther “ Residents of Massachusetts treated commissioners
sent by Charles II in a generally hostile manner and ignored an order to send officials to
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Randolph, as an agen. of
.he King, conduced a senes of
.nves.iganons in ,he colony and
-d.ha..hecoion.s.shadc,o,a.ed.heBn^
urt repeatedly stalled, albe.t with sonte unsat.sfacoty attempts a. mollification Finally
™ - IS,
.PS4, the Bntish Court of Chancery rssued a decree that vacated the ongrn.
Massachusetts Bay charter That rt uy C er, That decree becanre final on October 23, 1684
agreement, the General Court Je/uco subnnt.ed to the authority of the Royal Governor
The deposed
.Massachusetrs officals rega.ned the.r offices ,n 1 689, after the Glonous
Revolutron of 1688, when Wrll.am of Orange tooh the Britrsh throne from James The
restored tenure of Massachusetts’ cvic leaders a. thrs pomt was short-lived, however
King Wilham
.ssued a new charter ,n
.691, one which continued the institution of the
Roya, Governor Whrle the General Court remained,
.. was a General Coun curtailed in
legislative and judical powers, and shorn of all imponant executive powers
The political rndependence Massachusetts had enjoyed greatly diminished as it
became a colony more firrffiy under the control of the King The Governor, a member of
the General Court, was a royal appointee, could assemble and dissolve the legislature a.
will, and could veto any acts of that body. The Governor also approved House elections of
members of the Council, which was the upper chamber of the General Court and a
Gubernatorial advisory body No money could be spent without the approval of the
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Governor and the Council, Converselv
without the approval Ofhe House of Representatives and that body controlled the ry Governor's salary As a result
c ashes over financial matters were frequent occurrences BattI
Royal Governor and the House of Re
" Power between the
Represen.at.ves
continued through the e,ghteen.h
century, with vanous intercessions from the Kino r
^
Bernard's refusal to call the
General Court m 1768 and General .
= attempts to dissolve it on the eve of the
Revolution are indicative ofthe conflicts that occurred »Finailv ,h ,rinal y, t e colonists took up
F.ve intolerable Acts, which they saw as attempts to divest them of their rights
Thomas Hutchinson served as Governor of Massachusetts in
1 760 and again from 1 769- 1 774 Othf^r tu. nOther than General Thomas Gage, who served for less
than one year, Hutchinson was the last Royal Governor before the American Revolution
He had been active in Massachusetts politics since 1737, however, firs, serving as a
Boston Selectman Beginning in 1749, he served on the Council and in various Judicial
positions, culminating in the position of Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Superior
Court - The holding of numerous offices might not have proved Hutchinson's undoing
The problem was that he held many of them at the same time, leading to the perception
.ha. he was looking to establish and maintain an oligarchy and thus deprive the colonists of
their rights.
The practice of holding multiple offices simultaneously was held over from the
days of the Massachusetts Bay Charter, In the eighteenth cen.u^, as in the seventeenth,
members of the legislature, specifically the Council, were often also judges, Hutchinson
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1 advantage of this, thus incumng the wrath of many Massachusetts residents
Oove™. P.nc,s H.C.on CH.en.Pce
..e S.pe„o. Co. o„
Nove...
,3, ,.0 ao. Ho.c.nson was co^s.on. Oece„.. 30^,
. sa.e
Hu.c.nso„ was a,so Ueo.ena. Oove™. a Coonc. So.o. Coon, 3oa,e o.
P-a.e ana Cononana. o.He Cas.le,
.He on Cas.,e
,,a„a
.3 3oH„ W.n.Hnop Haa
before h., Ho.cH.nson he,a le„s,a.,ve, execoOve ana joa.c.a, offices a.
.he sa.e
..„e
Ada...ona„y, Ho.chinson
.enaea
.0
.ns.ai, his fnends ana rela.wes
,n.o offices under h.s
Hutchinson s son represented Salem in the House of Representatives
Hu.ch,nson.s hro.her-,n-,aw was Secre.ar, or.he Prov.nce, a,a,e ,n Essex Coon., ana a
member ot the Council. Two other relativf-« Kxrela.,ves-by-marnage
.0 Ho.chinson werejoages on
the Superior Cour. and Cooncl members haif-brother
Suffoll. Coun.y
.ha. Ho.chinson vacated
Court.
of his took the position i
upon receiving the appointment to the Superior
Hutchinson’s hold.ng these offices concurrently, combined with his distribution of
offices under his control
.0 frtends and family, raised the ire of many colonists before he
had even ascended
.0 the Governorshtp The colon, sts were more than aware that all the
offices Hutchinson held were not necessarily compatible “As John Adams later remarked,
Hutchinson had obviously ’too many offices for the greatest and the best man in the world
to hold - James Otis, Sr. noted that the positions of Lieutenant Governor and Chief
Justice were “'enough for any gentleman to hold’, and it was illegal that he should at the
same time act as judge of probate.’’” The allegations against Hutchinson’s simultaneous
holding of various offices led to his losing election to the Council in 1766, for the first
49
Since
. 74, and
.0 H.s bein,
.e„,ed a sea.
.e.e,
.0 oWe
.e
proceedings
Funhern.ore, was no, solely ,ha, the offices were
,ncon,pa„ble with each other
The trouble also lay ,n the fact that, accord.ng
,0 ntany of the colonists, the union of the
eg.slat.ve, execut.ve and
.udicia, offices was host.le to their I,bert.es Begin.ng in April
763, a pubhc debate raged ,n the press between combatants known only as 'T Q and
J T Q stated the case against accretion of power nicely:
All men will allow, that it is possible for one aentlemanto be possess’d more power than is consistent with the
'safety ot a community ^
The time may come when an ill use may be made of nre
cedents which we are no^, establishing, when others by
n«. as well as /rower, not barely to “disturb the peace ”but to destroy the liberties of a province
Pronunen, colonists, such as John Adams and Josiah Quincy, wen. so far as ,0 accuse
Hutchinson of being part ofa consp.racy ,0 destroy the liberties of Massachusetts
residents - This paranoia on the pan of the colonists led ,0 v.olent outbursts against the
government ,n general and Hutch.„son in pan.cular On August 26
,
1765
,
a mob angered
by the Stamp Ac, stormed Hutchinson’s house and destroyed it and nearly everything in it,
mcludmg public and private papers Hutchinson had been collecting for thirty years ’’
Hutchrnson responded to these accusations with the assertion that his critics were
in a conspiracy to topple the government In a letter relating the story of the destruction of
h.s house, Hutchrnson wrote of those who had roused the mob in the first place: “I wish
they could be convinced what infinite hazard there .s of the most terrible consequences
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such demons, when
,hey are ,e. ,oose in a govemnren, where
.here is
.
-her.., a. hand suffic.e„..o
suppress.he. Here
,s.he h„
^
eadersh,p,s.„us.ra.edwe„Hu.chins
^
Hutchinson worried about the power of the an
of the polity and
.he preservation of the.r rieh.s The ne '^nts. i cessity was for an
~.uch.hesa.es.r,feashehad,n.heyears,..^^^^^^^^
Hovernorsh,p Opponents of .he colon,
a, «overnn,en. tended to see Hutch,nson as
representauve of oppress,ve Br„,sh otle, regardless of Hutch •utc tnson s own posttions That
the Governor had opposed the Stamp Act of 1
7
fiS ft 765, for example, was lost on rebel
colontsts, generally u as a pan of the royal entourage, they assened, Hutchinson intended
to deny them the.r nghts and l.ben.es Hutch.nson, despite h.s generally moderate pol.t.cal
temper, saw any d.ssen. from the adm.mstrat.on as unreasonable, and wondered at the
coion,sts’ grievances « H.s
.nabil.ty to comprehend the pos.t.ons of the rebelhous
members of the Massachusetts pol.ty ultimately undid him
AS a result ofHutchmson’s official stat.on and h,s staunch positions, opponents
nterpreted all of his aCons through a lens of host.lity and paranoia. Hutchinson handled
the Boston Massacre, for example, with a reasonable amount ofaplomb and deference
toward the rebels Ye. the opposition report of the incident represented the fracas on
March 5, 1 770 as
-“the
.ntrigues of wicked and designing men to bring us into bondage
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John Adams blamed Hutchinson
specifically, insisting that the
“‘sold'but passive instmmen, s'" and that Hut h
»'d.ers were
He, H ,
^
-Jed coolly
ebberately, with all that premeditated mahce aoains. the oe ,» t p ople in general
,
-ofi.hee.ecut.vebecameevenmoreprevalent.han,thad
J
once Hutchinson assumed the Governorship. Members of his immediate and
exten ed family held a customs position, minor judgeships, seats on the Supeoor Court
-ding the position of Chief fustice), the position of province secretary and the
—~ip colonists interpreted t.s, too, as an e.o. m collusion with the
-ercount.todommate
Massachusetts
politicsto.hee.tentoftyra„m.^
colonists:
"The coincidence of his rise ,o ,h. n ut the highest authonty and the multiplication of
offices within his extended family could not it was said h a. , be accidental Everything fitted
the pattern suggested by this evident monopoly of office
If the rebels were creative and closed-minded in their accusations against
Hutchinson and higher powers in Britain, Hutchinson, again, was not overly willing to
compromise At one point. Lord Hilsborough, Secretary of State for the Colomes, wrote
Hutchinson, requesting the latter's opinion on potential revisions in the Massachusetts
charter. While Hutchinson suggested the possibility of abandoning the charter and creating
a new one in combination with the colonists, he was mainly against changing the
Massachusetts charter, though he still sought some son of strengthening of the
executive " The energy of the opposition and the general lack of active support that
Hutchinson received from England caused him to entrench himself fiinher into the position
that the executive needed strengthening « He argued for a strong, independent executive
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nto a plebeian anarchy and eventually military rule «
HutCnson wrote and spohe lectunn, the militant colon,sts on const,tutionalism
and
.he necess.ty ohma,nta,n.n, the balance of the En„sh-model poitt.cal system » Vet
not discuss,ons Hutchinson was as little interested In
what members of the opposition had to say as they were in listentng to him He was not
.nterested ,n the give-and-tahe of debate, but rather m carding the day with his assertions
For his efforts, Hutchinson suffered not only the rebuttal from the opposition in
Massachusetts, but a reproach from England for having roused the rebels in the first
place Hutchinson had treated the colonists’ claims that their rights were being violated
“stniggle to persuade the great moderate majority of the population of the sheer
..rationality and self-destmctive nihilism of the extremists’ claims and demands
Hutchinson’s downfall came most directly as the result of the publication of letters
he had written to Thomas Whately, former Secretary to the Treasury in England regarding
the situation in Massachusetts. Benjamin Franklin had underestimated the zeal of
American patriots and sent portions of the exchange between Hutchinson and Whately
from England to Speaker of the Massachusetts House Thomas Cushing Franklin’s hope
was that the letters would assuage colonists’ enmity toward England by redirecting it at
Hutchinson, a Massachusetts native Franklin instructed that the letters were only to be
shown to a small circle of individuals and were not to be printed. Eventually, however, the
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letters circulated and raised strnnao g feehngs aga.ns. not only Hutchinson, but England
general.-
m
^
Amenca were damning to anyone looking at them with a r y iS ui n cntical eye. To the rebels, they
were positively inflammatory The most trnnW r
,
'he letters involved the claim
y Hutchinson that colonists livine so far from p ing England could not hope to enjoy all their
rights as English citizens
“‘there must hp an ok abe an abridgement of English libenies,”’” While
Hutchinson claimed a misunderstanHintr r isunderstandmg. Colonists leaped on this with vigor and vitriol
accusing Hutchinson and, by extension, England of attempting to subjugate them to
atbitra^ government Resolves from the House assened that Hutchinson was part of a
conspiracy
-to raise their own fortunes and advance themselves to posts of honor and
profit, not only to destruction of the charter and constitution of this province but at the
expense of the rights and libenies of the American colonies.'- Hutchinson's demand for
obedience again clashed with the colonists' protection of their nghts, with neither patty
acting in a particularly conciliatory manner This controversy eventually was far too taxing
for Hutchinson's already strained constitution and drove him from office, out of his
homeland and into exile in England.
To the end, Hutchinson failed to appreciate the claims of his opponents In spite of
the moderation of his political temper, Hutchinson was unable to see opposition as
legitimate, and sought to Instill adversaries with what he saw as the truth rather than to
engage them in dialogue. The final major fracas of Hutchinson’s administration was the
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as an
^ I
Hutchinson
Pa~, Oeneta, Oa,e Hu.chtnsou steahhast, te..h to pe™,t the
-e Boston hathotuuiess the au. on the tea hah been pa.
onthenu.htsa„ate.seatopa..t.at.^^^^
called a lawless and highly criminal assembly -«
,t was no, . uy I t merely that Hutchinson
m.sread public opinion, though he d.d on several occasions « I, u uat It was that he considered so
itt e of the public as legitimate political partiduanfs “ Iticip t In spite of the moderation of many
01 his stances, such as his opposition to the Stamp Act and his unwillingness to tamper
•al. ».
political system and to engage them in an effective dialogue proved to be his
undoing as governor
By the time of the Revolution, the puzzle for the Massachusetts polity had become
.he protection of their libenies against an executive they felt had become too powerful
According to the colonists, the ability to hold several offices simultaneously, combined
with control of appointments and power over the legislature placed the executive in a
position to deny them their rights The solution, ultimately, would be to place that
executive in a political system in which his duty to execute the law was joined with the
necessity that he answer to others in that system. Jefferson’s assertion that governments
are instituted to protect the rights of the governed had to be made to fit with Hutchinson’s
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perfectly reasonable assertion of the hppH fd for a government powerful enouah t
law and order niaintain
e passage of the Constitut.on of
. 7S0 Pnot to that date, the cit.zens of
h~,passed,^et.7S0,ho.e.t,aao.eee.^^^
”e~e and a poht,cal fanction
,. was a separate
car^ out the law
,t was also a
^ ^ «uty and ahtllt, to
^ ^
through the veto power ,0
check the behavior of other mst.tutlons The question of how to balance these (unctions
~
^
-e- P^Sta. Ofgovernance that
elections^ The answer in the early years of the Massachusetts Constitution was
the constitutional executive
^^^^^^^^i!^ggtJtive Propo.sed in i 77
^
The Massachusetts Assembly sent out a notice on September 17, ,776 asking the
towns whether they would consent to having the legislature draw up a constitution
Towus such as Boston, Lexington, Nonon and Stoughton balked at the Idea It was
beyond the powers of the legislature to draft a constitution, protesters claimed, and an
attempt to do so would amount to usurpation The only proper authority to delineate a
constitution would be one with a popular base, chosen expressly for that purpose. Several
.owns recommended calling a convention to draw up a plan of government It was with
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the promise that the document would he c k
freemen's approval necessat, before
^
The legislature began work
ratification, that
on June 17, 1777 and
^ntajorityofthe towns assented.^'
approved a draft of the constitution onFebruary 26
,
1778
The separation of governmental powers
,n the r
*^°"*‘"“tion proposed in 1 778
moderate at best What separation there was
u , =flfe«ively within the
legislature Politics did not take nlae„
P
.
possessing political
;“---~-er,po,lt,cstookplacew.thm
annual popu.^
legislature against one another
The proposed legislature (The Genenl r
ourt) was divided into a House of
Representatives and a Senate which:
ceedings, and each sLrha: an "Tr;;'?
nate or reject any bill, resolve or order o°r to nro"^'"
le™.nsTnTvlb^ and resolve
Clearly, the authors of the Constitution
checks on one another Propeny
meant the branches of the legislature to act as
requirements for holding office were proposed The
proposed property requirement for the Senate
This could serve to assure that the two bodies represented different i
proposed legislature held the power to establish
was twice as large as that for the House
nterests The
courts, “make and establish all manner of
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wholesome and reasonable orders . ae . laws and statutes.” levy taxes and “do all and
everything they shall judge to be for ththe good and welfare of the State, and for the
government and ordering thereof”" The judicial h t,
,, K c
'
mention, though
members of the judiciary did hold their nffit offices during good behavior, presumably
nsulatmg them from direct political influence and allowino them a certa'‘s me in autonomy
Gwen the limited separation of powers, the governor proposed ,n I V7S was guite
.He Senate and Commander-in-Chief of the state militia and Admiral of the state navy The
governor m this case was to be a legislative leader in the broadest sense He had the duty
.0 report on “the condition of the State, and, from time to time, to recommend such
nratters to their consideration, as shall appear to him to concern its good government
welfare and prosperity The property requirement for serving as governor was more
than twice that for sennng as senator, seemingly separating the proposed governor from
e other members of the Senate, perhaps for the purposes of checking them "
Even tins influence over the legislature was greatly circumscribed, however It was
true that the governor was popularly elected and that he stood apart from the rest of the
senate due to his position as its President, his duty to recommend a broad course for
legislation and the relatively expensive property requirement for holding office However,
while the Governor was popularly elected, if no candidate received a majority of the votes,
the Senate and the House together chose the victor, potentially joining the legislature and
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the executive more closely than they already were Far ft„ u
th
^ ^ independent of the Senate
•tesovernor could do httle Without the approval orat least that hod 1h- duties as Comma„der-.n-Ch,ef“ Finally them ny, governor was exolicitlv a ^
of checking the legislature
hy the Gove^rno: and Senate uS
provided that the Govemot orTnT
State, the Lieutenant Governor’ hall'be
ate to enable them to proceed on th! h
•hem by thts ConstitutL afr
"
^u urion, s Governor and Senate.^®
The Massachusetts executive proposed in 1778 yH m was not a vital member of a
---m-o«cewasne,therseparatefromtheleg,s^
among government mst.tuttons w,th di.eong tuncuons Merely one
antong Const.tut.onal epuals
.n the Senate, the Governor had l.ttle say over laws that were
passed The colonists had seen actions on the part of the Royal Governor that they
-erpreted as attempts to deny them the.r nghts Certainly the d.m.n.shing of the
powers in the proposed constitution was an attempt to safeguard those rights
prevent tyramiy The members of the legislature who drafted the Constitution of
778 proposed the executive as an ineffectual, barely existent office rather than an
institution with any significant political power of its own
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If the men who
™ore
.han cautious regarding potential tyrann" t
from alone The nature of the execut.vi e proposed in 1 77s ,
general mood in the United S,L t States regarding
execut.ve power Othe
executives that were even weaher than thts one Ueg.slative o
nferionty had become the rule amon» the states d
'
“ """"
-urned out to be even weaker
’
“
-ak
was not followed, as counclsusually appointed by the leaiciafy ' g,Slature, served to weaken.he executtve.™ Most executtveswere re.ned,n similarly to the Governor of Virginia
»ecuZ\“ State, exercise
the laws of this Commonwea1tutn™shail"“°'‘‘''’®
pretence exercisp an, ’ any
of any law, statuteor” :f ^^e
Hxecuttve power rarely entailed any sor, of check on legtslattve power and in pracltce
~s were a,most never strong, vtabie members ofa polittcal system Separa.ton of
-ers.dno.enta,mth,s,ncarnat,on,anexecu.,vewathanab,l.,to^^^
legislature.
New York was the major exception to this rule Her,re, a unitary executive existed
with no strong gubernatorial council such as existeH i i,d elsewhere He was granted the full
executive power wiih only some influence by one council on appointmeni and another on
Cep.,., „ ,pp.
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York were quite extensive He was oiven th. r° Const,tutional authority to check and directthe legislature through the use of a qualified veto P vrq I'h Providing the legislature with directionwas mandated by making it “the dutv of ,h
the legislature at every
session of the condition of the state ta ui
such matters to their
was a relatively powerful executive with official nhirt
as an important member of a
political system^'
New York's Constitutionally powerfirl executive was strong ,n practice, as well
Covernor George Clinton urged members of the other institutions to “remain w„Hn the
departments in which the constitution has placed us, and thereby preserve the same
It shall always be my strenuous endeavor, on the onehand to retain and exercise for the advantaoe of thepeople the powers with which they have invested meon the other, carefUlly
,o avoid the invasions of fitr'
rights which the constitution has placed in other persons ”
Clinton used the strong executive power to great effect He used his power as
commander-in-chief of the state militia rigorously to maintain law and order He often
recommended concerns for legislative action, usually with great influence. He wielded the
power of appointment so deftly that Alexander Hamilton could accuse him of building a
party machine Clinton also used the veto power extensively, issuing fifty-eight vetoes
between 1 777 and 1 787 Here was the firs, and most prominent example of a powerfti
executive in the nascent United States. This executive was separate from and equal to
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other branches ofgovernment so that it could exercise its
-e, ,t was a,so a v,able member of a poht.ca, system onj”""
""
given by several towns for reiectiny thr. r
onstitution proposed in 1 778 was the lack of a
ac Of a B,„ of
.ghts, propeny
,ual.hcat,ons for holdmg office and voting, the scheme of
representation and dental of voting rights to blacks r„H aS Sn s, Indians and mulattoes were also
prominent reasons for n ^
towns even found the institutions too separated
and the governor too powerful
The most common theoretical objection was that the authority of public officials
was not sufficiently grounded in the people While some respondents lauded annual
elections as
“[f]undementual in Eve^ free Government, and the best barrier against
Cornrption, and the restless passions of Mankind,” others were doubtffil of the ability of
elections alone to keep public officials untainted ™ Term limits, oaths of office and an
explicit Bill of Rights were among the suggested means of keeping elected officials
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mindful that their office wac fnr ^ ui-pu he good and that tyranny was unacceptable^" The
desire to keep government in check by keepi
important one
)ing It mindail of its popular duty was a vitally
Another important theoretical objection involved separation of powers. Some
sought to elimmate what little separation appeared in the proposed form ofgoventment
The people of Greenwich indicated that they would “approve of a General Court
Consisting of One Representative Body, with a President Presiding over the same The
returns of Hardwick and Boothbay also indicate opposition to a bicameral legislature,
while New Salem’s return is explicit “Because there is two Branches Proposed to make
the Legaslative authority When we conceive that one Branch will answer all the Purposes
of good government much Better than two The return of Spencer refers to the
executive as essentially a branch of the legislature, while Boothbay’s return notes that
executive power ought to be located in a umcameral legislature, and “never in the hands of
one man The weak separation of powers was still too strong for some tastes
Indeed, some towns rejected the notion of a governor altogether, feeling that even
the proposed executive was too powerful and too disposed to despotism The towns of
Sutton. Mendon and Bristol each sent back returns objecting to the power of the governor
generally, while other towns objected to certain specific powers of the office The people
of Hardwick noted that the proposed governor “shall be Invested with such Power which
may be to the Hurt and Damage of the good People of this State Residents of
Greenwich stated bluntly that “they will not approve of a Governor, Lieut, Governor, or
Senate The return from Boothbay noted that a governor was “needless in a free state.
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-dw,.h an their Li™.at,o„s™y become da„oerous.o.h
i b
Clearly much of the thinking in Massach,ssachusetts regarding the executive was in r upredominant attitudes throughout the states
Not all Massachusetts
residents were so deem
however Many colonists had been an.red at the R
---s,especianyXhomasHutch,„son.ske^^^^
”
judicial staf
executive, legislative and
'--~^Manytow„speoples,dedwi.hthereside„.sofUp.^
therefore, who indicated “Ako .Js It appears to us that Leoislativp r h- •
rto
g tive, Judiciary and Executivf^departments ought to be preserved more distinct,ha
. .
form the proposed
.. » h..,
c„„,„ ^ ^
. or,*.,,
Constitution’s blending of the offices ofgovernment
“I, a' mm I appears to said Town that it will
the State at one and the Same Time The return of Williamstown noted
•Ha. perhaps the Governor should be allowed two votes in the Senate, while residents of
Spencer indicated some propensity toward a veto, noting then preference
’’that the House
of Representatives has a Right to their voice in the Mlitary, as well as Cvil Officers to
Originate Or Negative a Choice ”» The return from Boston noted
Id' a'nd th!f''''i‘r
^re so blend-
[Generan Coun
® °f ‘he
1 e al] may monopolize to themselves a Variety
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«He be. Fo™ of
and the Members confined^tn
'
“’'re>y distinct.
Incumbrance particular Duties without
Keeping the executive Ie«i<;Iati\ o o ^ • j- •
’ ® ^lative and judicial offices in distinct
powerful executive came in the “Essex Result a
- invention ofthe towns ofEssex
ounty met and issued a detailed report The bulk of thp ie work was written by Theophilus
- "““ «- -n*. P..PO- c.„.„
.
replace the rejected Constitution Manv of th.y the specific criticisms of the proposed
Constitution involve the executive
Hssas
tut.on ,s liable to exception That the seventeenth^anicle
executae T"""
"
‘>«cause the supremeutiv officer is not vested with proper authority andbecause an independence between the executive and leofs
exceptionable, because a due independence is not kept up
PoZrrno" rf
'^S'slative, judicial, and executivepowe s, nor between any two of them.
The principles supponing the judgments and recommendations of the convention included
the notion that legislative, executive and judicial power ‘•ought to be in different hands,
and independent of one another, and so ballanced, and each having that check upon the
other, that their independence shall be preserved,- If these guidelines are not followed.
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and power is consolidated
“the pm/A
^ rnment will be absolute, whether these n
hands ofone or a large number
The descnpnon of an.deal execu,.ve Office indicates.Hants o
"'-“~--w..Hootoppos.t.on,and.ocontto,a,r^^^"^
state, who should nffiinge then, -
Constitution- A unitarv
^
™der the proposed
A-.a.e„e,otoneco„posedoffewnte.hets,wasnecessa..o
ensure proper performance
,n office, while eleconh n
hy either the legislature or the ud.
' ‘ ^
. .
‘"dependence and accountability ’«
^pecitic recommendations reuardina r
„
,
^
^ P-y councl elected by the
ouse from members of the Senate, sole control by the Oovernor over the m,l,t.a term
--ota.,on,noffice,andanunco„d,t.onalveto^
'
“ viable member of a political system andy given power necessary to
carry out his duties.
Many of the towns who responded m any deta.l to the Constitution proposed ,n
i ns were concerned about mamtaining a popular bas.s for government as a means of
checking potentially tyrannical institutions The office of the Governor figured prominently
n many of those concerns Any separate, reasonably powerfii, executive was conceived by
residents who felt that a strong, independent executive was a necessary feature of ffee
pohtical institutions. These residents were certainly no more in favor of tyranny than those
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who opposed a strong executive The task then, , was to create an executive that was
independent and strong enough to perform the duties of the off non t ice and yet would not
become tyrannical in Ihe process.
. here was more, and more influential, objection to the lack of power in the
utive, and particularly to the lack of a separate executive department. The voters m
Massachusetts had rejected the Constitution of 1 773 not only because they found it to be
legislature had drafted
,t “One of the principal reasons underlying the rejection of the
of 1 778, m shon, was opposition to a constitution made by a General Couit
fhe members of which had shown themselves to be anything but disinterested in the
organization of the government -» With the Constitution of 1780. correclions in these
perceived defects came, helping lead to its passage A separate executive, stronger than
the one proposed in 1 778, emerged in a constitution proffered by a constitutional
convention.
In Febmai^ 1 779. the General Coutt sent questions to the towns asking, first,
whether the townspeople desired a new constitution and, second, whether they would
empower their representatives to call for a constilutional convention More than two-
thirds of the towns favored a new constitution drafted by a convention called for that
purpose.'"' The convention convened in Cambridge on September I, 1779, many ofits
members possessing instructions keeping them mindftil of the objections to the previous
efforts in this vein. James Bowdoin was elected President of what would later be called “as
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great a number of men of learnina talent ^ w •
patriotism as has ever been c^n^ ^ u
any earlier period.”’"^
convened here at
Ihe^ecutive nf 1 7«n
ThedraftersoftheCo„s,itutio„of,780
then had
An Pnp •
’
^ balance
energetic government was a necessitv A. r ny ames Bowdoin indicated “A on
-Hou.W to e.e.
..e,
.s at best, hn. a
.e,e. p.eee of„ac.„e. ...o^vll
-c,onoh_and.at.t.a„.^
epubhc Accord,ng to the records of the Const, tut,onai Convent,on: is the
-nceofafreeaepuhhc that the
Peop,ehegovernedh..edU.soft^^^^
™ .ng Presu.ahl, when laws were no longer of the peoples own
.ah.ng the
~hadheco.et.rann,caloroppress,ve.hes,a,edpur^
as to prevent those who are vested with authonty front beconung oppressors ” The
was to enable governnten, to protect peoples, oghts w„e
.ah,ng „ difhcul, for
that same government to deny those rights
.^nual elections were only one method of preventtng an energet.c government
from becomtng tyrannical, however The concepts of separation of powers and checks and
ba.ances permuted both strength and control regarding government and were far more
effecvely employed in the Constitut.on of 1780 than they had been ,n 1778 an address
introducing the new Constitution, Bowdo.n wrote
Unless a due Proportion of Weigh, is given to each ofthe Powers ofGovernment, there will soon be a Conftt-
,on of the whole An Overbearing of any one of its Partson the rest, would destroy the Balance and accelerate
Its D,ssolut,on and Ruin The Powers ofGovernment
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must be balanced Thosp
Ihe Administration should ha 'I
hem, as are requisite to It'
^
spective Places, and such Checks
every Branch of Power as^rii^p ^
Its becoming formidable and prevent
wealth. to the Common-
Bowdoin went on to indicate the specific nature of the separation f"'P'‘^'"'°nofpowers and checks
balances located in the Constitutional arrangement
The House of Representatives is intended as the R
sentative of the Persons and the Senate of1 f”'"'
of the Commonwealth IThe Ciml f
negative on each m„l, . u Power of a
ofMen are liable ,omiIUwaTa%™
pe:pTeXL'rs;r'^^^^^
the People ar large,
^ by
Bowdoin tunher noted that, in addition to the other branches of government, the
Governor's Council could also act as a check on the executive
Bowdoin IS striking a balance between strong government and controlled
government, between energy and accountability He indicates that the executive is, and
must be, strong to prevent a potentially tyrannical legislature yet he also goes to great
pains to remind people that this is, after all, a popular office It will be held in check by
other branches of government, by the Governor's Council, and by popular elections The
Governor is, and should be, both strong and accountable. This balance also illustrates the
two fimctions of the Governor The need for a strong executive points up in the fact that
the executive has been given sufficient power to remain an independent political institution
with a duty and ability to execute the law The need for control is indicated by making the
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Governor a member of a political system in which he must be wilHng to perform politics ifaction is to be taken
™s balance between strength an. control
,s
..rect, mb,cate, in the Const,tut.on
--- powers Of the Const.tut,ona,e.ecut,ve
.„ualelect.on^^
powers an. chechs an. balances are establ.she. Vet ,t ,s not mere, left up to elect.ons
r
^
- - oghts Of i„.,v,.uals
-n^ement The Const,tut,on of I VSO promotes a m,n. set un.er wh,ch the Constituhon
- other laws shoul. be respecte. to the utmost The Consututton urges members of
each
, nst,tut,on to see other branches of government as epual to themselves an. to hoi.
them in appropriate esteem
The Preamble sets out an explicit
political society
separation of powers and the purpose of law in a
“,rut‘,on of a Con-
rfmlu
°^°“''^™"’ent, to provide for an equitable mode
and a fhifhfiT^’
“ “ ™Pa«>al interpretation.
Earlier ,n the Preamble, ^security" is ind.cated to be ‘The power of enjoytng, in safety an.
.ranqutlity, their natural rights, and the blessings of life - The preamble thus d,splays the
necessity for a government that ,s powerful enough to protect peoples’ rights yet must
also be kept in check: “And whenever these great objects are not obtained, the people
have a right to alter the government, and to take measures necessary for their safety,
prosperity and happiness.
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l,«fcXX..dx„X
government to become too powertlil Article XX asserts that .AA executive power has a duty
respect&l of the law and the legislature
“The power of suspending the laws, or the
derived from it. to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall
expressly provide for
.Article XXIX indicates the need for “a ' , •an impartial interpretation
ot the laws and administration of justice Tn u- •justice. o ensure this, judges are allowed tenure
during good behavior and fixed salarip? Fmoii,
y, separation of powers is cemented in Part
I, Article XXX:
n the Government of this Commonwealth, the legisla-
tive department shall never exercise the executive^and
judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or ei-
ther of them The judicial shall never exercise the legi-
slative and executive powers, or either of them: to the
end It may be a government of laws and not men
’ '
ill
These articles show a desire to maintain not only a separation of powers, but also to
maintain a respect for the law on the part of members of the separate institutions of
government. While the executive would have veto power over the Genera] Court and
appointment power ofjudges, provisions are included to encourage the Governor to
maintain a due respect for the law and other institutions of government
71
'•»*-
."zirr:r,:.“r“"* »'
piety, justice moderation tP
to those of
gaii^, are absolutely necessaTt^pTele^^S"^
of libeny. and to maintain a free govem2nem
ought, consequently, to have a n^ni.
™ People
those pnnctples, in fte choice of then offi'"'”'”,"
*°
sentatives And they have a riaht t
and repre-
givers and magistrates an exact anY^‘'“‘'^^
of them,
.n the format,on and e ecutioZTh f
^aty for the good adm,n,strat.onrrc:tot:^^^^^^^^^^
r
-e ofr-tca, among many
.hose duty
.t
.ould be to see, through
‘
^
- p™-ed Thts publtc tms, mean, that
---ad a nght to expect a certam character Of their elected olhctals It^
ofiicals had, as pan of that character, a duty to the public to respect the
Consftutton and to respect other Constitutional institutions
Pan 2 of the Constitution estabitshes the
.nst.tutional framework of the
Commonwealth Separation of powers and checks and balances are agatn the guiding
pnnciples The General Court ,s dtvtded tnto ‘hrWe and Ho,,se ofRe„a,,.es
House on “the principle ofequality/- The propeny qual.fication for the House is one-
thtrd that of the Senate, buttress.ng the check,ng fUnctton of the two branches by
providtng them with officials of d.ffering interests - Members of thejudicial branch, as
indtcated above, hold their offices during good behavior, a, least nominally Insulating them
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opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial r
ourt, upon important questions of law
and upon solemn occasions This is also indicative of a respect for orh '^ t t er institutions
.^at framers of the Massachusetts Constitution were attempting to instill into the memhers
Of Its political institutions. The relationship was one which was to revolve around the law
-
ro™.l.„on,„„ ji,
were to be held in the utmost esteem
e powers ot the governor were similar to those in the rejected Constitution of
1 778 In addition to being the •^Supreme Executive Magistrate,” he was to hold the
position of Commander-i„ Chief, the pardomng power and substantial appointment power.
Certain of these powers are subject to the advice of the Gubernatorial Council, of which
the Governor was president and had “full power and authority, from time to time, at his
discretion, to assemble and call together.""’ No mention is made of any sort of legislative
advisory fonction on the part of the governor The closest to this is that the Governor,
with at least five of the nine members of the council, “shall and may, from time to time,
hold and keep a council, for ordering and directing the affairs of the Commonwealth,
according to the laws of the land ,4gain, the property requirement for the
Governorship was the highest of any public office, presumably providing a governor with
interests different from other office holders Executive power was placed in one official
who was to be advised by a Governor’s Council, The governor was invigorated by
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removing him from the Sen;itP Rather than merely another senator
a separate institution in which the
’
perform hts duties sufficiently
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^
, the prohlen, arose ofhow to h
™.. I..
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.h,
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power veto
I^.ve?shalltli:?LwTnTha^^
wh^u^tiu:" «over?or^!:'rL:
signify his approbation h
he shall
after such reconsideration,
tJo th“ds Ihe'^H c'
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House of Representativpc u ii Senate or
•N«.»n.,.t”S “J
« .r*
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w.h
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that passed would have to be broad enough, and presumably just enough, to satisfy
examination by members of various political institutions Action might be more difficult to
take, but the actions that were taken would be more thoroughly thought through as a
result.
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The executive that emerged in ,he Constitution of 1 780
^een proposed eariier and was stronger than molr
While it was not strong by Twent h
^
was strong for ,ts time Here was a pol tci litical executive dr.
strong enough to aiiow Its occupant to rf
-,d
°™
The
easonably independent of other branches and they were prevent d
encroaching
extensively into his territory Ye, the Go
iher
elso held responsible toConstitution by both the electorate and members of oth i
he was suffi i
institutions. While
was also held in check hv fhr. l •
’
the government of MassachiispttQ ruse'ts The governor was charged with executing the law ye,
w as also a member of a political system in which he had ,on to contend with competing
inierests and competing institutions Possession of the veto power was significant in this
*iave little say in most matters Under the Constitution of 1
7
S0
,
with a strong separation of
powers and a governor who could say, •No,” the executive became both secure and an
important member of a political system ,f agreements were to be reached on policy
matters, the governor, consent became necessary, unless a super-maprity in each house
could be secured, presumably a difficult task in the face of a governor's opposition.
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Yet what would happen if these tu/n f.
Perfo^g poa„c3, eo..e. H„.
.ov.e
,eaae..p. Ho.
.. ,e.
.r.e
.e
.„e,.o. o. .e execo... o.ce x,
that coalitions could be built and elections could be won? Politics in this
among and within Constitutional institutions,
branches of government
sense takes place
and the executive is one of three coequal
two early governors who
defined.
John Hancnrk
concerned with the law. John Hancock and Caleb Strong
were particularly successftil in providing leadership
were
as it has been
over
John Hancock served as Governor of Massachusetts from 1780 through
,785 and
-hen agahi from 1787 through
,793. Prior to his election as Massachusetts' c«
executive, he had served as president of the Provincial Congresses in 1774 and 1775
selectman of the Town of Boston and as president of the Contmenta, Congress for
two years.- Certainly Hancock's legislative experience would contribute to his
understanding of the workings of poHtica, institutions and Ins attitude toward the Ge:
Court when Governor of Massachusetts.
Notice that when Hancock served as Governor, political parties m any formal
sense did not exist. Pohtics at this time was organized around interests.'^ Hancock
certainly faced opposition, though it was not partisan in the strictest sen.se of that word
Several of the other prominent pubhc figures of his tune considered Hancock nothuig
more than a demagogue. John and Samuel Adams, James Warren, Eibridge Gerry and
James Bowdoin all attempted to thwart Hancock's reelection attempts and were
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remarkably
unsuccessful Hancock
a
, ,
'
'0 ‘he poin, where he
;;'°^-----enownasroh,slea.rsh.p.,^
well have been h.sleadersh,p style wh,chkepr,m popular
a nouon of respect for the General Court as a coequal political
.nstitut.on, Hancock
was hesitant to employ the veto Tn a
sage to the General Court on February 25 1790
-----swtthgteatreluctancethatlstateob,ct,o„s.^
”
Houses, but the duty I owe the people and the Const.tut.on, must nse supenor to eve.
Other consideration The racp at r, a ,case at hand
.nvolved a resolve passed by the General Court
to allow the dtvorce of Dan, el and Ab.gal Ch,ckenng Hancock’s react,on to thts
thus, the principles he held most dear
The legislature had granted the Chichenngs the divorce they sought. The objection
cock held to this was that the General Court did not have the Constitutional authorit>'
to grant the divorce:
When the people established the present Constitution ofCommonwealth they gave to the several departments
safe al T,"T"'’ f “"^idered to be
stmcoo
““ght to have such a con-
elThoto'^™
Authority to hear and grant divorces. Hancock notes, had been Constitutionally bestowed
upon the Governor and the Council ‘“until the Legislature shall, by law make other
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provision The General ^ i
“•"'I C“”
.1. „ ,1,
Supreme Judicial Court. At no time had thp i • ithe legtslature ever held the Constitut.onal power
aiiowed by an
.nshtutton which was not Const.tut.onally empowered to do so Pemtittino
the dtvorce would violate the separation of powers
Hancoch goes on to elaborate h,s op.nton of the
.nst.tut.on of ntarnage It is a vttal
Ptece Of c,v„ socety, accord,ng to h,., and the
,e,s,a.ure should tahe care to ensure it is
no. tahen hghtly That ,s a seconda^ po,n. ,n Hancock's message, however H,s pn„a^
concern
,s the
,nv,olab,li.y of the Const, tut,on Separahon of powers and Constitutronal
pnncpies should be respected by those
,nd,viduais
,n whon, the public has placed the,r
tarst, accord,ng to Hancock His veto, and thus h,s pol.t,cal conduct.
,s not based on his
tespect for the ,nst,tut,on of ntarnage. Rather ,t ,s based on h,s respect for the institutions
estabhshed ,n the Constitution of 1780 Hancock bases his politrcal leadershtp in the
Const,tut,on.
,n the fact that he and ™any others have been granted the task of uphold,,
the law, supporting peoples' rights and safeguardtng the populace from tyranny.
With a deep respect for the Constitution and its separatton ofpowers came a
similar esteem for the other institutions located the document's arrangement Hancock
evtnced a respect for the General Court as a body representative of the will of the people,
whose authority was grounded ,n the Constitution In a message to the General Court on
June 8
,
1 789
, Hancock opens by indicattng the importance of the legislative body and the
people's right to have their will expressed through that body He reiterates his hesitancy to
use the veto at all, given his confidence “that the discussion of the public business will be
‘Ig
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attended with candour and unanimity •"« He continues:
“I
measures which shall be by you
shall readily concur in those
pf pp, Cp„,„,.„ “ «»
his
and he is sure to be
own
as respectful of those as he is of
f"'
.1. 1.W1.P.. ,.,p„p
.„„ ,
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= nse of acquiescence, has been noted InHancock s activities, he indicates a definite sense that he
,s carrying out the will of the
S'slature at many times Several of Hancock
’s com
,1,1 . rv
“mmunications begin similarly
,o a letterdated December 8 1780 “Tn .r.
’ ^ consequence of a Resolve of rh.
, ,
r t the General Coun of
Massachusetts ” In a message on June 1 0 1 788 H ,,1 788, Hancock alludes to his having suggested
—es for regulating the State Militia. He is still deferential to the Oener. Court
owever allowing that its members
‘Vill discover defects which have escaped
„y
. .
...
..
^
.1 ,p
.i.
-d
.„ ^ ^
General Court is an institution to which HanmrL-cock owes some courtesy, the governorship is
an institution equal to the General Court He thus feek . H f •els a duty to guide it as it guides him.
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tn6 rest to the General Court T-r»:>L un He indicates as much m June of 1789:
I shall communicate to you such matters from time totime, as I may find to be necessarv for , 1,
business is Ifely to call for your attention but "teiomand ordmaiy concerns of supporting government
.n the same speech, Hancoch makes certain recommendations regarding the newly
instituted federal Constitution, but they are puite broad Mainly, his recommendations
relate to the character necessary for a free citizen.
-The exercise of the social and pnvate
virtues,” and education are the most vital attributes Hancock mentions - Finally, using
broad, general statements, Hancock recommends that measures be taken to ensure the^
“honor and credit” of Massachusetts, especially the issue of public debt When Hancock
gave more specific recommendations, they were either on more mundane matters or on
matters directly relating to his Constitutional duties such as Commander-in-CWef This
would cettainly fall into place with a respect for Congress's capacities as an institution. He
is acting as one political institution charged with a Constitutional duty while allowing
Other institutions to act in a similar manner
Hancock's gubernatorial administrations also encompassed the framing and
adoption of the United States Constitution. Here, as elsewhere, he urged obedience to the
law and promoted institutional behavior befitting members of a political system In a
message to the General Court in January of 1789, Hancock indicates that it is his duty to
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remind members of the Genp^i ^ .era, Coun
,ha.
.he federal Cons...u„on
.us. conr.and
obedience as does
.he Sta.e Cons.i.u.ion h^t'tu. ,
Heno.ed.ha.Massachuse..si.se,fwasnowa
7 ^ --- .He federal Co„s.l.u.,on and
Hu.
.he line which
govemmen. of
.he Commonwealth is well described mhe Constitution, & ought to be obviously established& carefiilly maintained, & such provisions ou-ht to be
.he c\tzers?fTeV
men w t he / Commonwealth, that all reasonablee ill b satisfied, nor indulge a wish to derive aidfrom any other tribunal, than those the state provides
Being a member of the federal system, for Hancock, comprised principles similar to those
entailed m being a member of the Massachusetts political system a respect for the
capacities of other members and institutions within the system, and a deep respect for the
Constitutional bases of authority
This did no. exclude, of course, popular limits on authority and public officials’
duty to the populace, as Hancock goes on to remind his audience that consi.mions and
governments are established “by the free consent of the People Nor does a respect for
.he federal Cons.itution exclude keeping an eye on the interests of the residents of
Massachusetts:
[W]e are to continue to support our own Government
with unabating anxiety for its welfare & prosperity In-
deed, the general Government of the United States is
founded in an assemblage of Republican Governments,
& It depends essentially on these not only for its dignity
& energy, but for its very existence in the form it now
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^ed
possesses, therefore, whatever ic hCommonwealth has a tenH support the
interest
Massachusetts public officials, then, had a duty ,0 look aft th
bu. also to be
.indffil oftthe ftedetal Constitution As wnh th
^
n it e state’s political
arrangement, this meant respecting the federal Tn , •
,,
' as equal with the
‘ Constitution and show,no a certain a
.
'
‘‘"’°™‘°f<''=f^^^nce when necessary Italso meant checking the federal an^ government when necessary
Van Beck Hall claims that “Hancnrf ^ i uock, a lazy but shrewd politician, dodat
issues That dodginu of issues hna
' of ^
-yie ofleadersMp through
« IC antock was quite successful electorally While Hare ry may not have taken bold
stands on divisive issues, executive leadership at the time did nor^ ^ necessarily require them,
milarly. Hancock’s respect for the General Coun and its capacities may well have led
to prefer that sort of broad leadership Hancock’s playing out of the executive
cHailenge resulted m the constitutional executive On the one hand, the official was an
ecutive This meant that he was one of several institutions designed to affect the law
The other institutions were his equals and held duties as important, even if those duties
fferent On the other hand, the official was constitutional This meant that his
authority, while ultimately popular, was grounded in the Constitution The executive was a
ntentber of a political system and, given his veto power, had to be considered in decisions
regarding promulgation of the laws In practice, this meant an executive showed a deep
respect for separation of powers and the legislative branch Authority was based in the
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itution while duty requued allegiance to the public good. Leadership was on very
broad terms, reflecting a notion of the legislature as the law making body.
Caleb Strong
While John Hancock faced opposition, he did not face anything like a political
party. Caleb Strong did. Strong served as governor from 1800 through 1807 and again
front 1812 through 1816. His administrations mark a period when poht.cal parties had
developed to the point where they affected political activity m Massachusetts, though no.
as Significantly as they would by the 1830’s. Oscar and Mary Handlin write that political
parties were based primarily around national issues and at this time had h.tle effect on
state matters. Indeed, he substantial yeomanry of the State,’ who voted for Jefferson,
also elevated the merchant Federalist Caleb Strong to the governorship.”'"
It has been mdicated that one significant aspect of Strong’s leadership is that he
was able to rise above partisan divisions. A memorial to Strong noted that fierce partisan
divisions over whether to side with the French or the British had rent Massachusetts
political life asunder by 1800. The time was one of ’’pohtical agitation and party strife,”
yet Strong managed to win election seven consecutive years.'* After a hiatus from public
life. Strong was again caUed into poUtical service upon the outbreak of the War of 1812,
“in the hope, that by the wisdom and conciliatory firmness of his administration, the
Commonwealth might be preserved from the disorder, and turbulence, and manifold evils,
private and public, with which she was threatened.”'^' Strong was thought to be politic
enough:
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that he alone could anneasp o
people, and restore comparatte plTe toHe was elected, but he brought nn
community
to the chair He strictiv m ^ u- resentment
of those who had been driven frtmTffic'f
and resisted all importunity to
This testimonial delivers an armrtitoaccurate assessment of Strong’s attitudes as governor
He notes that
“[tjhere is no evil to which free Governments are more exposed than the
prevalence of party spirit The extreme violence of this spirit degrades the character of a
nation and Vitiates the morals of a people Pnhi.v rr • i .Public officials should rise above party spint
because
-’our impanial conduct will prove, that we are faithful agents of the
Commonwealth, and not the lp;iriprc • *u iiui me leaders or instruments of a nartvr p y He warns at one point
against
.he effects of pan.sanship m the press: ’the Morals and Liberties of the People will
be in danger if the free Presses in the United States are disgracehilly prostituted to
Faction and Falshood
With the development of rudimentaty political patties, the question of patronage
became an imponant one Strong referred on many occasions to the criteria he considered
necessary for appointment to office
n the distribution of public employments, it is of import-
ance to the reputation and tranquility of the State, that
appointments should be made with impartiality
,
and with
a due regard to superior talents and meritorious services-
But as virtue and submission to the Laws are essential to a
Republic, and form the only sure basis of its prosperity—
these qualifications must, I think, be in a peculiar manner
requisite, m those who are appointed to office in such a
overnment for a man who is not under the influence of
moral principles, can have no just claim to the public confidence.
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Strong elsewhere indicates a desire c i‘re
‘hose for publick office, who are most
-.nsutshe. for
..hthr.es anh ffitesnr. h. whatever name of poht.ca, O.stmchon the.
If party affihation was not to gu.de pubhc offic.als whtle ,n office, what should^
Wh„e renundtng the Genera. Court of the,r dut.es. Strong refers ohen to the Const,tut.on
Rather than pomting out spec.fic objects for legislators’ attent.on. Strong would
refer them to their dut.es under the Massachusetts Constitution '
the Const,tution rather than the poht.cai party Strong’s v.s.on of leadersh.p involved an
ahthty to nse above part.san d.tferences
,nto a respect for the inst.tut.onal sett.ng in which
the governor found h.mself Const.tut.onal duty should supplant any part.san learhngs a
public official may possess
at times
Cues should come from
Strong is also qu.te respectful of the separation of powers and hrs place as an
executive One of the objects of legislation, according to Strong, is to “prov.de for the
intpamal interpretation and fa,thfi,l execution ofthe laws On May 31
,
1803
,
Strong
reminded the members ofthe Genera. Court that they had been granted the legislative
power, and that the framers of the Massachusetts Constitution had done their best to
assure the autonomy of the judical branch His respect for the separation of powers
extended to a respect for the Constitution and the law generally, “Our Consritut.ons have
Liberty as their guiding Principle,” Strong stated, “but this liberty is reasonable and
subordinate to the laws In June of 1801
,
Strong urged that “Obedience to the Laws,
and Respect for constitutional Authority, are essential to the character ofgood
citizens,”'” He certainly encourages such characteristics in Massachusetts’ public officials
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as well: “The members of the Onwomment w,ll on
.heir part think themselves obliged to
encourage by their example a love of order w
““
‘he laws "» Earlier, he hadn
.cated that laws must he Respected hy those who make and execute them
and directing the legislature, that the two are icoequal
.nstitutions with a responsibility to
Coun To you. Gentlemen, the legislat.ve authority of the Commonwealth is committed
-n dtschargtng thts tmportan. tmst, your del.berate reflect.ons w.ll he employed to
estabhsh such Laws for the welfare of the State, as you may think necessary- Hts
respect tor the General Court appears in hts respect for thetr Constitutional power as law
makers He notes that
..Our Constituents now enpy Peace and Tranqu.hty whatever
more can be done to mehora.e the.r Condition or increase their Security, you Gentlemen
-.0 In several instances. Strong allows that he wtll
..cheetfhlly concur” with any laws
“that may be calculated to secure to them the benefits, of a mtld and jus. Govertmtent
In his addresses and messages to the General Court, Strong is careful to indicate that he
has performed the tasks assigned htm as executive He is eager to use his position to
“promote Harmony among the several Branches of Government ”
-He thus offers the
General Court the deference and respect it deserves as a Constitutional institution on a
level with the executive.
This respect for the legislature did not prohibit Strong from advising the General
Court as to matters he felt required their attention His recommendations, like Hancock’s
157
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^;;"
^
-- ~ n,0. spec.
_.s .Han Hanco.
a
.
or example,
‘^e laws may be duly executed, pernri, me to suggest
.he
-P-ency ormahtng some add,
.tonal prov.s.on hor suppress,
ng ho..erles whtch are no.
established or allowed by the le»islatnrp ”'59 * , ,° a u e A. another po.nt. Strong recommended
el,m,na.,on of the death penalty “ On more than one occasion S,ion, trong transmitted letters
»«
... w.,
his legislattve leadership was more along the lines of
I shall cheerfully concur with you in any measures thatmay tend to encourage agriculture and the liberal and
The general recommendations that Strong made were consistently similar He
often indicated that it would be to the benefit tK r>benefit of the Commonwealth to promote morality
among the residents of Massachusetts Educat.on and religion receive great emphasis in
Strong's speeches as “those Institutions, whtch form the manners and morals of the
people, and which tend to inspire them with venerat.on for the Supreme Being, with
reverence for jus. authority, and respect for themselves He promoted agricultural and
manufac.ur,ng interests in his messages and urged penal reform '« Strong also regularly
urged a fiscal responsibility, the need for “a prudent economy in the administration of
revenue ’>« The program that Strong urged, if it was broad, was also consistent
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-a s to respect He
.ndicated
“[o]bl,gat,o„s to support the federal Co f
weii'“Ti, fj , onstitution” asll The federal government provided a miliiade militaoi protection for all the states This
S For this reason alone, he asserted the national. ® "“ona government deserved the resnect
eneral Court the need to do their Constitutional dut, i„ selecting electors for the
jsjm, as the governor was a member of the Massachusetts Constitutional system, and
held a duty to respect
.he other members of that system
the federal system required the states to maintain a political presence Here,
ercsed his role as a political actor while maintaining his devotion to the
ordered to call out a detachment of the Massachusetts militia He did not do
» because, after consulting with members of the Supreme Judicial Court,
nhed'irefd h"''"''?’ ^“"“"dhon of the U-t Stat s did not demand a compliance with that re
all the o r d
“ *
“P™™' by
th f
of the government, and by
se«Tlo“ M
*e people of Massachu-
etts should remember, that he was, in his own estima-hon guarding them and their rights against the encroach-
ments of unconstitutional power.
Here is a stark example of the executive challenge. Strong is assigned a duty he must
execute according to the law. Yet he is a member of a political system with interests to
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protect He must guard against tyranny and uphold
he turns to the federal and state Constitutions
people’s rights To meet the challenge,
documents.
and assens a decision based on those
In his reconciliation ofthe roles of the executive <str ^e, Strong understands the office of
governor as a const.tut.ona, executive He is one of a set of separate institutions charged
w.th protecting peoples’ nghts through the insttument ofthe law He has enough power
that he IS able to do his job effectively Other institutions have their jobs to perform, and
deserve as much respect as the governorsWp, despite their differing Unctions Yet these
nstitutions are Constitutional Their authority derives from the Const.tut.on and the ability
each branch has to check the other to prevent tyranny While other institutions deserve
respect, if they are acting unconstitutionally, they need to be stopped If policy is to be
enacted, it must survive all branches Strong adds to Hancock’s conception ofthe polit.cal
executive by asserting a need to rise above potentially lethal partisan division and by
displaying an ability to recommend more specific measures than Hancock had
Conclusion
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was ratified whtle one proposed two years earlier
that had contained a substantially weaker executive branch had been rejected Separation
of powers and the veto power in the 1 780 document allowed for a stronger executive who
was also an important member of a political system These two functions ofthe Governor,
the political and the executive, became the two pieces ofthe executive challenge John
Hancock and Caleb Strong were both able to provide leadership by forming a coalition
based on a program of governance which was electorally successful To deal with the
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-anen,e an. ena.e
.He offieeHCe.
.o
,ea.e.H,p, HancocH an. S.non,
Of a se. on„s...u.ions wHH a duty
.o p.o.ec. peoples' ngH.s
.Hrou,H
.He law THe
governor was separa.e from
.He legisla.ure and
.hejudicia.y and h.s funcions were
differen. from
.Heirs As a cons.iru.ional office i.s a„,h„ v
. u. on.y was based in .he Cons.i.u.ion
Th,.
d,»„ „ p„„,„
^
^^
location of political au.Hority It also mean, a recn. , rrespect for separation of powers and for
.He
cHer brancHes ofgovernment and thetr capac.ies THis was combtned with a willingness
.0 gutde those other brancHes ,f necessary and check them tf they overstepped the.r
constitutional boundaries It also meant an ability to rise above
partisan divisions and provide more specific policy leadership
potentially dangerous
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CHAPTER 2
the partisan
administrator
n»ni u ,
that standard.' Whilepartisan battles erupted esneciallv rip ca y dunng Strong's tenure, part.es as self-sustainino
organ,zattons that worked for the.r own benefit were no,
..
. Massachusetts’s
po Itical culture They would become so by the 1840'
r
"°'^bly with the election ofGeorge N Briggs as Governor
With the establ.sh.nent of organized and respected noiv ,political parties, the
Governorship became a partisan
.nstitution Rather ih,
,
.
'"^'>tu,ion whose occupant
derived authority from the Constitution
. Sovemorship now denved legitimacy and
authomy from the pol.tical party. Rather than one of a se, oft institutional players whop™«.d
P.n, C.„,
^ ^
judged solely by Constitutional measure It wac, was now a part.san task, and the wishes of
other members of the pol.tical party had to be taken into account
The trans.t.on to a part.san pol.t.cal culture occurred gradually throughout the first
nineteenth century Brooks represented the last of the Governors who could
claim any strong connect,on to the Revolut.on Once the supply of Revolutionaty War
heroes had been depleted, cand,dates needed some other basis on which to establish their
candidacies Pol.tical parties arose to fill the void ieft by this absence.^ Yet parties d.d not
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in
e
^^“''-P-^<‘°~Massachuse«spo,«,ca,Hf.^
• assac use„s pCa.os, Wd,„g
,o GeoflVey B.odgen, ^The par,, dica.ed
,e™s of
'
---- op, de.e™,ned wHa. .. woo,d . rewarded wr.
P0l..ca, eminence, and «.d Cose on po.rriea,
.nnovarion or rndependence
--.cXWOreenda,eser.edasOo.r„or,nrHe™d,s.0.s,d.n,,„o^
B96 fames Nesmr.h saw fir to dedrcate h.s biography of Greenhalge
‘^rjo rhe Republ.can
^an. of Massachoserrs, ro whose generoos and echos,asr.c soppor, Governor Greenhai.
.0 H.m ,n h.s ,ife - When Greenha.ge was hrs. eiecred Governor, accord,ng ,o Nesrcrh
Whe Repobhcan pany of Massachosens had honored him wirh rhe hrghesr office ,n
.heir
aift.”"
Party Machinpr^/
The Constirorional execor.ve had been kep. ,n check by other consrito.ional
.ns.,fo.,ons The execorive was given sofficienr strength to cany oo. his doties throogh a
system of separation of powers, bo. was kept from becomrng tyrannical throogh a system
orchecks and balances He was a member of a poi,.,cal system w,th a duty to execote rhe
w With the relocation of politics from Constirorional institotions to the electoral arena,
political parries became important as both checks on the elected execo.ive and soorces of
strength The governor derived the strength to accomplish any tasks from his political
party, while the necessity of holding together the diverse coalitions that comprised it and
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answering the opposition kent thpp ne Crovemor in check Th^ rr^
the th
•
^ l^ke-minded individuals seeing that
' ““ “ *“
— .f... 0„™, „„
members of the party d,d “^though old parties were disappeanng and men were
" ‘
™
democracy [in Massachusetts politics! co„u ,uP S] uld not be removed Those who considered
themselves democrats must form their own party Rather rh»F y K t an counting on one
Constitutional institution to check another members of .he i"’^h t polity sought to form and
sustain political parties so that powerful individuals could be checked
Opposing panies would want to check the power of a governor belonging to the
ther pam Marcus Morton, a Democrat, took office in 1840
,
having been elected to the
norship the year before The legislature was dominated by Whigs, however:
'‘^.hough Monon at last had won after more than ten years in open contest for the
governorship, he stood alone at the head of a hostile government - The govermnent was
deemed hostile based solely on panisan affiliation, and Morton, “would be opposed at
Benjamin Butler, upon his election to the Governorship in 1882
,
found that
the “legislature was in large majority against me In my council every member but one
was opposed to me,”‘ This was largely a partisan matter, as Butler had bolted the
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dominant Republican party and joined th n
Governor’s office
'
«ses out often I told the truth th > M
"“"S*' ' now confess that itwas accidental”’ In the election of u .
.
rather than defending Whig candidates, the
Boston /I /A/.v “devotpfl itc mns to unrestrained abuse of all Democratic aspirants
opposition party was not the sole means of checking power The party of the
ornor worked toward that end as well The party employed various tools and
P-dures to enforce its domination of political life m Massachusetts and to keep the
~
-- whtle allowing administration of the laws One of the earliest examples
o. a self-conscious political machine was David I lenshaWs Democratic party organisation
.he late eighteen thirties I lenshaw was one of a group of men who had founded the
r/t.vwtr/r, an anti-consci'vative newspaper in I sot ii ji - r'er, I S2
1
I le and his friends controlled
femocratic party politics in Massachusetts by the mid 18,10's,
The lirst aspect of the party machine to note ,s that tt was hierarchical A central
committee largely controlled the party's activities Henshaw controlled the Democratic
ntachine in his capacity as Collector of the Port of Boston "Henshaw, |T K
| .Simpson,
l Andrewl Dunlap, and Nathaniel and Charles G Greene, editors ofthe.VhUc™,.,, made
up .he Central
.State Committee of the Democratic Party ' Members of the Central
Committee appointed County chairtnen who appointed CoutUy Comm.ttees Metnbers of
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the County Committees in turn appointed Town chairs wh
Those at the top of the .
‘‘PPO'fed Town Committees,
party held all beneath them accountable and He h
say over many matters,
-shaw had the final
The Whigs, too, were hierarchical The Whigs of the t'g time were controlled bv a
^Pohdcians as Tew Uncoln and fohnOa.sofWorcester to select candidates.
o je and to mahe plans for Whig campaigns m each party, there was a group of
With these pany figures before decisions ofcs any consequence could be made. In the same
— that a constitutional e.ecut,ce,s hep. in Chech m the political system
— .He partisan administrator
,s hep. in chech through both
the opposition political party and other members of his own party
The pany machine had at leas, a say in who was allowed to seek, and thus hold,
elective office That decision came increasingly to be made through the state convention.
The Democrats held then first nominating convention in 1837 It was more formal and
choosing nominees quite yet. Until the 1840's the legislative caucus would make
“recommendations” subject to approval by the state convention
,t took until 1843 for the
Whigs to hold their firs, nominating convention, Whether it was a small group of party
leaders or a state convention, the Gubernatorial nomination was at least approved by the
party, meaning that the nominee would have to meet the approval of al, or most of the
groups within the party.
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Under the Democratic machine in the 1 830'^ H i,
, , ,
had a fair amount of
control over those who sought office under the Dem ' ,
Whe I ,
c ocrattc label in Massachusetts '*n leg, slat,ve caucuses were still a viable means of n
able ,o u
"ontmatton for office, Henshaw was
^^;--"-----dswerethedom.nantmembersofthecaucus,
and that itsou comes were benefic.al for htm Ha.ng established
.mself at the head of the
Denrocrattc parry and controlling a fair amount of federal patronage
,n the
Commonwealth, Henshaw controlled nominations for office often based on the public
--
--
-natton process, Nominattons were marhed on a sheet of paper wHIe
HenshaWs men watched, not.ng those who voted aga.nst the preferred nominee If a
Henshaw affihate, would appotnt a comm.ttee wh.ch would always emerge ftom count,
„g
the ballots with the name of the Henshaw nominee ”
Oddly, however, Henshaw did not care for Marcus Morton, the perennial
Democratic candidate for Governor at this time Henshaw represented the more
conservative, Xustom House'' element of the Democrats, while Morton represented the
ntore radical Xountty" members of the pany The dislike between the two men points up
.he imponance party had developed Once Morton's nominat.on had been ratified by the
party in 1 836
, Henshaw stood behind Monon publicly, despite the difference of ,heir
stands
-We are equally fortunate in the choice of our candidate for the Governor of the
State The purity ofJudge Morton's life and character defies the assaults of his bitterest
foes, Morton, too set aside his difference with Henshaw and other members of the party
for the purposes of elections, **
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Yet the point of dispute between k
^ more practical tha
P .'osopHtcal, Henshaw
.estred to res„„ H.s posttton as Collector,
.t He wanteH to He
wHhtn the party Morton, Henshaw found out, had a great deal of inf,a fluence over who
would be appointed to the oositinn
controversy raged from 1 83 5 through early 1838
men wanted to be in a position to exercise influence Each Hen understood the importance
party had taken on and wanted to be able to wield power It k •P It was obvious, however that
^
r..,w ,.l„ O.
.
holding the organization together wa<js ot the utmost imponance, requiring sublimating
intra-partisan differences
.^nominations for elective offices were controlled by the pany, non-elective offices
were affected by partisanship as well Certainly distribution of offices was seen as one of
the Governor'stobs A biographer of Roger Wolcott writes dn fact the real work ofthe
governor is chiefly that of which the people hear nothing,-the routine of administration,
the conferences in the executive chamber,
,/re cc,ref„l
.selec,on ofsnue officers, and the
adjustment ofthe different departments whereby friction is avoided and the whole
administration is made to run smoothly - The Governor had become an administrator in
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that part of hrsjob rnvolved the distribution of offices (with rh H
Executive Council) and he’ ^ expected to distribute them to inH n ,
ftithfi I . u
'ndividuals who had beenfaithflil to the wishes of the pany
"
-
-V- » .
. ...„
appointment in Massachusetts As early as 1808 one can find> a recommendation to
Governor Sullivan indicatina that “ i
WHar
,
..
‘He Town of
ey ^tippon a certain individual for Justice of fhe pt Peace who is “firmly attached to
^
- the General Government and to republican pppciples The
Excellency ••2' This is a rarity, however Generally,
prior official capacity or satisfaction to the public
fitness of character, technical ability.
recommended an individual to
position.
Recommendations to various governors indicate that as late as 1828 pany
concerns were not ofparamount imponance, though they were being
considered. By 1828, party makes
more extensively
a stronger showing in the letters of recommendation to
the Governor regarding appointments Though pnma^ consideration in recommendation
for appointment to office is still given to ability, prior expenence. satisfaction to the public
and general character, one applicant, a Mr Eaton, desired an appointment as County
Commissioner “and considers his party services as fiimishing him with some claim
Republican administration.”^^
in a
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By 1834, partisan
affiliation had become an even stronger test fnr anr. •
letter to Executive i
° appointment Ae Council member David Mack Ir • a
^i-ock as a potential Justice of the Peace:
'
ties, and we do not think his hn [
^^^^P^^ance par-
integrity are such as totstifvZV™
'hn Hope, and ", “"“-ce, with
Eliflciples corri^^^htrs
vo'itluen^ to orient the annn' ^
^
P—em appointment being made
"
"“* "" “> »”»•
.-« «.
...... -,.
...
% lb. iMOi, p„„
...
...
....
,.
. Cl..,
„.p.
^
being a whig, there was but little chance for him Finallv nartMnal y, p y was more important
than family to some individuals
,?r'if‘ir'I.
Brother-an ttld line Democrat---ho holds the office of Inspector General of Leatheryou hnd everything correct in his office, and I pre-
thTwh
™
''™ tietrimLt to
if vou th- TT’ ^ Pnnsonal favor Butf y ink, by retaining him, it will injure in the least
Eiesem or m the future, the interest or success of the
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party, I would no. have you retain hin, on my ac-
administrator if the Om o u an
e3,, ,
'
was based on the
"
^ affibation Officeholders of
.he sanre affihauon as
.he G
allow policies
.o be earned ou. ,n a
.ore effecveectiv manner and were rewards for thnwho had served
.he party
'^ar
.hose
The surest path
.0 a career in politics was
.hrouoh,he
lhel830,becauseof^V '
Pa™- es.ablish.en. In
°'=o use 0
. service to Jackson’s nanv " u,
.
T y- *he position of postmaster of
orcester was filled with the editor of the Worce.s,er Co„m Re „^
^<^P‘Miccm Republican
Lieutenant Governor William Haile was “a coiorl c
lihe I
Pohlic life, but wealthy and a
campaign contnbutor.” and was nominated for lieutenant »og vernor and governor in
the early 1 890's “ An individual who had pursued a career rP m politics through the political
party would presumably be more likely to go alon» w„h ,hoO g ith the party and bury differences
when necessary, given what the party had done for him Presumablv a rabl>, Governor who had
come up through the partv would be better ahip t u-- PP®P«‘^^ttble to sympathize with and hold together the
various pieces of the party
n~l,
serve both roles On the one hand, patronage and a conciliatory attitude would allow the
Governor to establish ties with the various wings of the party This would allow Wm to
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keep the Governor from becoming too powerfiji At= 00 rfol legtttmate opposition could contest
reiattve moderatton in h.s activtt.es through its ability to control
nomtnattons and by establishing a sense of serving the panv thro N5 rty ugh appointments. Thus
parties controlled executive ambition estahliQhr^H
’ "*“‘’''^hed consensus around the executive's
program, and ensured a faithfrtl execution of that program
On the nattona, scene, poitttc.ans were becoming partisans as well Mass-based
Congressional Caucus as a means of selecting prestden.ial candidates The national
government also controlled enough patronage in the states to establish organizations there
for electoral purposes Finally, state panies often divided themselves according to stands
on national issues. Party organization had become an imponant phenomenon at not only
the state level, but also at the national level
The Partisan lUinH
If this was the machinety of the pany, what was the mind set of the pattisanP A
Whig party resolution from 1 848 captures the political culture which evolved around
political parties. The resolution was an effort to persuade Massachusetts’s Whig voters to
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vote for Zachary Taylor for President Rnggs, the Whigs’ Gubematonal candidate that
year, is scarcely mentioned, though he was the
,0 ^
^
‘he Whig convention
o rot Ooventon The nesoiotton
,s
.e.i, howeven, hot the ptctnce h
resolution notes, was not the first choice of Massachusetts Whigs forthe Presidential candidacy
‘^hose
tned fidelity to the whig causl" t'hro'^^h*
public service, which te haTren?. u®n
" P"™''
ents, and usefirl to his country and maridnd"™'
th“:^™“ Of the people of ouroC”
The puest.cn ,s whether to support
.he c.fi.en of another State Should MassachusettsW.» p;.,. ,p.
„p„,
^
they should “From a full and careful view of the whol. ke subject, we have no hesitation in
giving our preference to Gen Taylor, and in recommending him for your support -
Ultimately, the success of the pany is more imponant than the success of any individual
within the local party
The identity of individuals is defined by their party affiliation: “We approach you,
fellow citizens, as m,gs, a party whose views and sentiments are well known,”” The
label Whig means something specific The resolution relates various principles involved ,n
Whiggeo- and stresses adherence to those pnnciples: “These doctrines we have affirmed
as Whigs, and as whigs we cannot abandon them We believe them to be identical with the
prosperity of the country, and while we stand for our country’s interest, we cannot forsake
these fundamental principles ”” Partisan interest is tantamount to public interest. Keeping
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the party alive, adhering to Whig principles, is
political life
more important than any other aspect of
The resolution goes on to state that these voters en are not merely Whigs but
Massachusetts Whigs. Parties are far horn ntonoi.th.c, but contain many factions, each of
decision. The Massachusetts Congressional delegation is discussed as being a monolithic
group, especially regarding the slavery question Yet th.T • • .y ion. , ey maintain their free soil stand,
not from any desire to produce a schism among the Whi^s or tn h ihs ui wn gs, o build up a new party,
but from an honest conviction that slavery fisl an evil rr k u
- L J il, and ought to be circumscribed
T et, slavery is far from the only issue on the Whig agenda and should no, fragment the
ingulfed ,n a single idea. We know that in the practical affairs of government, our rulers
must meet almost every question, and we have a platform sufficiently broad to cover every
great question of national policy Partite • ,P y arties are not single issue groups, and compromise
and respect for other party members is necessary to maintain a coalition
The resolution discusses Taylor in glowing terms, while excoriating Lewis Cass,
the Democratic candidate
General Taylor is a safe conservative Whig; General Cass is a
radica reckless Democrat: the one is an open, frank and honest
old soldier, the other a sly, anflil, intriguing politician: the one
would respect the will of the people as expressed by their Repre-
sentatives, the other would trample it underfoot: the former is a
friend of peace; the latter is an advocate for war: the one would
stand upon our own soil to improve it, the other would grasp at
all the country around us.^’
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the candidate of the Whig th
^ P“"'ons
- one being
g, e other of the Democratic pany Me K
electorate are ,he .
Members of the
’ ^
'’‘‘''"’8 surveyed the whole field »d r
wtsdom may suggest, and enlightened patr t
’ ^
r*.
.« c„ .1
patriot IS clear Vote Whia a nrrv •
^
s proper conscience is a Wtiirr
vote their CO
" and voters should
consciences, as long as that leads them ,n a dnection favorable to the Whios
and the on V effert offho
‘^“uiuaie,
of the movement must be either to elect or increase the h
democratic candidate This th d
losing Office The election
saw both the defeat of Whig nominee Henry Clay to James K Polk and the
S e of a Free Soil party The authors of the message are blistering in their criticism
o-embersofthethirdparty..Buttheirbhnddevotiontowhattheycalledpnnciple,
persevere, and the evils under which we are now laboring, are in a great
-- Chargeable to their inconsiderate devotion to party« Presumably, this last phrase
narrowly focused group could detract from the chances a broadly-based Whig party would
hold of winning the race for office.
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Yet, the officials in the Whia,g party are not mete office seekers Their cause is
apparently more noble Remember that the nartv"= a
,,
^ with the public good
e mere office seekers are members of the other panres or those who would attempt to
of a third party The third party candidate is !
best to dissuade voters from his
They continue
Martin Van Buren and the authors do their
camp, first indicating that he is not, as he claims, free soil
hes hatTecf“'’ <>« par-tie ave b ome corrupt, and that it is necessarv tn fx
a new pany based on moral principle But wha7do thes7po Itical moralists propose to you'’ They propose to take
'tzr TTr' . f . t amhrehng, whose very names
we d™°:raM^ While, theTefore.e a mit th t there is too great laxity of morals in both doiiticai parties, we confess that we should despair of a refL-
mation in a school of which Martin Van Buren was the teacher 43
Whigs, while certainly seeking office, are not mere politicians They would not sacnfice
the public good, the good of the party, for one issue. No right-thinking Whig would do so,
or he would risk becoming a Martin Van Buren-type office seeker with no true concern
for the public welfare
If Whigs saw the members of the opposition in a certain way, the members of the
opposition certainly saw the Whigs in the same light, and charged the Whigs accordingly,
urging that Zachary Taylor was not fit to receive the vote of consistent Whig party
members The authors of the message go on to respond to these charges: “you will be
told, as you have been, that he is not a W}ng, and hence Whigs cannot support him with
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^ ». .w.„
1, ^
. „
'*"» »%w
i:'""'*""
oubernatorial candidate George Briaas Hp ^ n
O
The ,„div.ua,
.e pan.san
.. und.s.ood pol.ca,
.de„.,v in ,e™s of
PO .Pca, pa„,es The pan.san affii.aPon of a cand.da.e was of panan.oun.
..ponance in
--"-™.e-c,p,eandeonsc.encew.e.,edop,„a™.^
rebel w.th.n the party, was factious, too narrowly focused and no. looktng out for the
P-..C good ,f an olhce seeker worked for the good of the party, he was a noble hgure
good, he was a ntere pol.tician who would benefit no one The question regained,
however, of how to conduct oneself once in office
The Parti.san Administrator
The locus of politics had ntoved, by the 1840's. front Constitutional institutions to
pobtical part.es, Pol.tics of the time was ‘The warfare ofparty and one author of the time
wntes that “[o]u. of the discordant elements of party issue firmness, moderation, national
credit, and stability. Pany government justifies itself- The question, then, was how to
deal with the executive challenge in a political culture based around parties. How could a
I
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political figure who also held a duty to execute the i
'he demands of exercising
leadership with both vigor and restraint th u
*
How could the executive
administrator look like‘s
“ “
“”"nt»«, »».
instances of gubernatorial objection to leuislatinn ,g o were scant Until 1 85
1
.
there were only
three vetoes in the nineteenth century The first veto of thy tt the century came under Governor
Levi Lincoln, Jr in 1827 “ Between 18^7 and ISSI ,h- 1 85 1 there were only three vetoes, two in
b, U.„l.
..b
„ ^
r»
^
notes m h.s second veto that he is “constrained to the discharge of a painflil duty,”
ndicating a cenam amount of self-consciousness on the pan of the governor " While
Lincoln’s vetoes were upheld. Republicans in the General Coun exercised their own
power and overrode Everett’s veto of a legislative pay-raise ten years later
As parties, and thus the legitimacy of opposition, became accepted in the
onwealth, not only did vetoes increase, but their nature changed as well Although
Levi Lincoln was self-conscious about his use of the negative, his vetoes do indicate a
greater reliance on what would be in the public interest, or responsible policy, rather than
only on what would be constitutional. In his first veto message, Lincoln writes:
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Table 2 1 continued
In entenng upon my present office. I diligently and ear-
nestly sought to examine and settle upon the duties, which
evo ved upon me, in relation to the exercise of the Ex-
ecutive prerogative in acts of legislation, and by a careful
regard to the principles of a Representative Government
and the provisions of the Constitution, in the arrangement
and distribution of its powers, I was brought to the result,
that the interposition of a negative was to be justified only
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nown Charles Rjver Bridge controversy Lincoln. points out “that the power of the
government may be nght&lly exercised in opening a new co
and Cha I
“nimumcation between Boston
Charlestown, whenever the nnhhr
^
'”‘9'
In this instance
Lincoln continues,
“this necessity is not to be found ” hnd, hence the necessity of a veto
Edward Everett vetoed a legislative pay-raise based on n'y “I’ perception of it as an
unnecessary extravagance Members of the legislature d'disagreed, and voted what they felt
was the more responsible position
Beginning in the 1 850 's vetoes ramp,.,me much more trequently, with seventeen of the
nineteen men who serxed as governor vetoing at least one bill and fD fourteen vetoing at least
Ihree pieces of legislation By the ISSO's, with the Republicans firmly established, and the
Democrats in tenacious if often fiitile opposition, parties had become an accepted and
antagonism Vetoes were evolving, albeit very gradually, into tools for the expression of
responsible policy rather than only proper constitutional interpretation. Governors became
more willing to use their power to push for discussion among political participants
Presumably, vetoes rendered under the panisan mind set would become more
frequent under divided government, as differences over responsible policy, i.e. partisan
differences, caused deeper institutional divisions. Divided government occurred so
infrequently in Massachusetts during the nineteenth century that the most frequent utilizer
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of the veto, Frederic Greenhalge with ^twenty-two
negatives, d.d not even face divided
government Roger Wolmn „ u
Sequent nay-sayers also did not face a lemd.t
-her party Ben.anrin
’
face divtded govemnrent, as d,d
W-H.sse..w.wasne«o„tHe,,stw.e,evenvet^^^^
e story, However, as George Bontweii, tHe «rs. governor to use the veto
.tH an^
equency, d,d face d.vtded government as did Henry Gardner, another early and relatively
frequent veto user Thus, whtle d.vtded government was a rare occurrence
,n the
Commonwealth
,n the n.neteenth century, it cena,nly seemed to play a role in the use of
the veto.
As the three case studies for the partisan admin, strator, George N. Briggs,
Benjamin F Butler and Fredenc T Greenhalge will he used, George Bnggs represents the
end of an era After Briggs, governors were generally less hesitant to use the veto, or less
deferential to the leg.slature, Add.t.onally, Bnggs represents the beginning of another era
in Wh,ch governors were more consciously and purposely part.san Benjannn Butler and
Fredenc Greenhalge were two of the top three governors in terms of use of the veto in the
nineteenth centuo. Butler used h.s veto against divided government, while Greehalge did
no,. Butler also represents the dawn of a new era, as he exhibits charactenstics of the
popular manager Greenhalge, as the most prolific employer of the veto, displayed a
staunch panisanship, while also foreshadowing the Progressive executive toward the end
of the nineteenth century.
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George N Rna»
^
being an effective
panies. Due to hisB rr compromise candidate ” Rr-,date, Bnggs was able to hold together the
pieces of the WhioPartv Re r,i c
* Ihevanous
' has written that “Bneos's
tbe fact that his personal
very well
the Whig coalition
By the ISdOX Bnggs acknowledges, the electorate has opened np, dne to the
” P°P“'^^'y-hased panics have become an accepted part of
the political landscape
“We are elected m th m
, „
, .
''
"h,ch we hold by the votes of our
e ow-citizens, organized into political parties ”” Amhn > • iAuthority
,s ultimately popular while its
expression comes through political parties Brinosy , gr.P nggs s 1 844 inaugural address indicates not
approval ot political parties, but an understanding of their necessity:
“The people
Of all free governments will be divided into political parties The security of liberty is
increased by such divisions Differences of opinion upon measures best calculated to
promote the public good, lead to discussion, and discussion leads to discovety of truth -
in Bnggs 1849 Inaugural Address, he celebrates the fact that the previous Presidential
election saw the peacefirl transfer of power from one political party to another. Parties and
.he process which created them, when they promote peace and harmony, are something to
be justly celebrated, according to Briggs
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that th^are
all have one country to serve anrf ti,
^ ^
*em AJI are
.nterested alike’in tL caurof^“7human rights, all are alike affected bv bad? T
dressing the twrg^pS^^r
^
'f *e sen-ui uui> passage could be oenerallv ri.ff: j •
minds of our fellnu/r^iti, •
® °*mJsed into the
ofpolitica”feI^: :Se".h7fi
“
mg partisans struggl-
The purpose of a partisan leader would be to
.imise the sentimenf to w.eh Bnvgs
government could be effectively conducted Where the constitutional executive sought an
au of beneficence among branches of government, a respect for members of other political
nstitutions which would facilitate the conduct of politics, the partisan administrator was
concerned with creating that beneficence and respect among members of electorally
competing political parties.
Briggs’s acceptance by the various groups within the Whi» party both held the
party together and kept the governor in check. His need to please various elements within
the party led him to soften his personal stands and keep them in line with general Whig
stances He also often took stands on relatively non-controversial issues In many spot.
his Inaugural addresses are similar in content to the Whig party platform discussed above
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and other Whig party platforms, A resolution hv xay Massachusetts Whigs in 1849
, for
example, indicates that “The u1 n distinction between the Whuz and n
.
,
Democratic parties has
„
Learning, arts and industrv' have rprf:>;y/or^ •O recetved the.r tmpulse here almost ent.rely from the Whin
party, whtch for twenty-four of the las. twenty-fr. years has had the control of thesj
a Ptotecttve tanlf, for interna, tmprovemen.s, for a stable currency, for low postage rates
tor equal representat.on and for
-safe and success^, popular elections -
Boggs’s stands as Governor ,n that year were hardly more controversial He
dtscusses ,n more specific terms, though equally benign ones, some of the tssues ratsed
above Other tssues he dtscusses mclude the state’s poson and educational systems, its
financial condition, care for the nonr and uP d the handicapped, and possible improvements in
the judiciary » The issue on which Boggs takes the sharpest stand is the Mexican War He
is openly agatns, it, noting
-[b]ut for the unhappy war, whtch s.„l contmues between our
country and Mexico, the last year would have been one of general and unalloyed
prosperity to the people of this North Amencan republid”« This is quite in line with the
Whigs, who complain that “the lust of doimnion is now cheoshed by the democratic
party Briggs’s stands would cause little consternation within the Whig party.
Boggs’s stands on issues were generally no. designed to incite inter-partisan
acrimony, either. Another of his most direct stands, anti-slaveiy, was on an issue about
which Massachusetts residents had established a general consensus, though it was quite in
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line wi,h the Whig parly stance on the matter “ R
nothlrfrh n
‘hat partisanship should
;--P---he,ro«cers to the need to treat others
.threspectS.^^^
-ona, rssue, Brrggs notes, hut ,„t should he met wrth hrndness, candor, and hrmness
eason
.snot arded bypass,on,
ortru.hhy™ie„ce,.Massachuse.^
hnnness, and wrth ent.re respect for those who may d.ffer from us, and wrth the
determination never to violate the constitutional rights of any sister state "« Stands could
he partisan without being thoroughly divisive
.n this unfortunate sectional question, it
would be well for each party to consider that the other has rights - While the panisan
eader was correct to maintain a partisan stand, he would he hept in chech by a need to
establish and maintain the respect of members of other political parties as well as his own
so that public business could be properly accomplished
With the increased importance of political parties as organizations, the issue of
patronage in administrative offices naturally took on greater meaning Presumably, a
coalition would be easier to hold together, elections easier to win, if the party had some
rewards, i.e, offices, to distribute to its followers. Briggs indicates his stand on patronage
in his first inaugural address;
When he fixes upon the number of persons, he then looks
out for Xhe proper persons to do his business He will then
give them such a compensation as will be a just reward for
their labor, and will be likely to secure such services as long
as he may need them. Public offices are public trusts, creat-
ed for the benefit of the whole people, and not for the bene-
fit of those who may fill them .The principle laid down by
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should be ftilly proteSed in officers
and the exercise of the elective
of their opinions
partisan mterferenceTn pofe ^om
sound one has shown to be a
Yet his stand is not as simple as it seem<; Rri,. •8gs indicates a modified position, and
the prevailing one, on patronage in a letter to a friend:
I believe in the first place, that to turn out a sinnle manappointed by our opponents, merely because el nl
d:;:; wL*;:'
b‘“’ ^
hat It would be impolitic When Gov Morton cLe inpower, he found nearly all the offices filled with Whigswho were appointed to places they held because they
T'^n I,
displace or turn out a single man0 a those he had the power to remove, but when vacan
preciseraTo
''
ecisely s ur own party has always done "
Removal from office, then, should not be contingent on partisan affiliation, but
appointment to office can be madejustly on that basis Patronage was not simply a matter
for Briggs of removing enemies and replacing them with friends It does involve ins.allino
partisan friends into offices that open up, however.
Briggs vetoed no bills during his seven years in office. His tenure marked the end
of an era when governors were not expected to provide any sort of policy leadership and
generally did not interfere in legislative business Gubernatorial recommendations were
freely ignored by legislators As a leader. Briggs was not expected to provide substantive
policy leadership, and he did not In spite of this, he was certainly successtlil electorally,
winning election in seven successive elections. Additionally. Briggs’s pany was successfiil
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in
.mplementing much of its agenda in Massachusetts Bnuos-
....
SoS s success coincided with his
ability to satisfy and integrate various parts of the hi«his own pany and to respect and to hold
s of other parties in respect and esteem in the political arena
- p..,™
n~...
—
i.
__
„„„„ „
.
». s*„,,
», b.
.«.« ». ^
pf
~.«™, i. 1.,
it .n primary position - Briggs notes the benefits the state constitution confers on the
people. “By our constitution and laws, all citizens are placed upon a common level, and
are entitled to the same civil and political rights, and ail men are, or may become,
cttizens • He calls upholding the federal Constitution the great purpose of the people
and, thus, the party, and warns that the great danger of the slaves issue is that it will
endanger the Constitution if moderation in politics is not followed He reminds legislators
of their Constitutional duties and, after doing so notes:
Legislators of Massachusetts,—these are the high and no-
ble purposes for which this government was instituted. They
bear the impress of the great men who formed, and the brave
and patriotic people who adopted the constitution in which
they are written. They are purposes worthy of the attention
of the representatives of an enlightened Commonwealth To
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1forward you are clothed with the power of making
Bnggs
.s a partisan adntt^stra.or who has no. completely lost the characteristics of a
constitutional executive
George Briggs provides the earliest example of a self-consciously partisan
administrator He acknowledges, and rs pleased with the existence of political parties,
underlining them utility But, as a part.san leader, he looks
together, but to create harmony among his and
not only to hold his party
opposing parties. This is not the earlier
stance wh.ch sought the ehmtnatton of panies despite d.fferences. This is the working out
of differences among extsting pan.es, without discouraging their existence The partisan
admrnistrator, whtle devoted to his own pany, could also seek peace with the other party,
lest them differences deteriorate into mere squabbles The need for harmony within h.s
own pany and the existence of opposition kept the Governor in check Positions on issues,
as they became more pan.san had to satisfy the various groups withm the pany.
discouraging extremism on the part of the Governor
•Administratively, any power the Governor may have possessed came through the
appointment of members of the same political party as the Governor, While Briggs
opposed the removal of officers for partisan reasons, he favored appointment to office
based on partisan affiliation Part of the Governor's job. with the approval of the council,
was to dole out certain jobs; when vacancies occurred, they were filled with men of the
proper partisan persuasion. Whereas the constitutional administrator, such as Strong,
looked tor individuals possessing the proper character, the partisan administrator tended
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toward men of the same party. If the
different party, the members of his
Benjamin Rutlpr
governor attempted to appoint individuals of j
party were there to check him.
one term He is mentioned here because
Benjamin Butler served as Governor for
he combines certain features of the paitisan administrator with aspects of the public
manager, a conception of the executive that would
He also was one of the most prolific users of the
divided government. Butler
eventually become the dominant one.
veto, and used it as a tool while facing
saw parties as a hindrance in attempting to exercise any power
as Governor and advocated reforms that would allow hii
gubernatorial affairs. While Butler used
m greater latitude to conduct
parties to gather his own support within the
electorate and to check the power of others, he sought
conducting administration.
to overcome them as a means of
Butler understood the power of political parties in Massachusetts He. “having
been a consistent Republican and acting with that party.” attempted to obtain the
Republican nomination for Governor in 1 87
1
He was beaten for the nomination by
William Washburn, bu, he supported Washburn, feeling ,t was his duty as a Republican to
do so. He attempted to obtain the nomination the next year, but effective opposition by
the State Central Committee prevented him from gaining it After a quarrel with
Republican party leaders, Butler “came to the conclusion that [he] could not be governor
in the Republican party
After leaving the Republicans. Butler made great efforts to realign himself with the
Democrats. While he ran as an independent candidate in 1878
,
he also had the nomination
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Of .he De™o„a.ic Pan.,
.hough „ was achieved h.
..her dubious
.eans Wh.,e Bu.ie.
had a person. foUow.ng, h,s efforrs were
.o ob.ain
.he supper, of
.he parry as a whole
W..h support conung
.os. heav.ly fro.
.he Insh wards wi.h.n
.he parry, Bu.ler was
opposed by .he Brah.ins who headed
.he De.ocra.s, and were
.ore conserva.we
.han he
and his followers He did no. cour. h.s own vo.e as .uch as he .ried .o win suppon
through the Democratic Party as a unit.
By 1880
,
Burler was successful in cap.uring
.he De.ocra.s: “In a Preside...
year, un.ry wi.hin
.he Massachuse.rs
•Democracy’ seemed essemi. for success, and a
marriage of convenience was arranged be.ween Bullet’s followers and the
conservatives Bu.ler wen. through great pains to stress his partisan affiliation. His
suppon of Winfield S Hancock, the Democratic Presidential candidate
.ha. year and his
vilification of the Republicans on the campaign trail all were attempts to win favor with
the Democratic Party This can be contrasted with the constitutional executive, who did
not practice electoral politics to a great extent. Politics under the previous political culture
had taken place in constitution, institutions Under political parties, it shifted to the
electorate Debates occurred under the gaze of the voters, and platforms such as the one
examined earlier took on a vital importance, LHtimately, the mass of the Democratic Party
accepted Butler, though the Brahmins still had problems with him in succeeding years ”
Butler’s stands as a Democrat were effectively in line with those of a reform party.
He had deserted the Republican Party, “he said, for it had betrayed the Negro, the farmer,
and the worker—elements for whom he expressed his undying devotion Butler had
once defended industrialist Jay Gould, yet he still managed to garner the support of labor
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inaugural address are quite reformist, focusing on suffrage questions, civil serv.ce
reform, crime, taxation and education He also mentions that reform to the benefit of
labor, especial,, reform of child labor, is a fit subject for legislative consideration, though
be goes mto little detail Butler took stands which pleased the Democratic Party, though
he moditied them when he saw fit.
Butler thus understood parties as the way in which to win support and to
counteract the political power of others. He would adjust himself to the needs of his
political paay and attempt to please others within the party to win suppon. Whether he
was supposing a candidate who had defeated him for the nomination, or taking stands
ormed more than they might have ordinarily to partisan standards, Butler saw the
political pany as the most effective instrument for winning elections and building
coalitions.
Yet Butler’s victory as a Democrat is problematic from the point of view of the
pamsan admimstrator, as he was the only Democrat to win election in Massachusetts that
year,” Indeed, by 1880
.
Butler had “taken over” the Democratic party; by the time ofhis
Governorship, “the pany was completely controlled by [Butler] While Butler was using
the Democratic Party, he was using a pany that was secondary in an essentially one-party
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state Butler had managed to use the Democrats a., c.- c r
,
,
.
' ^ spnngboard to his own success while
oing little for the party statewide He was inclined m umclt to use the party-in-the-electorate but
only so long as it served his own ambition. Butler's sucoortepp rs even encompassed
“a small
group of Butler Republicans While he used and"
supported the Democratic Party to
gather support, that support was essentially personal, encompassing individuals who may
ot .ay not have been Democrats. This development foreshadowed the governor who
would seek suppon not based on partisan affiliation, but based on personal following
Eventually, support would come from the public directly, without parties as
intermediaries.
It parties could be used as an effectiv
conduct administration was a different
of the Massachusetts Governorship
e means ot capturing office, using them to
matter Butler decried the administrative weakness
I may say that the governor of Massachusetts has less ad-
ministrative power than the governor of any other state
Ihe legislature was in large majority against me Of his
own motion the governor can nominate officers, but these
o icers cannot serve until the appointments are agreed toby an executive council of nine In my council every mem-
ber but one was opposed to me The governor cannot even
pardon an innocent man out of the State prison except by
the advice and consent of the council
.
In his investigation of corruption at the state almshouse in Tewksbury, the “Republican
party employed counsel to sustain the officer of the institution at great expense, and d.d
everything it could to embarrass me and hinder the investigation.:”*' The party-in-
government had become a hindrance rather than a help Clearly, parlies were an obstacle
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ad™„is,.a,ion of the laws for Butler, ntaking it difficult for hint to build or hold
together any sort of coalition within the government
As mentioned above, Butler entered the Governor’.
most of his council composed ofmembers of the
difficult, appointment ofDemocrats all but i
s office with the legislature and
opposition party He found any action
patronage appointments and occasionally
impossible Butler certainly attempted to use
was success&l,
.4 Republican official at a prison
in Concord who was uncooperative was replaced by a loyal follower of Butler Mostly
However, Butler was IHtstrated Hts attempt to appoint the first blach.udge in
Massachusetts, for example, was successffil only after he replaced his Democratic
With a Republican one
nominee
An early advocate of civ.l service reform in Massachusetts, Butler called for
administrative reforms that would allow htm greater freedom in conducting gubernatorial
affairs He indicates, ,n his Inaugural Address, a penchant toward greater neutrality in civil
service appointments While Butler is pleased that Massachusetts legislators have
instituted fixed tenure for civil servants, he is disappointed that the method of appointment
has not changed;
The “civil service reform” manner of appointment, by
competitive or other examination, has been wholly ig-
nored. On the contrary, the practice has quite generally
obtained, of the officer having the appointment putting
his wife, his son, his daughter, his son’s wife, and his sis-
ter in office as assistants and clerks, and into other offi-
cial and salaried places. Besides, the rule is, with hardly
exceptions enough to prove its correctness, that all the
salaries and paid officials, at least of the higher grades,
have been, and are, of a given political faith.
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Nepo,.sm and partisanship are bane of the Massachusetts
time and money, according to Butler
civil service, causing waste of
Butler goes on to elaborate “other defects ,n the civil service of the
Commonwealth which need reformat,on very much indeed.”- Mainly, he Indicates that
.here are too many officals for the work to be done and that evil servants are generally
paid too much He asks for authonty to ameliorate these conditions
If the legislature will cut down and limit the officers ofthe Commonwealth, and the amounts of their salaries
as I have indtcated, and give power to the Governor soto do he wtll undenake to cany on the needed business
of the State with the reduced officers, agents, and employ-
es will till their places, and any others which may become
vacant, with equally good and efficient incumbents select-
ed and appointed under the most carefully prepared rules
of competttive examtnation, for the establishment of which
ne trusts the legislature will make provision ***
Butler emphasizes neutrality and efficiency in administration His ideal is to remove any
.mpediments between the Governor and the civil service Political parties could too easily
lead to the wrong individual in a given position simply because he holds certain political
beliefs The proper management of the civil service is Butler’s goal, and achieving that
goal means implementing an unbiased appointments process and allowing the chief
executive free reign over administration.
Butler took upon himself a much more specific policy fiinction as Governor. His
recommendations to the General Court were very specific and his tone with the legislature
was not as deferential as John Hancock’s or even George Briggs’s Hancock and Briggs
were largely content to allow the legislature relatively free reign in determining an agenda.
respecting its role m the political process. Indeed, legislative leadership by the executive
PPM. pp*„,„« „„
P.P. Esp„,.u,
^
in his recommendations and his reasoning He was an.,„n,-s n attempting a more detailed policy
leadership than had generally been seen to that point.
Butler uses his veto power to much the same effect, sending back many bills with
his objections attached » His objections were usually policy oriented, rarely
constitutionally-based and more detailed than the objections of even a more partisan
administrator such as Edward Everett Where the constitutional executive was hesitant to
use the veto and the partisan administrator slightly less so, but more policy-oriented when
doing so. Butler had no qualms about employing the veto whenever he saw fit, and using
It to make points about policy rather than just constitutional interpretation To a certain
extent, Butler's actions as a policy leader while in office and his use of the veto during his
tenure make sense He was, after all, facing divided government in a partisan era.
Alternatively, Butler could be seen as far from a loyal partisan, and his rank as a Democrat
could easily be interpreted as an opportunistic move designed to advance his own
ambitions.
How should Butler be judged as a leader^ Upon winning election, Democratic
Butler made many specific legislative recommendations in his inaugural address to a
Republican General Court, on issues such as electoral law and ballot reform, women’s
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suflfrage, labor law reform, civil service and other administrat.ve measures and education
tmprovements As noted above, he also used hts veto power to attempt to guide the
General Court, One btographer notes ofButler’s term in office that, “although most of the
vetoes were upheld, they caused unending comment. Few of the measures he advocated
were enacted by the legislature, and his attempts to end inefficiency in the state
government were met with scorn,”’' According to Butler himself, “the General Court ‘sat
down’ on every reform he proposed ”” Actually, some labor reform was enacted, and
much of what Butler proposed would become law in the ensuing years under Republican
rule ” The most immediate example of this is civil service reform which Butler advocated
m his inaugural address, but the General Court did not pass until the following year, 1884
,
under Republican Governor George Robinson Butler’s attempt at reelection, despite his
VOW in his inaugural address to serve only one term was unsuccessful.
For Butler, politics was an activity that took place not in either the electoral or the
institutional arena, but in both. Butler was less kind, and less conciliatory, toward other
members of the government than George Briggs had been. Butler is openly critical of both
political parties as well as the institution of the legislature. In discussing voting law reform,
he accuses both parties of corruption. Butler uses a discussion of the state’s reformatory
institutions to launch into a tirade against the legislature as well as the state’s system of
boards and commissions, culminating in an indictment of the abilities of the General Court,
which, according to Butler, from my knowledge and experience of public business in a
cognate body is of necessity the most unfit of all possible tribunals for investigation of
facts. Indeed, Butler does not associate the reforms he advocates in his address with the
I
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ratio Party Rather, he portrays them as his own views, the product of his “best
thought upon the topics occumng to me as of interest to you, and the discussion of which
would benefit the State.- These reflections have led Butler to the best solutions for the
state’s problems On the matter of education, for example, he urges legislators to use their
common sense and proceeds to tell them where that common sense should lead them ”
Those who may disagree with Butler are called “unreflecting” or labeled as not being
“just-minded
Certainly, Butler’s attitudes inspired resentment among his colleagues. When the
General Court passed civil service reform In 1 884
,
It was under a governor who was much
more respectful of the legislature as an Institution, and other members of the government
generally This example, and Butler’s ultimate failure as a leader generally, illustrates
important flaws In the approach of both Butler and the Republicans in Massachusetts. As
Butler was less apt to consider others as legitimate members of the political landscape, and
to include their views in his notions of proper policy, he was all the more unsuccessful On
the other hand, Republicans in the legislature held up what may have been necessary
reforms, indeed many reforms that would come to pass soon enough, because they were
not inclined to respect Butler, a Democrat Partisans had the potential to respect others,
despite differences, as governors such as George Briggs showed By indicating a
disrespect for Butler, however. Republican members of the General Court held up
potentially beneficial legislation. Benjamin Butler’s tenure demonstrates how a lack of
respect for the Importance of other members of the political system could cause
leadership, as well as the political system itself, to falter
136
Benja^n Bu.ler was a shaky pan.san. He understood politics as a pantsan activity
and, when rejected by one party, eventually sought the support of the other party rather
than solely stnktng out on his own. He was willing to go along with the party at titnes if he
disagreed with it, and saw the party as the most formidable means ofgamenng electoral
support for htmself and counteracting the electoral power of others Yet, Butler seemed
most tnterested in panics as electoral entities as long as they se.ed his needs and
ambitions Administratively, he advocated a lesser role, at least dunng hts own term, for
pohttcal panies Butler also sought to overcome the effects of divided government
through stronger attempts at executtve policy leadershtp and use of the veto Politics was
an acttvity that took place not only tn the electorate, as
.t did under a panisan polittc^
culture, but also wtth.n political institutions, as ,t had under a pre-panisan polit.cal culture,
Panies, for Butler, made for ineffective admimstrat.on and stnctly panisan administration
made the pressures of the executive challenge difficult to reconcile effectively Winning
elections and holding together coalitions could be difficult under a panisan system given
an opposition party in the dominant position.
Frederic Greenhal^e
Frederic Thomas Greenhaige was elected Governor three times in the 1890's. He
was a staunch Republican who had bolted the pany only once to vote for Horace Greely
rather than Ulysses Grant in 1872, Greenhalge’s biographer notes that “[b]y instinct,
inclination, and education Greenhaige was not a partisan. The necessity of party
government he accepted, as all men must in a free country In political warfare he became
a partisan chief All his life belonged to the Republican party, all his efforts were directed
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to achieve its success”^^ As governor u ,nor, Greenhalge employed
,he veto more often than any
Other governor of the nineteenth century yet he did not f ^face divided government during
any of his tenure He is an interesting case because he ,g was a party man who combined
pr.ncp,e with the necess.t.es of party government: was never separated from the
Repubhcan pany by any divergence of opin.on in matters of deep
.mportance Yet he was
not the man to give up to party what was meant for mankind, though he willingly
sacnficed h,s private opinions when consc.ence allowed Greenhalge’s conscience
generally comc.ded w„h the Republican conscience and he was willing, on many matters,
to overlook d.fferences for the sake of the pany Larger pnnciples of the tndivrdual and
the pany were uittma.ely the same wh.le lesser ones were allowed to pass,
Greenhalge understood that the Republican Panv was a diverse group often given
to disagreement. A close fnend of Greenhalge’s noted that:
[njobody saw better than he that great political parties are
necessary in a free democracy. He understood that no such
party, with its millions of thinking men, can be an absolute
unit in opinion He knew that to decide great questions each
party must act as a unit. On the other hand, he believed in
t e divine right to bolt ’ It was weak to bolt continually It
was a matter of conscience with every voter to decide when
the e^mergency was so great as to justify him in deserting his
Standard ^
Greenhalge encountered the political party in his ascent up the steps of
Massachusetts politics. He was held up because he was considered too much of a risk,
given his strong opinions. The bosses of his hometown of Lowell “all ‘admired’”
Greenhalge, “but they feared he was not ‘practical
.
a
political figure of such strong
opinions would have trouble holding the various wings of the party together.
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Greenhalge showed his panisansh.p more than Briggs had Poi.iics conttnued to be
an eiecorai ac.,v,t, Upon be.ng nom.na.ed to run for a second term, Greenhaige ratied
aga.ns. the Democra.tc party whtie gioriiying the Repubi.can party Greenhaige noted that
“’[glood administration is good Repubiican doctnne and good Repubiican work
The work of the Democratic party cannot be satisfacto-
<7 to the country, i, is not satisfactory to the Democrat-
party That work is based on no principie, it does not
even represent Democratic principie And we have the
unparalieied spectacie of a great party ieader-a Demo-
cratic President-sounding the kneii of his own party
and with blistering words stigmatizing the mujrmm o,ms
ot a Democratic Congress as the consummation ofparty
pertidy and party dishonor ’
We are treated to the strange spectacle of a President
without a party, and a pany without a principle
. Every
dollar Irom the Republican system of revenue brought life
to our enterprise, every dollar from the Democratic system
IS a deadly blow to our industriesHow different the re-
cord of the Republican party! How its principles shine and
glow in the letters of living light coming from the heart and
brain of our honored Senator' You have placed the great
standard of the party in my hands 1 accept it reverently
Greenhalge's campaigning
,s for the Republican party and against the Democratic party
He does not mention names It is the party that has done good for the people, or the party
that has not Party members are not even mentioned by name, except later when
Greenhaige refers to “the golden days of Lincoln and Andrew.”'"' Party comes above the
individual, and it is through the party that good is accomplished in public life Greenhaige
*
“Andrew” is John Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts during the Civil War
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sees himself as the standard bearer of th^ u.-pu lean party, not as a candidate with his
Though he chast,sed
.he Democrats dunng
.he campaign, Greenhalge was n,o.e
conc.ha.0
.. as gove™. h.s
.naugura, address after
.he above ca.pargn, he does no.
men,
.on .he opposinon party, reserving his cri.icisms for .he more ambiguous
“demagogue” and “anarchist
.n addition to mak.ng specific recommendation, he
notes that members of the legts.ature, without mention.ng parttsan affiliation, have a “duty
to protect and foster [Massachusetts’s] every interest, material, moral and intellec.ual, so
far as they come withm
.he province of leg.slauon He holds respect for the position of
legrsiators, notmg in 1896 “the high publ.c trust reposed in a legislator” given that “the
people commit to your care the firture of the Commonwealth Polit.es took place
dunng elections, but the partisan leader was more amiable once in office. Certainly
Greehalge found it easier to be amiable than Butler had, given that Republicans controlled
the General Court
Despite the fact that he did not face divided government, however, Greenhalge
vetoed more bills than any governor of the nineteenth century His vetoes were more
pohcy-oriented than those of a constitutional executive Remember that the latter was
reluctant to use the veto, considering that reluctance a sign of respect for the capacities of
the legislature The vetoes that did occur were based on the projected constitutionality of
the proposed legislation If it violated some constitutional standard, the legislation was
faulty Otherwise, it was reasonable. Under the partisan administrator, vetoes became
more directly policy-oriented. The ultimate question was no longer whether the proposal
140
the needs of the people as filtered through the party
Greenhalge rejected several bills based on the nature of the proposal itself rather
tts constltut.onal.ty In H,s first ter™, he vetoed a b.,1 w.ch allowed
.rout artlfic.ally
reared ,n pnvate ponds and streants ,n th.s Conunonwealth
,
[to] be used for food during
February and March «’ Greenhalge returned the b.l, wrth conunents because, among
other reasons 1, would
-annul or .mparr the pol.cy of preserving and protecting fish and
game which has become the established policy of the Commonwealth He rejected a
b.ll which removed restncons on shad fish.ng in Massachusetts because i, would
“undermine the whole body of the law now ,n force in this Commonwealth looking to the
protection and preservatron offish and game, and is likely to work injury which it would
be difficult and perhaps impossible to remedy,-' Proposed laws could now be vetoed,
and were, not only if they were unconstitutional, but also if they were bad policy, or
against the will of the public, as defined by the party.
If the nature of Greenhalge's vetoes is indicative of the changed character of the
executive, so are the circumstances under which some of his vetoes were overridden. Only
three ot his vetoes were, but the aftermath of one is telling, Greenhalge vetoed the
Veterans’ Preference Bill, which would have given preference in civil service hiring to
qualified veterans, only to see the bill passed over his veto. His veto message was a strong
advocacy for attaimng the best civil service possible, regardless of affiliation:
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to secter,hTr
.ce arc/nt ob.ard™XT ^ --
pubHc serv.ce
,s conned by fffons“‘r
ten, of bounty or reward inLad of 1 r^
‘ “
The fact that Greenhalge's veto was overndden
.ndicates the party at work as a chech on
power
-The soldier vote is an
,„,po„ant factor in the political party he represented his
aeon n,i,ht have offended a lar,e section of that pany Vet the Republ.cans of the
legislature kept Greenhaige from doing so by passing the b.II over h,s veto
Greenhalge may not have offended that sect,on of the pany very much after all
The aftermath of the overndes
,s indicative of the existence of a base of suppon for
Greenhalge that was more personal than it was partisan Soldiers and others who
approved of his veto wrote to express their support
My dear Governor,-As a private volunteer ex-soldier
wish to thank you for your courageous attitude in your
veto of the Veterans’ Exemption Bill, naturally upon at-
ainmg man s estate [I] became a Republican, and 1 con-
tinued to be a Republican until driven out of the party by
disgust with some of the demagogues who have held high
positions within its ranks. Nothing that one man has ever
done or said has so inclined me to a return of allegiance to
the party which you so honorably represent in this common-
wealth as your last veto, and if the recording of my vote for
you for any office in the gift of the people to which you are
willing to accept the nomination constitutes me a Republican
I am one already.
Au editorial in the Boston Transcript noted about Greenhalge: “He has pluck, undoubted
pluck, and will do his duty as he sees it. with little regard to the opposition his course may
arouse.”"^
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This supper, did no, seem ,o be some,hing Greehalge cul,iva,ed or promored, bu,
somerhing which grew ou, of evems.
., is apparen. ,ha, Greenhaige differed wirh Ms par,y
on many poims. He was no, unpopular because of ,hose disagreemenrs, however, and he
did no, sph, wi,h Ms party based on ,hose differences, WMle Ms support may have come
from sources orher ,han .he polir.cal party, he was also willing ,o do wha, was necessary
to establish himself as a Republican and to remain a viable member of that party. His
support may have come from the populace of Massachusetts ,o such a degree ,ha, he did
no, have to worty about disagreements with his party In that sense, Greenhaige
foreshadowed
.he public manager who is both checked and empowered by the people,
without the intermediary of the political party He seemed, however, to place the
maintenance of the party above most personal predilections.
Greenhalge’s appointments were indicative of the nature of the partisan
administrator
.^s noted above, he favored appointments that were above party Yet when
he attempted to implement that policy, he was largely thwarted by other members of his
own party. He attempted to appoint a Socialist to the Commission of the Unemployed,
believing that “with two (of three members of the commission] representative (one
conservative and the other radical) of the labor elements, some thought&l and practical
solution of the problem might be reached,”"’ The Executive Council, however, refused to
approve this appointment Greenhaige had to withdraw several other names from
consideration because of the disapproval of the Council.
The Governor may not have had an extensive number of appointments to make,
but they were certainly an important (and time-consuming) part of his job. In delineating
I
143
h.s idea of the perfect vacation, Gteenhalge began by noting that ,t “would be free of
office seekers The actions of the Councl to counteract ntany of his appointments
mdicate the partisan admin.strator was expected to fill offices ,n a certain manner to please
other members of the pohttca, patty Appointments to office that were open to party-based
selections were cons.dered fit for the members of the polittcal party in control of the
oOvernment. Greenhalge s experiences indicate that attempts to provide otherwise would
be counteracted by other members of the Govemofs patty who had interests at stake
The remaining question is of the nature of Governor Greenhalge as a leader
Greenhalge was certainly electoraliy successful, captunng office each time he ran,
campaigning enthusiastically as a Republican, utilizing the Republican agenda He was also
inclined to policy leadership, certainly more so than George Briggs, though less so than
Benjamin Butler. Greenhalge’s prolific use of the veto, and the nature of those vetoes,
reflected his greater concern with policy matters Interestingly, of Greenhalge's twenty-
two vetoes, fourteen were of salary adjustments for various public officials, vetoes he
justified as necessary in times of economic crisis,"’ Two of these were pocket vetoes and
one was overridden Thus, on matters of policy, Greenhalge mostly remained in line with
the Republicans.
Greenhalge saw the General Court pass several of the policies he recommended in
his addresses to the legislature. In his address of 1895, Greenhalge notes that a “number of
recommendations were made in the message of the governor last year, and several of them
have been adopted.”’"® These included a literacy test for voters, the “registration of
practitioners in medicine” and an additional judge to help expedite business on Boston’s
144
In the addresses suggesting these vanous measures, Greenhalge had shown
respect for the Genera, Court as an
.nstitution and for the work of legislators, regardless
of partisan affiliatton As a partisan administrator, then, Greenhalge was successful in
ntany of h,s leadershtp efforts The Genera, Coun acted on several suggestions he made,
and seventeen of his twenty vetoes stood. As long as he showed respect for other
members of government, he achieved a measure of success as a leader in the
Commonwealth
Fredenc Greenhalge, despite his desire for a ment-based civil service and a
following that may have been as persona, as it was partisan, was mote blatant about his
partisanship than George Briggs had been Moving beyond simply approving of parties
theoretically, he was a devoted Republican who split with his party only with great
difficulty and over matters which he did not consider minor Working tirelessly in support
of the Republicans, Greenhalge disparaged the Democrats using his partisan following to
offset any power the opposition may have accrued Greenhalge, as a partisan
administrator, was unafraid to use the veto, certainly less hesitant than constitutional
executives such as Hancock and Strong had been His vetoes were more policy-related,
i.e. partisan, than those of the constitutional executive. In assigning offices, Greenhalge
was reluctantly partisan, and his experiences with patronage matters point up the nature of
the partisan administrator. Greenhalge had other members of the party to please in the
distribution of offices and the performance of his job Thus, some of his attempted
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appomtments were rejected for partisan reasons and replaced with loyal Repubhcans As a
leader, Greenhalge showed respect for others and attained success with several proposals
Conclusion
Popularly-based political parties came to dominate Massachusetts political culture
by the 1 840’s Through hierarchic^ control over nominations and dissenunation of
patronage, party machines were able to control much of what occurred in political life
Individuals were kept in check through opposttion parties and, more importantly m
Massachusetts, the members of one’s own party The pany embodied the expression of
the public good. What was good for the party was good for the people. Political
Identification was based on party affiliation, and individuals were expected to put aside all
but the most drastic differences for the sake of the political party
With the shift of politics to the electoral arena via political parties, the governor
became a partisan administrator As a partisan, the Governor was expected to follow the
party line and do what was necessary to hold the party together This often meant taking
broad stands or avoiding stands on particularly divisive issues that might incite intra- or
mter-partisan battles Stands on issues could be firm without being divisive, if respect were
shown to ones' opponents and other members of one's party. In any event, the members
of the opposition, or the members of one's own party were there to check any Governor
who became too powerful As an administrator, the Governor had a responsibility to
appoint people to office to help carry out the law Those appointments were expected to
be partisan and, again, other members of the party were there to keep the Governor in line
if the appointments were not properly made.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POPULAR MANAGER
Geoffrey Blodgett has noted that in the years shorty before the turn of the
centuty, the Massachusetts governorship was a weak inst.tution. Particularly
administratively, the governor was ineffectual
fts only decisive power over legislation was the veto
unce a bill became law the governor found himself cur-iously detached from its operation ‘The governor has
almost nothing to do with the administration of the lawsm the broad and vital sense,’ a veteran State House ob-
setver wrote in the early [eighteen] nineties ‘Ample
machinery is provided for the enforcement of the laws\Mthout any action by the governor at all
Blodgett attributes this weakness to three factors. First, other important executive officers
such as the Secretary of State, Treasurer, Attorney General and Auditor were elected
independently of the Governor They denved their authority from the same popular base
as the Governor but were not responsible to him Next, Massachusetts administrative
business was conducted mainly by independent boards and commissions, most of which
had spntng up after the Civil War The Governor exercised little control over these
agencies beyond staggered appointments. Finally, the Executive Council, given its powet
to approve or disapprove both the administrative appointments and removals of the chief
executive, hampered many Gubernatorial administrative efforts.
Over the next eighty years, constitutional and statutory reforms would address
those characteristics of the governorship that Blodgett indicates weakened the office. If
other officeholders drew their power from the same source as the Governor, he is
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none.e,ess co„.,..,o„a,„e„ as .He cH.ere.ec.ve, an Hone. wHicH Ho.e.s or
manor offices could no. claim As such, he would come
.0 embody
.he will of .he people
«.recly ,f .he governor embodied
.he will of
.he people,
,. became h.s responsibilhy
.0 see
.ha.
.he governmen. me.
.he public's demands Even.ually,
.hrough cons.i.u.,o„al and
s.a.u.00- reform,
.he Governor would be given grea.er con,ml „ a •s t tro over administration and
adminis.ra.ive reorganiza.ions
.0 help see
.ha.
.hose demands would be me.
Ul..ma.ely,
.his mean, a direc. relationship between
.he governor and the people,
one free of pol.t.cal parties According
.0 reformers around the turn of
.he century,
partisan politics, with i.s secre.iveness and deal-making, hampered governmental effons
.0
carry ou. the voters' wishes. If .he effects ofpan.es on
.he electoral process were
lessened,
.hey believed,
.he direct expression of
.hose wishes could take place through
.he
governor This also required a direc. relationship between the governor and
administration With panies coming between
.he chief executive and public administration,
with the nile of appointment being the panisan affiliation of the appointee, complaints of
cormption and inefficiency were commonplace With political panies removed from
administration, and with the governor exercising greater control in that area, the
government could run more efficiently and effectively In this way, the popular will could
truly be carried out by the executive Ultimately, this meant the governor would become a
public manager In 1 900
,
the Boston HercilJ praised incoming governor Winthrop Murray
Crane “as one who promised to be ‘efficient’ and ‘non-partisan”’ These were ideals for
Progressive reformers ^
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E^^MffktsaLR^f^
. Governor George Bourwe.l signed a b,ll requ.ring
.he secret ba„o, a.
Massachusetts eiect.ons hor state and hedera. omces, ’ The nerv
.aw ordered that voters
“
- “«
-
..
towns The leg, slat,on also forbade such practices as multiple or fraudulent voting and
provided penalties for elec.ons offtcers who neglected their duties/
necessity as a safeguard of the people’s riohts thr. io population of the Commonwealth
had grown, he notes, representation had no. grown proportionally:
The value of the right of representation depends mater-
uffi-r’’° Th
'"''^P«"dence of the right of
s rage Th,s latter
,s not the original right of the gov-
ernment conferred upon the citizen, but the right of the
citizen by which he takes his part in the constitution and
management of the government
The public, therefore, can properly establish such reg-
and srfe,™ Th'
for the general convenience
afety The publicity of the ballot does not appear tobe a regulation of this sort, as [the ballot’s] entire secrecy
IS consistent with the safety and convenience of the whole
community.
Motivations behind the new ballot regulations were not entirely selfless, however The bill
was also an attempt to break the hold of the Whigs on the politics of the Bay State
Remember that parties had printed ballots to that point, making voting an open act and
coercion of voters who opposed the pany, especially the coercion of factory workers by
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.he,r bosses, an easier nrai.er Boutwel, belonged
,o a coalition of Free Soiiers and
Dentocrats iook.ng to wrest power fton, the Wh.gs, who depended on factot, bosses to
deliver workers votes While the secret ballot did affect the Whigs briefly, they tegrouped
.he following year, and made the secret ballot optional rather than mandatory, setting back
reform of party control ^ With resnprt tn upec to the gubernatonal relationship to political parties,
the next significant reforms came in the 1 880s
The Civil Service l aw of 1SR4
As Illustrated in the last chapter. Democrat Benjamin Butler called for reform of
administration in the Commonwealth at the beginning of his single term in 1883 Nepotism
and patronage had led to an inefficient, ineffective administration, he asserted According
.0 Butler, a neutral civil service with appointments based on mem, combined with greater
administrative control on the part of the governor, could help remedy these evils The
General Court, under control of the Republican pany, rebuffed the cantankerous
governor When Butler failed to win reelection, the victor. Republican George D
Robinson, continued the call for civil service reform
Robinson portrayed public administration in Massachusetts quite differently than
Butler had, calling it “honest and economical Her record," Robinson continued, “is one of
singular purity and efficiency,”’ Yet, even in light of this achievement, a civil service law
would be necessary to “secure and perpetuate all that our experience has demonstrated to
be sound and successful policy,”^ Robinson noted that:
The national government stands committed to the destruc-
tion of the spoils system, and the State ofNew York has
enacted a very comprehensive bill, intended to carry the
156
reform into the departments
and the large c.t.es ThehH
age of the State and the a fe andT'
lie money, shall not be emlyedt /cco ’’"f
party supremacy, and when fitness not favor^shall'd^**'^^
^rriTe ofth:~
is inteia »tand~ -“-„t
practicable and eLie^ra^tye™^
°|^
^
proval will speedily come.^
^ ^
^P~
On June 3, 1 884, Governor Robinson approved “An Act to Improve the Civil
setv.ee of the Commonwealth and the Cities Thereof- This was an early attempt to base
selection of civil servants on merit rather than on partisan afltliation. The Act prowded
that the Governor, w.th approval of the Counc, appomt a three-member, b,-patt.sa„ Cvtl
Serv
.ee Commtssion. Th.s commission would draft rules “for the select.on of persons to
fill offices ,n the government of the Commonwealth and of the several cities thereof, winch
are requ.red to be filled by appointment, and for the selection of persons to be employed
as laborers or otherwise
.n the service of the Commonwealth and of the several cities
thereof ' Rules prepared by the Commission were to be subject to the approval of the
Governor and the Council Rules could also be changed with the same approval
The Act went to great lengths to assure neutrality in cettain civil setvice
appointments General outlines were given as to the rules the commission should establish
Public jobs were to be classified and filled according to competitive examinations These
examinations were to be directly related to the position to be filled and were not to
mention political or religious affiliation. Promotions were to be made on the basis of merit
and semority. Certain exceptions were made to these rules, including veterans, elected
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officials, judges and “officers whose
executive council
appointment is subject to confirmation by the
Various authors have concluded that Massachusetts did not make full use of the
potential inherent in this merit system, and their objections are fair Certainly one can
merpret calls for the law on the pan of Democrats such as Butler as merely a maneuver to
lessen the strength of a powerful opposition. One can also see the law as an attempt to
consolidate power on the pan of the Republicans Blodgett indicates that “(i]n practice
the law aimed squarely at Boston Democrats, [who] quickly went to work to find ways of
evading [it],- While this may be the case, that is beside the point here Rathe, it is
tmponam that this was an early effon at “the elimination of panisan politics" from the evil
serv ice “ Reformers of the time, such as members of the Massachusetts Reform Club,
conceived of proper administration as neutral and efficient, and viewed parties as
hindrances to that ideal
Electoral Reform
Between the 1880s and the 1920s, the General Court enacted various pieces of
legislation that served to separate political parties from many of the intricacies of the
electoral process The General Court reinstated the Australian ballot in 1888 taking the
printing of ballots and control of much of the electoral process, and thus the electorate,
out of the hands of political parties,'* The law provided for the public printing ofbaliots
which had to take a very specific form: Candidates names were to be listed alphabetically
under the office for which each was tunning, along with respective addresses and partisan
affiliations and sufficient space for the voter to register a choice. The outside of the ballot
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had .0 have
-Official Ballo, for” ,he respective polling place, the date
the signature of the Secretary of the Comrrronwealth stamped on it
of the election and
The law also
provrded agarnst cornrpt.on
,n voting practices and provided penalt.es for negligent
election officers. Various legislation regulated ballots and vot.ng procedure even ftrrther.^«
In 1913, for exantple, a three mentber State Ballot Law Commission was established The
act provrding for this commiss.on included provisions for neutrality on the part of ,ts
member, through b,-panisan membership and regulations against conflict of interest ^
Legislation also gradually lessened the strength of political party elites in the
candidate nomination process Individuals such as Governor Eugene Foss insisted that
direct primaries would take away the decision making power of parties regarding
candidates for office, and therefore allow' a better expression of the public will “Establish
the direct primary, choose your own public servants without reference to any machine or
faction, make them accountable only to yourselves, and popular government will be
established Massachusetts installed a direct primary system in 191 1, the year Foss
assumed the governorship.^' Candidates for statewide office could only be nominated
through “direct plurality vote in primaries,” attempting to separate party elites from the
process
Though an effectively organized party organization could, to a certain extent,
control the candidates offered to the electorate, the threat of insurgents was real
nonetheless It was quite possible that the candidate running in a general election under a
party s name was not the candidate preferred by the party’s officials. Augustus Gardner
demonstrated this to the Republicans in 1913 and James Michael Curley would do the
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Through the early twentieth century, reformers had begun separating the execut.ve
from polittcal parties, with some success. Electoral reforms served to separate the
executtve from parties and tie h,m to the public directly, wtthout part.es as intermediaries
Ctvil servtce reform helped ensconce a notion that proper administration was neutral and
efficent, rather than party-controlled and thus potentially wasteful The constitutional
convention that began in 1917 took the popular-manager no.ton ofthe executive on whtch
earlier reforms were based and attempted to write it into the Massachusetts state
constttution Many reformers a. the convention felt no. only that the governor embodied
the will ofthe people, but that he should be a. the head of a competent, efficient
administration so that will could be carried out properly Efforts to strengthen the office
as the embodiment ofthe popular will were more successful than attempts to link the
governor directly to administration.
On January 8, 1914, newly elected Governor David I Walsh, a Democrat,
addressed the Massachusetts General Court:
The strong public demand for certain changes in our
Constitution compels the Legislature, year after year,
to consider the same proposals for its amendment. The
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constantly recurring demands. The failur of the Lei
a large body of mteli.gent, patriotic citizens
®
be L'sembTed
Legislature cause toas l with the consent of the electorate a bodvof citizens, who shall be selected without party delegaLnto foliate amendments to our Constituln STubmuted to the voters of the State, will tend to settle otherwise irrepressible controversies, and will make our Const!
TITTfT;”
Walsh made specific recommendations regarding appropriate amendments. Among these
™
0o.,.o,
p,„. ,
recommendation and found “no legislation necessary,” though
the slimmest of margins: 103-105
a bill was filed, failing by
Walsh called for a convention again in 1915 He renewed his suggestions for
amendments, adding several, including: “The short ballot, with concentration ofpower
and responsibility in the Governor The members of the General Court again defeated a
bill supporting Walsh’s suggestion. Pressure for
could not be ignored.
a convention grew, however, until it
The demand was so great that a Republican Governor, Samuel W McCall, echoed
Walsh s demand for a Constitutional Convention. In his 1916 inaugural address, McCall’s
first order of business was to call for a Convention and to offer suggestions for
amendments His list of amendments was considerably shorter than Walsh’s, but was
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comprised of the short ballot, biennial elections and an executive budget The General
Court followed McCall's advice, and, after approval by popular
of delegates, a Constitutional Convention convened
vote and popular election
The governorship was one of many issues dealt with in the convention, and the
views of many of its members do indicate a changed notion of the elected executive A
report from the convention's Committee on the Executive indicates the changes m thought
regarding that office
However faithflilly and ably a legislative body may per-form Its duties. It cannot supply the element of political
leadership, of responsible initiative, its very numbers its
v^ery election by a large number of constituencies, prevent
this The executive alone represents the whole body of
the people because he alone is elected by and is respon-
sible to them, in State government it is therefore chiefly
to the Governor that people look for improvements or
reforms, whether these are to be secured by administra-
tive or by legislative means They expect him to put for-
ward and to push to success legislative policies of his
own, — not merely to content himself with ceremonial
and supervisory duties.
Here, the governor alone represents the popular will Prior to this, the legislature had been
an equally important and capable partner in the relationship between the government and
the public Previously, the constitution and subsequently political parties had come
between the chief executive and the electorate. Now, he, alone and directly, was assumed
to speak for the people of Massachusetts If he were to do so, he needed to be able to
bring his program to fruition.
The work of the convention regarding the Governor did much to further the
movement toward application of the notion of that officeholder as a public manager. The
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two-year term, the executive budget, heightened
ability to return bills with recommendations
executive emergency powers, and the
all resulted from this convention. The
year term allowed the Governor
two-
more time to attempt to install the program he was now
expected to push upon entering office. The “ordeal
resulted from the single-year term
of an annual political campaign” which
was
would free up the executive, allowing greater
over The elimination of perennial campaigning
leadership
potential for gubernatorial legislative
31
The executive budget would allow the Governor greater control over spending and
thus enable a sharper focus on efficiency in matters of public expenditure - The executive
would have to recommend a budget to the General Coun within three weeks of the
assembling of that body
.^1 expenditures of revenues were to be contained in one general
appropriation bill, through which the General Court could modify gubernatorial
recommendations as it saw fit The Governor would be able to recommend supplementary
budgets, and appropriations bills other than the general appropnation bill had to come
from gubernatorial recommendations. All appropriations would be subject to a
gubernatortal line-item veto. The Governor would then be obligated to communicate his
reasons tor effecting changes in the appropriations bill to the General Court The
Governor was given more detailed and substantive power by assuming a more positive
role in the fiscal affairs of the state.
.'\nother effort at adding to the governor’s authority was the amendment allowing
the chief executive to declare laws for the purposes of emergencies. The resulting
amendment gave the governor the ability to declare a law the General Court had passed as
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effective i^ediately, provided he could declare an emergency that required i. to take
effect before the const,tut.onally-mandated mnety-day waihng period.^ an eloquent
defense of the amendment, one speaker indicated thatP that its purpose was to protect the public
from the evils of interests that would disobey the legislature “Thu ' ,y m This simply means that the
Governor may withdraw from the power of special interests an opportuntty to hold up the
Legislature on order that they may gain a few months longer to do the business which the
Legislature may have forbidden Where the legislature could not properly ensure the
public good, it fell to the governor to do so.
Another amendment resulting from the convention gave the Governor a more
positive legislative role than the original gubernatorial veto While he could still return bills
with objections, according to Article LVl, the Governor could now recommend
amendments as well, though under a different procedure than a veto The Governor would
have five days in which to return a bill with recommended amendments. The General
Court would then be able to reconsider the bill and possibly make the amendments
suggested by the Governor The legislature could then approve the bill, in any form, and
return it to the Governor for his signature If this occurred, the Governor would not have
the option of recommending amendments again, though he could veto the measure This
amendment demonstrates the desired Progressive relationship between the executive and
the legislature The Governor would have a greater opportunity for more detailed policy
leadership of the legislature Rather than only objecting to bills, he would be able to make
substantive suggestions to the General Court Rather than merely making
recommendations in an inaugural or state of the State address, the Governor could suggest
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amendments to bills that had been dirertU/ k #• l i •d,rectly before the legislature Here was an opportunity
for both substantive policy leadership on the Dart of th<- r„n p the Governor and greater cooperation
between the execut.ve and legislative branches of the State’s government
Also in keeping with the tenor of making administration
-more business-1,ke," a
resolution passed that limited the number of executive departments « While estimates on
the number of existing departments vaned from just over one-hundred to over two-
hundred, the move to limit them succeeded Oddly, however, the ability to reorganize the
executive branch was kept out of the hands of the governor and left with the General
Court Also, there were several motions to eliminate the Executive Council, one of only
three remaining in the United States, but none ofthem succeeded “ Thus, while the
convention resulted in certain augmentations of gubernatorial powers, the office still
remained relatively ineffectual administratively
The Popular Manager in Practice
What effect did these various reforms have’ After the institution of measures
designed to lessen the influence of political parties in Massachusetts and to augment the
strength and influence of the governor, what did the chief executive look like in practice’
Again, as indicated in chapter two, looking at the development of vetoes over time is
instructive. Table 3 I illustrates the distribution of vetoes over the twentieth century,
though not Item vetoes Most simply, in the twentieth century, vetoes have been far more
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Table j.l Gubematonal Vetoes 1900-1997
Year Governor Vetoes Vetoes
Ovemdden
Divided
Governments
1900-02 W M. Crane 16 0 N
1903-04 John L. Bates 29
1 N
1905 William Douglas 4
1 Y
1906-08 Curtis Guild 24 0 N
1909-10 Eben Draper 10 0 N
1911-13 Eugene Foss 67 28 Y
1914-15 David Walsh 20 0 Y
1916-18 Samuel McCall 27
1 N
1919-20 Calvin Coolidge 12
1 N
1921-24** Channing Cox 25 0 N
1925-28 Alvan Fuller 77
(+1 pocket)
14 N
1929-30 Frank Allen 12
1 N
1931-34 Joseph Ely 64 17 Y
1935-36 James Curley 30 7 Y
1937-38 Charles Hurlev 51 6 Y
1939-44 L. Saltonstall 90 5 N
1945-46 Maurice Tobin 21 0 Y
1947-48 Robert Bradford 35 2 N
1949-52 Paul Dever 7 0 N (1949-50)
Y (1951-52)
Continued on the next page
The two-year gubernatorial term began with the election of 1920.
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Table 3
.
1
continued
1953-56 Chnstian Herter 24 0 Y
1957-60 Foster Furcolo 10
1 Y (1957-58)
N (1959-60)
1961-62 John Volpe 18 2 Y
1963-64 E. Peabodv 6
1 N
1965-68***
John Volpe**** 82
(+55 pocket)
25 Y
1969-74 Francis Sargent 97
(-M86 pocket)
37 Y
1975-78 Michael EXikakis 35
(+90 pocket)
23 N
1979-82 Edward King 14
(+37 pocket)
7 N
1983-90 Michael Dukakis
1
1 N
1991-97 William
Weld
22 22 Y
1997 Paul Cellucci 2 2 Y
between 1900 and 1997 vetoed at least as many bills as Greenhalge. with seven governors
vetoing at least twice as many pieces of legislation As the notion of the governor’s being
an important leader in the policy process took hold, governors became less hesitant about
using the veto
The four-year gubernatorial term began after the election of 1966.
Volpe left office in January of 1969 to serve as Secretary of Transportation in President
Richard Nixon’s Cabinet.
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Partisanship has played more ofa role in whether a governor's vetoes
_
overridden than whether a sovernor eYPrric«° “erases the veto ,n the first place Of the 934 vetoes(»*d,
^ ^
»». - iw
,.
^
least one chamber The remaining 425 vetoes or 44 so/° s, , 5-/o, came with the governor's party
domtnattng both houses of the General Court These numbers are supposed by the fact
that four of the top ten, and ten of the top twenty, users of the veto did not face divtded
--‘y
-Sht governors since ,900 did face divtded
government for at least one term, account,ng for just over one-half of all vetoes cast.
Weld left office in July of 1997
Bradford's, nfMcCall m2) Co°t«r <*«)'
(#19) and Kimr o hi
^^^2) x (#13), Guild (# 14 w/Herter), Crane
Coolidge and A(len'(Llh #nu''Dr3'(d3' '''t'""
govemmem were
;:r:“n=r
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Thus, in ,he twentieth centu^. a governors partisan affiliation does
much of a difference as to whether he vetoes a bill
When one looks at overrides of vetoes, the
not seem to make that
Table 3 2 demonstrates The General Court
Notice that this is only 21 84% of all
story becomes a bit more complex. as
overrode 204 vetoes between 1900 and 1997
vetoes cast, indicating that overrides of vetoes are
relatively uncommon Of those 204 overrides,
.47, or 72.06-/„, occurred under a
legislature controlled by the party opposing the governor's. Only 57, or 27 94% came
Tabic 3.2 Overrides of Gubernatorial Vetoes 1900-1997
^Vetoes
#Ovcmdcs
Divided Go\crnment 509
147
Unified Parly Government 425
57
from a legislature dominated by members of the governor’s party Also, of the 509 vetoes
under divided government, the legislature overrode 147 of them, or 28 88% The General
I
Court overrode only 57 of the 425 vetoes, or 13,41%, under unified-party government
While a twentieth-century governor is only slightly more likely to veto a piece of
legislation under divided government, he is almost three-times as likely to have that veto
overridden The Progressive mindset, one under which partisan competition was a
hindrance to the representation of the public will, took a firmer hold on the Massachusetts
This does not include pocket vetoes or item vetoes
;
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executive than it did on the Massachusetts legislature,
develop the power of the office at the
As a result, governors sought to
expense of the party
Thi.
f..». orF«i. o
^
~ r„,
himself directly with Franklin D Roosevelt
relief from the Great Depression entailed
and embodied the era of the New Deal, when
a more central role for governmental
administrative programs This was also the era when the popular manager, through
Roosevelt’s leadership, truly came to dominance
many of those same ideas in Massachusetts
on the national scene. Curley represented
James Michael Cnrlpy
James Michael Curley is one of the stoned figures of Massachusetts politics,
Curley was Governor for only one term, though he was long prominent in other aspects of
the state's political life. While many tales of his escapades, especially those told by Curley
himself, are apocryphal, his behavior in the Governor’s office is indicative of the nature of
the directly popular executive His administrative activities are not as indicative of the
notion of the executive as manager, but Curley was caught in the midst of changing
political cultures, and evidence of a managenal perspective can be found. While his
support was personal, administrative control had not yet been handed substantively to the
Governor, though Curley would attempt to effect a certain control Curley’s tenure, even
more than that of Benjamin Butler, is a precursor to the executive as a public manager.
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Curley has a reputation as a party bos, indeed as one of the last of the bosses in
Massachusetts, and he had done much work in Democratic
eventually taking over the ward and
Ward 17 during his youth,
nsmg to the top of Bay State politics ” However, he
ultimately moved past any sort of strictly partisan alignment, as his ambttion carried him
into a more personal following \n I 'dDo h Agam, Curley
Governor’s office:
writes of his winning the
Shan go m without a promise except to the voters ofhe State
.Ml my life 1 have been a lone wolf in politics
reusing to take orders. My campaigns have followed a
certain pattern I’ve had first to defeat the bosses in myown party then fight a combination of Republican over-
ords and disgruntled fugitives from the Democratic camp
This IS an accurate representation of the popular nature of the Progressive executive
Writing in 1992, biographer Jack Beatty notes, Curley’ s support was more
personal than partisan:
The strongest party left in the age of the political entre-
preneur is the party of ‘me ’ That was also Curley’s par-
ty, his ideology, Curleyism, even bore his own name
Like too many recent politicians, presidents among them
Curley specialized in the politics of division, using ‘wedge
issues’ to split groups apart. .In short, look past his old-
time oratory, consider his crude electioneering the equiv-
alent of our televisual demagogy, and Curley emerges as
our contemporary, a prince of our disorder.
.No machine,
no party bosses, no pudgy men in fedoras nominated him.
As he had done so often before, he nominated himself
The last two sentences above refer to Curley’s Gubernatorial campaign of 1934. Curley
defeated Charles H. Cole in the Democratic primary by a vote of better than two-to-one.
Party elites Joseph Ely and David Walsh, both former Governors themselves, had opposed
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ory, 1 1 ,eked my own party, and now I set out to lick the Republicans "" With a
nomination that was against the wishes of party leaders r„rl»F y eaders, Cu ey was obliged to build
suppon for htmseif rather than rely to any great extent on the party to do so Indeed
.hough Curiey attempted to coopt President Prank, in Rooseveh's hacking, he lacked rhe
support of the White House in his run for rhe Goveiuorship, wt.h the President
than partisan He had nin in the pnmaiy against the wishes of the important members of
the state Democratic party and won
.he genera, election wt.hou, the support of the highest
member of the national pany He had effectively separated htmseif from the parry
electorally
remairunsO
Yet, Curley felt the personal nature of his victory was dubious As hard as he had
worked to cultivate a personal following
,ha, could defear either parry, Curley saw his
support as dependent on wha, he represented, a liberal response ,o ihe Great Depression,
His was no, a personal vote of confidence, bu, "a vico^ for the programs and policies
enunciated by our great leader Franklin D Roosevelt.”" The evidence bears out Curley’s
assessment of his victory, as he ran behind other Democratic statewide candidates and
significantly behind Joseph Ely’s total in the election of 1932 ," As Curley’s support was
personal, he was accountable only to the public directly, not to the party. While he noted
the personal nature of his victory, Curley also saw htmseif as the direct embodiment of the
Will of the people represented by Roosevelt’s programs.
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he Governor s Council, which he called an “archaic appendage of Bay State
~en. an obsolete te„c of royalist rule, kept alive by Republ.can tones and fa.th.ess
Democrats- Curley’s exasperat.on reflects an inability to carry out administration
effectively because of a Council composed of .ndiv,duals hostile to James Michael Curley
Curley would turn a Republican majonty on the Council i
of administrative appointments, however
nto a Democratic one. In matters
partisan affiliation was not as important as
suppon for Curley:
My first move in this game of political chess was
to appoint Joseph A. Sheehan, a member of the Fi-
nance Commission, to the bench of the Superior
Court and replace him with E Mark Sullivan, a Re-
publican who was my Corporation Counsel when
I was Mayor
This indicates further the personal nature of support for the public leader. It indicates as
well the attempt to bring administration directly under the control of the Governor, to
make the Governor into a managerial agent
Curley’s concern with his lack of control over administration was that it hampered
h.s effons to implement his program In his Inaugural Address, he attacked the merit
system in administration as politically motivated and a hindrance to the purposes of the
Gubernatorial office:
The tenure of state officials renders it impossible during
the term of a Governor to make such changes in adminis-
trative offices as may from time to time be necessary for
the proper conduct of state departments
. .Under the exist-
ing system the Executive is denied direct responsibility.
173
moon, e,t
pnce
.„ such capa
dee.s best foe
Nonce eha.
.. is Cueley's peogean,
.ha, is be.ng
™p,e„e„.eb As .he Cu.iey
,s
no. deferennal
.0 .he leg.sla.ure. checldng
.,
.hrough a ve.o when proposals are
.he. and o.hers
.0
..plenren. a program Ra.her,
..s is h.s program, and h„pb ,s
.0 pass
and ,nrplen.e„.
, as efficen.ly as poss.ble, ,n .he „a.e of .he public good If a„y.h.ng
mpedes tha, process, „ ,s deny.ng wha. ,s ,n .he public good Seeh.ng con.ro. over
adnun,s,ra.,on was one ^e.hod of effec.ing and
.™p.e„en.,ng one’s program wi.h as much
efficiency as possible
The leg.sla.ure was ano.her perceived impedimen, ,0 .he impIemen.ation of .he
Guberna.onal progra.n was the legislature Curley was not adverse to mahgning
.he
General Court
.f the opportunity arose, forther indicating the nature of the public manager.
Politics was not mainly an electoral activity, as it had been under the partisan
administrator I, now took place .n both the electorate and constitutional institutions In a
radio address, Curley discussed the passage of a forty-eight-hour-work-week bill, and
indicated the nature of the General Court’s work: “In the past, it has been the policy to
consider legislation solely from the standpoint ofwhat was desired and what was
acceptable to the large financial interests of the Commonwealth, rather than what was
equitable and just to the entire people of the Commonwealth.’’-" Curley talks about
174
“achieving] mastery over the legislature desoite Ren„hrp Republican numencal supremacy in both
senate and House,- ,n his Inaugural Address, Curley sought a reduction in the siae of
the State Legislature and a switch to biennial sessions In his 1936 State of the State
Address, he went so far as to recommend a unicameral legislature,
Curleys attempts to dominate the General Coun are indicative of the public nature
of this type of executive As the sole embodiment of the public’s will, with no obligation
.0 the political party, the Governor had no qualms about attempting to bring the
legislature under his thumb Contrast this with the constitutional executive, who sees the
legislature as an equally important governing body and accords it due respect If people
were to think of the executive as the representation of what was best for them, the
legislature had to be denigrated in the minds of the voters The law-making body, after all,
could too easily frustrate the Governor’s program, which represented the direct expression
of popular opinion, A legislature that was unwilling to work with the executive was only
standing in the way of what the voters wanted The Governor had a duty to bnng that
body into line
Curley’s use of the veto indicates a changed relationship between the legislature
and the executive with the advent of the public manager Curley was not hesitant about
using the veto He also took advantage of the power to return a bill with
recommendations Curley vetoed thirty bills during his term and returned at least eight bills
for amendment His vetoes were policy- rather than constitutionally-oriented, and
significantly bolder than vetoes under partisan executives had been Curley vetoed a bill
appropriating money for highway repair, claiming a certain provision was “purely political
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rationality: Is the proposed legislation a nerfect / ^ pffl.' .s p t, /.e. efficient, means to a given end. If not,
the legislation could be rejected as inadequate
Because legislation needed to be passed to ensure the public’s well-being, Curley
was eager to send b.lls to the leg.slature. He sent several messages to the General Court
recommending
“immediate enactment of the accompanying bill ’’» Whereas the
constitutional executive and the partisan administrator would make broad
recommendations to the legislature, the popular manager would send specific bills to that
body. The elected executive would no longer wait for the legislature to enact laws in the
public good, and then “gladly concur ’’ He would take direct, concerted, detailed action to
see that the public good was met in an efficient manner Curley went to great lengths to
justify the bills he sent to the General Court. It is not merely that proposed legislation is in
the public interest. It is, but more importantly, it is the best, most efficient means of
meeting the pressing public problem.
If the elected executive had become popular, he needed some way of reaching the
people Curley made use of the radio to take his case directly to the people. He delivered
thirty-three radio addresses during his term as Governor.'' In many of these addresses.
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cu.e. conceded
..se,f wUH p.eces of.s and a„e.,s
. influence
.e Gene.,
coun Curley used
.he radio no. only
.0 enhance h.s own vis.hi.hy, hu. also .0 piay an
the burgeoning Social Securiry program, Curley no.es:
It IS my pu|pose as announced on Wednesday las. to discuss the subject every Wednesday night at 6 30 and in
°f the most impor-tant steps ever undertaken by a government in the historyof the world for the protection of the entire population
tunity to do so you will listen in and that all who desireinformation other than that which may be fiimished inhese wlks will direct his interrogatories to me at the
State House, Boston
Curley used the media
.0 educate the public at the same time as he claimed
.0 advocate
what IS m the public’s best interest The public executive had .0 be able .0 make use of the
media to educate a public if he were .0 draw strength from an astute public opimon
But what of Curley as a leader’ Again, Curley campaigned on the New-Deal type
platform ofgovernment relief from the Great Depression Curley himself claims that:
“More social legislation for the people of this Commonwealth was enacted under my
administration than under any previous Chief Executive Certainly the General Coun
enacted much in the way of social legislation during Curley’s term, some of it at Curley’s
suggestion, and even approved the $61 million budget he proposed in January of 1935,'’'
Yet, as one biographer notes, this was probably as much a result of the deepening
economic crisis as anything Curley had done ” Indeed, the pieces of Curley’s “work and
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wages" program that did pass were often the product of promises for jobs
the governor.
on the part of
Yet Curley lost more legislative battles than he won. Under his first term’s
accomplishments. Curley had claimed "96% successful leglslahon - As his second-term
accomplishments, Curley makes no such grandiose claims. He notes:
one of the most disastrous floods in the Commonwealth’s
history where a demand for relief funds from the Legisla-
ture was marked by two all night sessions rendering pos-
sible a successfiil flood relief program despite tremendous
obstacles A new Old Age Assistance law was successfully
enacted which was the most forward step taken for the
protection of the aged in the Commonwealth
Yet, that flood relief was not as effective as it might have been because Curley failed to
seek federal help » The General Court did not approve, or approved m a ve^ weakened
form, many measures he advocated to help relieve the effects of the Depression, and
Curley was similarly ineffectual in attaining federal aid in that regard “ When he left the
governor’s office m January of 1937, it was amid accusations that he was a despot and a
dictator *' Curley had alienated members of both pames in both the legislature and the
electorate, where Curley-supported candidates often went down to defeat when Curley
himself became fhe issue “ Curley’s imperious behavior cost him respect and possible
success m office. More generally, the public-manager notion of the executive had failed
The notion that the governor alone represented the interests of the people and that he
alone should carry out his program had been Curley’s downfall.
In James Michael Curley, one can see the emergence of the public manager. The
elected executive had come to embody the public good directly, free from political parties.
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suppon was d.e„,v public, as be bad won b
.brougb pn.anes and elecbons
.ba.
response,bty to see
.bat the public good was enacted If a bes.tant legislature or an
.ncontpetent adnti^stration
..peded the Governor's tntplenten.ation of his progran, (,.e..
the public good), they would effectively be blocking the will of the people TWs
necessitated that the executive g.n greater control over the legislature and adnri.stra.ion
w,th a cooperative legislature and an efficient administration d.rectly under the Governor,
the public W.11 could be earned out as efficiently as poss.ble As a result, the execut.ve
found
.. necessary to take b,s case d.rectly to the people The public manager would have
to reach the public through some mass medium Curley accompl.shed this through the use
of the radio His use of the veto ind.cated that policy needed to be not constitut.onal or
partisan, but the most effic.ent means possible given the ends that needed to be
accomplished Curley was an early example of the popular manager, drawing his
legmmacy directly from the people, and attempting to exercise direct and substantial
control over administration.
The World War II Fra
The era between the Great Depression and the 1960s saw officeholders give the
desire for a more powerffil governor in Massachusetts further public expression. Leverett
Saltonstall, governor during World War II, vetoed ninety bills between 1939 and 1944, a
feat that is even more impressive than it looks, given that the General Court did not meet
during 1940 and 1942 except for a brief emergency session each year.^^ Saltonstall vetoed
these bills despite the fact that his party, the Republicans, controlled both houses of the
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Genera, Coun, i„d,caring
.ha, ,he veto was no longer s.ricly a part.san
.ool. Finally,
,hese
vetoes occurred dunng wart.^e, when one would expect to see a show of untty antong the
mentbers of the govenunent. Sal.onstall also
.ssued seventy-five executive orders benveen
nd 1944. Most of these were connected with wartime activity Much of the subject
matter of those orders was banal, and few, if any new conrntissions or boards were created
to handle public problems, though existing commissions were given certain dut.es.
Governors between ,945 and ,966 averaged only ,0 3 execut.ve orders. Even that
average is a bit misleading, however, as Maunce Tobin issued twenty-two orders while
Paul Dever issued nineteen, accounting for over one-half of the seventy-three executive
orders issued in that period Much of their output was war-related as well, corrected with
the Korean conflict The subject matter of most of these was equally nondescript as the
previous executive orders. No executive commissions or executive boards were created
With the return of peacetime, the governor no longer held as much direct policy-making
power
Governors around this time did, however, begin to make use of the power, granted
by constitutional amendment after the convention of 1917, to declare laws effective
immediately due to an emergency. While Saltonstall only used this power seventeen times
over his six years in office, Maurice Tobin used it eleven times in only two years. Robert
Bradford eight times in two years, and Christian Herter thirty-six times in four years,
indicating an increased desire on the part of the governors for a more substantive policy
role“
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Foster Fiirr.nln
Foster Furcolo, who served as governor from 1957-1961, invoked the emergency
P-tston more often than any previous governor, wnh thirty-nme acts. Furcolo represents
.he executive as it had developed hy the 1960s, with attempts to be pol.t.cally powerhrl
that were not supponed by a strong administrative framework,
trends Curley had started and became
He continued many of the
even more systematic in his bid for administrative
control Also, while Democrat Curley had
Furcolo faced only one chamber of the
gone up against a Republican legislature,
opposing party, and then only by two members,
during his first term and unified party government in his second term
Furcolo, a Democrat, served two terms as Governor of Massachusetts, winning
election in 1956 and again m 1958. His victory over Sumner G Whittier in 1956 was
particularly convincing, coming by a margin of over 140, 000 votes,“ Furcolo’s victory
that year came as Republican presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower registered a
strong victory in Massachusetts Given that Democrats won many elections in
Massachusetts, Eisenhower’s victory indicates that Massachusetts voters were not hesitant
about ticket splitting for top posts Party had become less of a force in gubernatorial
politics
Much else about Furcolo’s election indicates the more personalized nature the
executive office had taken on by the mid-twentieth century. A biographical sketch of
Furcolo following his election indicates he had been unknown to Massachusetts
Democrats ten years before his election to the Governor’s office The tenor of the article
indicates that this is a meteoric rise. Furcolo’s quck rise is certainly indicative of an
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individual who has not “paid his dues” through
through the party ranks.
The campaign itself saw much party activity, though
setvice to the patty or worked his way up
accounts seem more personal
than in the pan.san era. Remember that Frederic Greenhalge's attacks, in the late
ntneteenth century, were directed mainly at the opposition party Policy under the
opposition party was anathema to the interests of the
directed against the party as an entity
citizens of Massachusetts. Rhetoric
was present in Furcolo’s first campaign, but much of
Furcolo’s speech had become personalized Where Greenhalge had attacked the
Democratic party, Furcolo attacked Sumner Whittier
[Furcolo] struck out at his opponent for ‘voting against
measures which favor the consumer ’
On tour different occasions, Furcolo stated. Democrat-
ic leaders have tried to push through legislation to pro-
tect the public against high prices and ‘on each of these
occasions, Whittier cast his vote against the interest of
the people.
Furcolo “challenged his Republican opponent to ‘campaign on his own record’ and not on
the record of any other public officiar’“ Much of the speech during the campaign
indicated that it was the candidates who were doing battle, rather than the parties
hittier, for his part, took umbrage at the personal nature of the negative campaigning,
calling for its end.^^
The changed nature of the Governor’s office is evident in an article from the
Boston Globe the day before Furcolo delivered his inaugural address. The piece opens,
“Gov.-Elect Furcolo’s prospects for cooperation from the legislature improved today,”
upon election of Newland H. Holmes as President of the Senate/® Holmes had not been
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.he firs, chcce of
.os. RepobUcaos, bu. had won
.he Sena.e Presidency
.hrough a
coah.,on of Sena.e De.ocra.s and five Republicans. This is
.nd.car.ve of
.he dechne of
parties. Holmes was a Republican leader in a Sena.e
Ye., his eiecion as Sena.e Preside.
con.rolled by .he Republican party
was seen as fortuitous for Furcolo. a Democrat.
The article is also indicative of the changed nature of .he Governorship in relation
to other institutions, especially the legislature The Governor is i
the legislature and is providing it with direction. It is the legislature
n a supenor position to
that should be
cooperating with the governor rather than the other way around The previous
conceptions of the office had the relationship reversed It is also significant that
cooperation is stressed The mstimtions are not checking one another to ensure protection
ot rights Rather, they are cooperating to maintain the public welfare
This new relationship between the Governor and the General Court is also present
m many of Furcolo’s speeches and proposals, John Hancock and George Briggs had been
happy to concur in any measure passed by the General Court provided it was
Constitutional for the former and ,n the public («. partisan) good for the latter Furcolo,
as the embodiment of the public good was not so ready to capitulate:
It has been the policy of the Chief Executive to forthright-
ly meet the many and complex governmental problems of
the time, even when this has meant the advocacy of unpop-
ular programs and proposals. The standard had always been
to espouse that which in conscience has seemed required
for the public good, rather than that which has been expedient.''
The Governor had taken on a more direct, more detailed, policy role in the name of the
public good He is therefore seeking the cooperation of the legislature in enacting
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programs to effect that public good, Furcolo openly acknowledged the legislature’s
cooperation
’’The Executive Department wishes to express its gratitude for the
cooperation received ffom members of the General Court, in support of farsighted and
beneficial proposals The relationship between the executive and the legislature has
shifted to the legislature’s approving executive proposals rather than the other way
around The legislature had taken on an inferior position.
Party, too, had become far less important in the relationship between the
institutions, Furcolo faced divided government during the firs, of his two terms, though
only ,n the Senate, and then only by two members During his second term, his party
controlled both houses of the legtsla.ure ’’ Furcolo vetoed ten btlls over two terms, two ir
hts firs, term, in the face of divided government, and e.ght in his second term, wt.h hts
party controlling the legislature While Furcolo did no. veto a large number of bills
compared to most other twentieth-century governors, he is instructive in that party played
little role in his uses of the negative.
In hts second Inaugural Address, Furcolo recommended that the General Court
pass a rule allowing that any petition could only be heard once in any two consecutive
legislative sessions This would, according to the Governor, “increase the efficiency of the
legislative process”’^ Efficiency was a theme sounded repeatedly by Furcolo throughout
his administrations Greater efficiency and cooperation with the executive on the part of
the General Court would allow the institutions to carry out the public will more
effectively Otherwise, problems would go unaddressed This is the classic Progressive
notion of the Governorship and its relationship with other institutions. The executive, as
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The media became an important link between Furcolo and the public, indicating a
popular leader had to be medta-sawy Where Curley had used the radio. Furcolo made use
of television On July 23. 1957, for example, he spent t.me explarning to the public the
tragedy that had occurred when his proposal for a limited sales tax had been defeated in
the General Court Furcolo was quite deliberate in explaining why hts limited sales tax
would be beneficial to the public, using the example of a conversation with a citizen in his
office to Illustrate his points/^ Toward the end of his address, the Governor noted: “In
order to solve these problems. I need your [the public’s] help and cooperation and that of
the Legislature as well. I ask for that help and cooperation and for your understanding of
these problems
.
, Here was the executive going directly to the people without the party
as an intermediary He needed to educate people if public opinion were to be worth
following. As the representation of the popular will, he could take that authority to the
legislature and push for measures that would satisfy the public good
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spons.ve and more efficient In a summary of Furcolo’s accomplishments as Governor
significant Important goals were
Streamlining of the Executive Branch” is considered
“greater efficiency and co-ord,nation of programa, and oflong range planning as
“the development of sound businesslike s
well” and
tate procedures designed to create greater
efficiency and reduce the cos. of public services ”” It had become the Governor'sjob to
take the lead in effecting matters of public concern, and l-urcolo intended to accomplish
that with as efficient an administration as possible
A report to Furcolo by the Commission on Administration and Finance is
indicative of the nature of the e.xecutive-as-manager Notice the connection between the
Governor himself and the will of the people
Our present laws establishing and controlling the opera-
non of over two hundred separate departments, agencies
boards, and commissions within the Executive Department
place them in theory— but often not in practice — under
the Chief Executive The policy which has characterized
the organization of the Executive Department, frequently
separating responsibility from authority, makes the state
government less responsive to the democratic will than is
commonly realized/**
I he problem, according to the report, is “to create strong and responsive Executive
Departments genuinely accountable to the electorate’’ and “to immediately equip the Chief
Executive with the necessary tools of modern management and administration
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The report goes on to delineate the “2enpralg e principles of effective and democratic
management ofgovernment whether at the FpHr. iFederal, state or local level "» By reorganizing
state government according to these pnnciples by “makino ihee ,o g t governor responsible for
administration and sivins him= mg authonty commensurate with his responsibility the twin
goals ofadministrative effectiveness [and efficiencvl,„H r ,y] and political responsibility can be
achieved,”*' Consolidation of agencies clear iin».= es, lines of authonty and effective gubematonal
staff are among the principles of administrative management adhered to in the report.
More important than the specific recommendations of the report, however, is the
notion behind it This notion is that the Governor can become effective administratively
through the reorganization of the executive branch The executive-as-manager would
orgamze the depanments and staff under him to achieve the most effective and efficient
results Furcolo certainly sought the benefits of reorganization, submitting major
reorganization proposals to the General Court, one of which was said to “presage an
executive cabinet form of government in the Commonwealth. tt82
Foster Furcolo represents the popular manager type of executive. His authority is
based directly in the people, and his support is more personal than partisan. He is a
detailed policy leader and looks for cooperation from the legislature on his proposals.
Representative of public opinion, the popular leader must educate the public at the same
time as he is taking his cues from them. Administratively, if he is to carry out the will of
the people effectively and efficiently, he must be given direct control over administration.
The ability to organize the executive branch to ensure proper reaction to public issues is
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indicative of the executive-as-manaser Foster Fnrr^iger. Furcolo never gamed that pnvilege, though
he certainly attempted to make use of the princinles of th^Pnncipi t e executive-as-manager.
The 196fl<;
>n the ,960s. the Massachusetts govemorshtp took on more of the characteristics
nature ofgubematona, politics Constttutional and statutoty reforms that passed in the
mtddle of the decade gave the state’s chief executive greater power over admimstrative
matters such as reorganizabons of the execut.ve branch, and appo.ntments and removals
of other executtve officials The governor had become the direct representative of the
interests of the people of Massachusetts and
ability to act on those interests
The Election of 1 QfSO
was given powers designed to facilitate the
The gubernatorial election of I960, between Republican John Volpe and Democrat
Joseph Ward, revealed starkly the changed character of the executive from partisan to
directly popular or personal. The Democrats held a pre-pnmaty-nomrnat.on convention
through whtch the party indicated its preference for the nomination, though the primary-
election would be decisive This led to a spiteftrl electoral battle among seven Democratic
candidates for the pany’s nomination. Joseph D Ward won the backing of the party on
the first ballot at the convention. Robert Murphy had been Ward’s main opponent for the
endorsement and within days announced that he would fight Ward for the nomination “
Under the partisan system, members of the party were expected to fall into line behind the
candidate regardless of personal feelings. Remember that in the nineteenth century, for
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than pn.anes, as theW d.scouraged cHaHenges
,o .He >„,.s cand.da.e" wHereas
the latter encouraged
.He. In MassacHuse.ts, However, winntng at .He convent.on was
and ntoved against
.He party to build suppon for Wntself personally Five otHer candidates
also decided to challense Warri fr>ra g rd for
.He nonuna.ton, IdrtHer indicating
.He weakness of .He
party
Ward went on to victory in tHe nrimarv u.a uy n p y He did so. However, only after a bitter
stnrggle that saw h.m accused of corruption and fixing the nomination convention and the
primaoi ballot to his own advantage The endorsement of the party was one reason for
Ward s victory He also outspent his opponents and had more media exposure “ This
tactic makes sense given the personal nature of the candidacy If campaigns were more
personal than they had been, there had to be a way, in addition to the political parw, in
which the individual candidates could reach the voter Newspapers, television, radio and
other forms ofcommunication could be used to reach voters on behalf of individuals as
effectively as they could on behalf of political parties.
Indeed, the media itself had changed. Originally, newspapers had been developed
by and tor political parties. With the development, in the late-nineteenth and early-
tvventieth centuries, of a professional print media separate from politics, candidates began
to employ it, rather than the political party, to reach voters.'" Radio and television later
serv ed individual candidates at the expense of parties as well The professional media.
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on
was
from parties, gave candidates a chance to reach voters by themselves and
..
behalf of themselves Given the expensive nature of using the media, the requirement
-ney, and Ward had no financial problems in the Democratic primary of ,960 "
publicans were better organized than the Democrats and put up only one
primary Yet, in the general election campaign, John Voipe would make
efforts to obscure his Republican identification Volpe's concern was with the popularity
of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and the coattail effects his candidacy might produce The
election for Governor was a contest as much between Republican candidate John Voipe
and Joseph Ward as between the Republican and Democratic parties
-Voipe attempted to
draw the attention of the electorate away from the Republican-Democratic axis of the
state and fix ,t on a contest of individual men: John Voipe Joseph Ward He
therefore ran on the slogan ‘Vote the Man, Vote Voipe In essence, Voipe urged
voters to vote for him rather than for the Republican party, per ,ve “Vote the Man, Vote
Voipe," was the Progressive candidacy captured in a phrase Volpe’s effons were aimed
at dissociating himself from the Republican party in the voters minds This would make it
easier to capture split ticket Democrats and independents, both ofwhom were plentifhl in
Massachusetts
Voipe succeeded in making the election of I960 largely into a personal battle.
Corruption w as the theme of the election, with each candidate attempting to impugn the
other’s integrity.* Ward attacked Voipe in a series of television and newspaper
advertisements targeting alleged conflict of interest regarding both Volpe’s contracting
business and his tenure as Commissioner of Public Works Voipe answered the charges
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effectively through his own use of television limo jt evts,o t,me and newspaper space, accusing Ward of
distortion and threatening to sue for libel
Ward’s circumstances
,n the general elect,on also indicate the changed nature of
the gubernatonai base of suppon As the Democratic nomtnee, he advocated party loyalty,
hoping that the Democrats’ majority pany status in Massachusetts and Kennedy’s
populanty would push h.m into the Governor’s office Unfortunately for Ward, however.
his behavior in the primary had left many Democrats with an impression of him as corrupt,
costing him much party support He was oivf^n i •P a ^iven no financial assistance from either the
State or Nat.onal Democratic Comnuttees Those he had defeated in the pnmary either
.gnored or opposed Ward - Finally, John Kennedy refused to tour the state on Ward’s
behalf In Kennedy’s final stop in Massachusetts, he came out enthusiastically for the other
State-level Democratic candidates, but was quite reserved when discussing Ward.- Given
that Ward received so I,trie support from the party, he seemed to have little choice about a
personal candidacy, despite his emphasis of party loyalty.
Volpe translated the personal campaign into a victory. Indeed, the results of the
general election are indicative of the nature of the campaign. Volpe ran far ahead of
Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee for President, 1,269,295 to 976,750. At the same
time, Ward ran far behind Kennedy, 1,130,810 to 1,487,174. Ward also ran only 80,000
votes ahead of the Democratic nominee for United States Senator who was running
against Republican Leverett Saltonstall, an enormously popular incumbent."® On the
gubernatorial level, personal support had become more important than party support in the
electorate by the 1960s, and it reflected in the race for the chief executive’s office.
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primary, and was not supported enthusiasticallv h, fkmusias . y by the party organization in the general
election, desprte his calls for party unrty The Repubhcan nomrnee had not had any
Repubhcan's victo^ in a state that rs predomrnantly Democratic,
,n the sanre contest as a
popular Democratic Presidential candidate, firrther
.ndicates the weakening of part,es.
Support for candidates for chief execut.ve was no longer deeply partisan, „ had become
personal, based on the character, strcs of the
.ndivldual rather than the party Politics was
no longer pan.es combating one another Rather, it became individuals who could claim a
status independent from the parties battling one another, often fiercely and with little room
for compromise. Gubernatorial candidates won nominations and ran campaigns with little
help from the pany Thus, their support became personal,
.As a result, the Governor came
to embody the public will directly The office of the Governor became a personal office
whose occupant could claim the direct suppon of the people regardless of the pan.san
affiliation of either
Reforms of the 1960«s
As the governor came to develop a personal following separate from his party, the
movement to strengthen the office administratively, so that its occupant could meet
popular demands, had its greatest success in the 1960s. Amendments to the Constitution
would augment or change drastically much of what had emerged from the Convention of
1917, The Governor was granted a four year term in 1964, though it started with the
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elect.cn of ,966 ^ He was given ten days in w„ch to return a bi„ with reconuuendations
through Article XC .n ,968
.Most importantly for purposes of the ntanageria, executive,
the Governor was given substant.al reorganization power ,n ,966 Art.de LXXXV,,
atmuhed An.Ce L.XX^ whtch had g.ven the Genera, Court powers over organ,zations of
the executive branch The amendment gave the Governor the power to present
reorganization plans to the General Court:
For the purpose of transferring, abolishing, consolidatino
or coordmatmg the whole or any part of any agency or°
the O.nct.ons thereof, within the executive department of
the government of the commonwealth, or for the purpose
of authorizing any officer of any agency within the execu-hve department of government of the commonwealth to
delegate any of his Oinctions, the governor may prepare
one or more reorganization plans, each bearing an identi-
fying number and may present such plan or plans to the
general court, together with a message in explanation thereof”
This provision involved the same reasoning that had buttressed the efforts of earlier
reformers It was the governor’s task to see that the popular will was satisfied If he were
to do that, he would have to have an administration that ran effectively and efficiently and
over which he could exercise some control.
The governor also gained administrative authority through a reduction in the
powers of the Executive Council. As Blodgett notes, the Council hampered the governor’s
efforts at appointment and removal of officers, by virtue of its power to approve or
disapprove them.'®' In 1964, however, the approval of Question #5 on the November 3
ballot eliminated the statutory authority over appointments the Council had maintained.
Appointments and removals in the executive branch no longer required the approval of the
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initiative
Counc, .03
.e„ cou. no.
_ve an. appoint...
.a.W.
finniy separated the governor front the Counc,
,n adnt.™strat,ve ntatters: ^dn addttion, so
much ot any provision of the General T r. cLaws or of any special law requiring the advtce and
consent of the Council ‘with resoect to anvp y action or onnsston to act by the Governor, or
any officer, agency or instrumentality of the executive department’ is repealed ”'“3
Governors had been calling for greater control over administration for nearly a century. In
the 1960s, they received it.
With much of the civ il service being ostensibly neutral and beyond complete
jurisdiction of the Governor even with his enhanced powers, the question became one of
control If the executive embodied the will of the public, how could that will be carried out
administratively if much of the civil service was out of the Governor’s hands’^ The answer
was to make the Governor’s Office, rather than only the General Court, the location of
responses to policy problems Executive orders became an accepted means of dealing with
popular concerns, and their number grew at a rapid rate beginning m the mid-1960s. As
noted above, prior executive orders had been mostly war-related and their subject matter
had been almost uniformly unremarkable.
Both the number and the nature of executive orders changed around the time the
Governor was given control of administrative reorganization Executive commissions and
executive advisory boards sprang up fairly rapidly as the Governor sought greater control
over public affairs. In 1965, with John Volpe’s Executive Order Number Forty-eight,
which established a Governor’s Committee on Fund-Raising Within the State Service, the
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vi«
..««,.„ „„„,„„
^ ^
publ.c problem or wuh the reorganization of the executive department Eight ofthem
established new Governor's Councils or Governor's Committees Francs Sargent
issued forty-eight executive orders from ,969 through ,974 Again, most of the orders
addressed pressing social problems or reorganized the executive department tn some
fashion Sixteen of these established some sort of Governor's Commission, Council or
Task Force.- Executive Order Number Seventy-four established a Governor's Code of
Fatr Practices regarding discrimination, while fourteen other orders created boards,
commissions or councils that were not specifically labeled Gubernatorial
Further, the emergency power, which governors had begun to use more
prominently m the 1950s, saw even greater usage in the ,960s Endicott Peabody declared
forty-six laws effective immediately dunng his one term, more than any previous governor
During six years as governor, John Voipe declared one-hundred twenty-five emergency
laws, wWle Francis Sargent declared two-hundred
,wen,y-,wo.‘»’ The desire for a more
powerfiil governor, or a more responsive government, had pushed the officeholders to
using their constitutional powers to a greater extent than had previously been attempted
The Governor had acquired both a more positive, and more detailed, policy role
and heightened powers to effect changes in the executive branch. The notion of the
Governor as directly representing the public will translated into administrative directives
straight from the Governor’s office, and the establishment of commissions, committees,
boards and task forces under the Governor’s name to look into matters of public concern.
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The c. se^ce Ha. Heco.e neu.a,, so .He Oove.o.
.ooH .o ceaHn, co^ass.ns
,o
Genera. Coun cou.d He bypassed Even
..He Genera, Cour, Had„ .He Governor
au.Hon.y
.o crea.e
.He comnnssion,
.. was s.gn.fican.
.ha. .hey were granting Hi™
.He
power
.0 do so, ra.her
.Han do.ng i., or deal.ng w..h
.he problem themselves The
governor had come to represent the public will and was given the policy and
administrative capacity to carry out that role.
Conclusion
w..h political parties losing influence and control over the political process, the
executive changed from a panisan administrator into a public manager. His source of
legitimacy was now the public directly. Parties no longer mediated the relationship
between the executive and the electorate. Being directly popular, the elected executive
came to be considered the sole representative of the will of the public As such, it became
his responsibility to implement a program for the public’s benefit The legislature, did not
entirely concede the fiinction of representing the public to the executive however, and an
uncooperative legislature, or a reluctant executive branch for the matter, could too easily
thwart the plans of the Governor and hinder the realization of the will of the people,"”
The public manager needed somehow to bring the legislature and administration under
control Through appeals to the public and by placing many policy decisions in the
executive branch or the executive office, these objectives could be accomplished
Appointments to office were no longer partisan, but were ideally based on technical or
professional competence
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Even m the heyday of political parties notenti;,l »P
, p ntia appointments were often touched
a iin.e of the Oovetnofs personal taste With a political culture that has always been
-e personal than partisan, Massachusetts has seen more than its share of administrative
scandals Allegations of conflict of interest and favors for cronies are relatively
common - In this sense, the image of the public executive as a manager, with an
emphasis on efficiency, neutrality and professionalism, came late to Massachusetts if it
came at all. It did come, however, in the person of Michael Duhahis, a three-term
governor and the 1988 Democratic Presidential nominee.
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CHAPTER 4
DUKAKIS I
There
,s a chailenge inherent in the office of the Anrencan elected execuuve That
officeholder faces pressures arising ffon, two institutional roles whtch nray no, be
const, tut,onal possess,on of the veto, the executive is a pol,t,cal figure who must play a
role, along w,th other members of the polity. ,n a poh.ical system But the executive also
serves an admnnstrauve role: it ,s his duty to execute the law These two roles do no,
necessarily complement one another For example, an adm,n,stra,ive appointee may be
pointcally aligned w,th the chief executive ye. execute the law poorly Poor execut.on of
.he law leads to charges of incompetence or ,neffic,ency on the pan of the elected official.
Yet. ignonng poll,real activity leads to accusations of arrogance or aloofness Attempts a,
reconciling these pressures and meeting the executive challenge have resulted in three
concepuons of the office: the constitutional executive, the panisan administrator and the
popular manager The latter conception is the dominant interpretation of the executive
office in American politics.
The problem then becomes the exercise of leadership Leadership here is defined as
the ma,menance of a victorious electoral coalition based on a stable, coherent program of
governance that the elected executive is successful in implementing once in office How
does a pres,dent or a governor exercise leadership given the executive challenge of
compet,ng pressures'. Voters expect chief executives, ideally, to run on a program which
the candidate will implement once elected Each of the above conceptions of the executive
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provides a means for achieving this end Yet whetg ms what measure of success can an elected
executive achieve under a »iven concentirmp on of the pos.t.on'- Can the prospects for success
be affected by choosing among the vanous concept.ons of the executive office^
In order to investigate the potential for leadership each of the three major
concept,ons of the execut.ve. the political experiences of former Massachusetts Governor
Mtchael Dukalos make an effective case study Dukak.s ,s an exemplary case study the
executive challenge because he modified hts conception of the office over time. This
chapter will present Dukak.s from h.s days as a state representative through his defeat in
the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary This is Dukakis as a Progressive-type
politic,an, or a popular manager, and his battle with a partisan administrator. The next
chapter will detail Dukakis’s 1982 gubernatorial primary victory, his successful second
term, his reelection to the governorship in 1986 and finally his defeat at the national level
in the presidential campaign of 1988 It will be asserted that his successfitl second term
was due to a modification of his conception of the executive office as he became more ofa
constitutions! executive His Isck of snrrpQc in iqsq j i •c. iiii idVK i uccess in 1988, moreover, was due largely to his
once again adopting a popular-manager conception of the executive office.
Michael Dukakis’s political career is thus useful from the perspective of the
executive challenge for two important reasons. It offers insights into all three types of
executives and thus allows one to compare and contrast them. Further, it shows the
malleability of the executive office. The executive, while being constrained by the
pressures stemming from the roles of the office, is also able to work within the bounds of
those roles and shape the office into an instrument for leadership
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Mv Dukakis the General Tnnrf
Michael Stadey Dukakis came out of Brookline. Massachusetts, a town bordered
on three sides by the c.ty of Boston, Brookline has tts share of urban ne.ghborhoods. such
as the area located near Boston University. It is also home to mote upscale subdivisions,
however, and is quite wealthy, with a great many residents who are professionals and
members of the upper class This was the environment in which Dukakis spent his
formative years. An excellent school system helped instill an achievement ethic in
Brookline’s young people, while Dukakis’s mother and father taught him the value of hard
work and frugality ' Dukakis translated these values into a lifestyle that stressed the value
of family, principle, honest effort and financial soundness, values he would take into
politics.
When Dukakis entered Brookline town politics, in the late 1950s, he faced a
situation that paralleled developments in the rest of Massachusetts, though on a smaller
scale than in a city like Boston Dukakis was part of a new generation of reformers who
sought a more activist government that was less corrupt and more efficient, along the lines
of the values that had been instilled in him in his early years The reformers opponents
were old-style, more traditional, often Irish, pols who ran local governments by the rules
of nineteenth-century political machines ^ The reformers also had few, if any, ties to the
Yankee, Brahmin class of old stock.
Working-class Irish pols dominated the Brookline Democratic Town Committee
at this time, and their methods offended Dukakis and other reformers:
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The Town Committee, discouraged broad representa-
tion and grassroots activism had no interest in progres-
sive causes nationally
.[and] voted repeatedly to nomi-
nate hacks, still fighting the Yankee-Irish wars, for state-
Wide office.
Dukakis and his fellow reformers were able to wrest control of Brookline’s Democratic
Town Committee from the pols in 1959 in a stunning upset/ After their victory at the
local level, Dukakis and the reformers set their sights on the General Court
Michael Dukakis’s election to and experiences in the Massachusetts General Court
effectively demonstrate the Progressive mind-set that would color many of his words and
actions as Governor Dukakis was a Democrat, certainly, and voted as a liberal on most
social issues. He was not, however, interested in toeing the party line From the start,
Dukakis s ambition was apparent to all who knew him, and that ambition was not bounded
by the traditional party structure At several points in his career, he pursued his own
electoral agenda without regard for deference to his party’s leaders or even those who had
been his friends. He had little patience for the traditional party structure and often worked
outside the party to pursue office
In 1960, with the formation of the Commonwealth Organization of Democrats
(C O D ) Dukakis and friends Fran Meaney, Herb Gleason and Bill and Carl Sapers were,
according to the then-Democratic Chairman ‘“out to destroy the party
A
more
accurate representation of their aim was reformation of the party Democrats of Dukakis’s
ilk despised the glad-handing cronyism, often resulting in outright corruption, that
characterized their state party’s established leadership”^ The goal was to dislodge
entrenched party leaders and replace them with the younger reformers who saw the party
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as programmatic rather than as a means for distnbuting benefits/ It was not party, per se,
that bothered Dukakis, but the nature of the patronage-based party in Massachusetts
Dukakis’s unsuccessful run for Attorney General in 1966 also illustrates his
impatience with the traditional Massachusetts party organization. He “show[ed] not a
speck of deference to his elders,” calling his candidacy “a choice for reform and change”
for Democrats as opposed to “the same old tired voices.”' Given Dukakis’s limited
experience in the House, he needed something other than his record on which to base his
campaign His theme became clearing away corruption Fighting corruption was above
party for Dukakis, and he would carry that theme throughout his career
Along with his maverick attitude, Dukakis had a definite gift for organization. That
gift came to the tore often and early in Dukakis’s political career, it was employed for the
benefit of the party Again, it was not party that Dukakis was against. In fact, Dukakis and
other young Democrats with whom he worked at the time favored a strong party
organization that was able to win elections They were active campaigners, going door to
door and sending mass mailings.^ Members of the organization also were far less uneasy
regarding the nominating convention than traditional Progressives, favoring a twenty
percent rule for eligibility in the primary The difference was that they sought to elect
issue-oriented candidates rather than patronage-oriented ones. Their goals were ‘“reform
and having better people elected. Traditional partisan channels were eschewed as
corrupt or too resistant to change to be of any use to the reformers. They set up their own
organization to match their own purposes.
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Certainly, Dukakis and other members of C O n u* j-i^ers r L U D sought a direct and effective
express,on of .he of the people Dukakis had •^always dreanred" of‘a spectacular
nowering of denrocracy,” and was constantly active
“recruiting participants ,n,o the
political process in order to change it Indeed the “r n n u^ u® i a a, COD philosophy was predicated
on a pohucally aware and active electorate, which would panicipa.e in a vigorous
democracy and produce responsible, issue-onented candidates ” The strongest office,
according to C O D reformers, should be the executive The popular will had to receive
,ts strongest expression in the executive, and “the key to a successful democracy was a
strong chief executive Dukakis asserts that, “An executive has to be a cheerleader,"
and must take advantage of the opportunity “to create a better society, to help improve
the quality of life of your fellow citizens
Dukakis pushed many of C O D ’s goals while he was a member of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. Beginning a case study on the executive with a
governor’s legislative experience is appropriate given that the governor had his first
political success in the legislature. Indeed, even as a legislator, Dukakis had his sights set
on the Governor’s office He had a definite idea of what the office should entail and many
of the reforms he sought were designed to strengthen the State’s chief executive. These
reforms were directly connected to C O.D ’s search for a Democratic party that “could
come to govern honestly and fairly.”’® The concern here was not '"what government
should be doing so much as.
. how government should be doing it.”” This involved
strengthening the Governor. A four-year term, a governor and lieutenant governor who
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ran as a ticket, and consolidation and elimination of minor elective, administrative offices
were among the COD proposals
In the legislature, Dukakis pushed for these reforms and greater reorganizational
power for the governor as well as elimination of the Governor’s Council '* Like COD
generally, Dukakis was particularly energetic on “matters of process dealing with
governmental reform and the structure of institutions In a typically Progressive
manner, Dukakis focused on the process. The notion was that with good, clean
government, the public could be heard, problems could be addressed and special interests
could be purged The focus of Dukakis on procedural issues would carry him through his
first gubernatorial campaign and into his first term in that office.
Though Dukakis s main concern was with issues of institutions and procedure, he
did not completely avoid social issues, expressing concern for housing and race relations
His greatest success in the legislature, however, was the passage of a no-fault automobile
insurance bill, one of the earliest in the nation Dukakis’s handling of the no-fault issue is
instructive for the insight it offers into the political methods Dukakis would bring to the
governor s office. First, Dukakis looked at the automobile insurance issue in
Massachusetts as a problem with a solution. Massachusetts possessed the highest car
insurance rates in the nation, a problem Dukakis felt could be solved rationally. He
advocated a solution that had been offered by two professors who had studied
Massachusetts’s insurance system exhaustively.^*^
Car-insurance reform represented an attempt to professionalize something that had
become corrupted by political interests. Due to the nature of Massachusetts’s insurance
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laws,
.o.ons.s who were involved accden.s had ,o prove fauU cour. before being
able .0 collec. damages. Delays ,n overcrowded courts often resulted in insurance holders
no. receiving proper contpensat.on for their claims Dukakis was fighting a battle agatns.
tort lawyers and insurance comnanies i •P hese political interests had gained substantial
power in Massachusetts and were eager to keep the money they had been earning. Bu,
Dukakis saw these interests as was.elhl and corntpt.ng, and sough, to cleanse the
.nsurance system of the extravagance and misuse brought about by powerful, entrenched
interests In place of that waste and abuse. Dukakis sought to install a system that would
funcon profess,onally, free of abuse from political
.nterests, for the benefit of the people
of Massachusetts - Pol.t.ca,
,nterests were cor^p.ing and only through profess,onalism
could proper results, or properly efficent results, be attained
Dukakis was adamant enough about no-fault to remain beh,nd ,t for s,x years in the
General Court When the bill was finally passed and signed in 1970
,
Dukakis's actions are
indicative of the institutional attitudes he brought ,o public life Once the House and
Senate had each passed a no-fault b.Il, a conference committee was appointed to resolve
diflferences between the bills Dukakis was on the original committee, but was removed
when he was unwilling to compromise The bill that resulted was. ironically, tougher on
insurance companies than Dukakis’s original bill had been Once the amended bill had
been passed by both chambers, Dukakis took the floor in the House to answer questions.
He “[drew] from a deep well of knowledge to describe the bill’s intricacies and
implications,” earning a standing ovation from his colleagues
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Here was Dukakrs’s firs, major political success He was successfi.1 because he had
been competent, because he had advanced a rational solution and because he had
successfirlly debated the ments of that solution. Furthermore, he had done so in the face of
political interests which he saw as inimical to the public good. Like the focus on
procedure, the reliance on competence would follow Dukakis into h,s first gubernatorial
campaign and his first administration An executive who is knowledgeable enough and
persuasive enough with the facts should be able to convince others of the rightness of his
cause Dukakis admits that his first term as Governor was colored by his legislative
experience
Some of [the nature of the problems of a first gubernator-
ial term] has to do with what you do as a legislator
.You’re
one of one-hundred forty, one-hundred sixty
. You’re fight-
ing all the time to try to get your stuff through. You don’t
need these kinds of skills [consensus building.
.
. coalition
building involving people] quite as much Now, good legislat-
ors have those skills
, but the likelihood is that you won’t do
that You might join with other like-minded legislators as I
did often, but it’s, different, when you’re Governor
Dukakis’s first term would be marred by a lack of these activities as he carried the culture
of competence into the Governor’s office
The culture of competence was the institutional structure behind which Dukakis
attained his first political success. A political figure with a proper grasp of the facts and a
mastery of debate could push an issue through. People had to be made to see the rightness
of the solution to an issue regardless of the political interests that may be at stake. Further,
Dukakis focused on the implementation of professionalism, rather than what he saw as
political corruption, to facilitate reduction of waste and increase of efficiency. Improve the
process, make i, more profess.onal, more rat.onally based, and the results of that process
would be better for the people.
The Election nf i Q74
Between 1971. when he left the General Coun, and 1974, when he was elected
Governor, Mtchael Dukakts kept Wmself occupied with activities that both demonstrated
his burntng desire to hold statew.de office and illustrated Dukak.s's Progressive not.on of
the Govemorslhp. Dukakts kept himself on television, as moderator of TTte AJvoca.es, a
show which presented arguments for and against national issues in a courtroom setting.
This provided Dukakis with powerfitl visibility and allowed him to become more
television-savwy “ The public manager needed to reach people Given the importance of
television as a means of reaching voters, Dukakis was able to gain valuable exposure at
next to no cost
Dukakis did not rely solely on television to gain exposure in Massachusetts,
however As early as 1970, he began building a statewide organization to work for his
election in 1974. This involved building upon the supporters Dukakis had gathered in a
run for Lieutenant Governor in 1970. A law student, Alan Johnson, did much of the foot
work in organizing and Dukakis managed to build an impressive roster of activists and
supporters by election time. Here was a potential candidate who did not work within
traditional party lines and was canvassing individuals for his own benefit rather than for
the benefit of the party organization. Indeed, supporters were often attracted to what they
perceived as Dukakis’s integrity. His eagerness to supplant “politics as usual,” the
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machine politics on which Massachusetts was organized, was attractive to reformers
around the state.
If Dukak,s fought what he saw as corruption in the electoral arena by
circumventing it, he fought it head on in the administrative arena On November 24, ,970
Dukakts announced the format,on of an organtzation to invest.gate act,v,ty in Governor
’
Sargent's administration and make recommendations for reforms, “The Dukakts Raiders”
comprised a volunteer organizat.on made up mainly of reformist lawyers whose pnncipal
targets of investigation would be state regulatory agencies Several reports critical of
agencies under the Sargent administration would come out over the next two years
Dukakis was targeting the Governor in order to set up a run for office in 1974 » Agencies
were to be run professionally, and it was the Governor's job to assure that they were If he
did not, he was negligent and should be held accountable
Dukakis attempted to break away from traditional Massachusetts partisan, i.e.
patronage, politics in both his campaigning and his administrative efforts. He assembled an
organization for Michael Dukakis rather than working through the traditional party
system. In administrative matters, he attempted to expose a lack of professionalism, and
what he saw as overt corruption. Thus, the executive was both directly popular, with no
partisan intermediary', and a manager, responsible for professional, efficient administration
of agencies and programs.
Dukakis would combine these approaches in the campaign of 1974. His election in
1974 was based on a pledge to “clean up” Massachusetts’s government. A system that had
been revealed to be corrupt and wasteful needed to be made more professional and more
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efficient Dukakis connected this system to the public mood at the time Calling the
patronage system a “‘cancer’ on state government, a system that ‘must be destroyed,”’
and the public’s disposition “angry” and “unhappy,” he claimed “the governor is there for
the taking In the wake of Watergate, Dukakis found it easy to capitalize on public
feelings of resentment toward what they perceived as a corrupt system.
For his purposes, Dukakis faced the perfect opponent in the Democratic primary
Bob Quinn represented everything against which Dukakis was running. Quinn was part of
the “old-boy network” of Massachusetts politics and relied on that network to carry him
to victory over Dukakis in the primary Indeed, at the start of the pnmary season,
conventional wisdom had Quinn running in front of Dukakis. Additionally, Quinn had
most of the major old-line Democrats, including the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President, backing him These two factors caused Quinn to pay no attention to Dukakis
and to focus his efforts on Governor Sargent Quinn’s based his campaign around efforts
to unite Irish and Italian hard-line Democrats, further solidifying the primary as a contest
between the old-style and new-style politics."^ Quinn thought so little of Dukakis that he
refused to debate him even two weeks before the primary, with Dukakis ahead in the
polls. In the last week of the campaign, Quinn attempted to blast Dukakis with negative
ads (such as those portraying the reformer as “an ‘advocate’ of abortions”) which were
ultimately unsuccessful.^** Dukakis, for his part, criticized Quinn’s work as
Massachusetts’s Attorney General, questioning his competence, especially in handling
federal crime-fighting grants from the U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.^^
The campaign was a personal battle between two different styles of politics.
216
In disseminating his message, Dukakis made use of the television skills he had
honed in working on The Advocates A simulated house party at which Dukakis spoke
was telecast across the state, and voters were urged to hold house parties of their own and
watch the program.^^ Dukakis employed technology to benefit himself and to educate the
public as to his message Quinn was more traditional in his campaigning, targeting ethnic
neighborhoods personally while other major Massachusetts Democrats stumped for him/''
Thus, campaign tactics demonstrated the nature of the 1974 Massachusetts Democratic
primary it pitted the traditional partisan pol against the modem, good-government
reformer
Quinn thus represented exactly what Dukakis was mnning against; the party-
based, patronage politics of Massachusetts’s traditional Democrats He used that type of
politics attempting to defeat Dukakis, and, Dukakis intimated, voters could expect more
of the same if Quinn were elected Governor Quinn had underestimated the force of
Dukakis’s personal organization and Dukakis’s message Dukakis had built a strong
following and was able to capitalize on the anti-cormption mood of the state’s citizens to
defeat Quinn handily: “Citizens who felt independent of the old-boy network, but united in
a reform spirit, were expressing themselves by pulling the Dukakis lever all across the
Commonwealth.”-’*^
With his primary victory, Dukakis called for the ‘“dawn of a new era’ and an end
to ‘the buddy system of politics on Beacon Hill.’”'*^ Yet Dukakis was not completely blind
to the Democratic party In achieving electoral success, he recognized the necessity of
placating the old-style politicians, and made some efforts to do so through the general
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election season. His mnning mate was Thomas P, O’Neill III, son of the legendary Tip
0 Ne.ll Tip helped pull together the old-line Democrats to keep the party united through
the general election," Again, however, Dukakis was a reformer, and concentrated on
maintaining professionalism once elected. The party Dukakis was after was a reformist,
good-government party rather than the spoils-based party of the traditional Democrats,
The party was to be a means of facilitating the direct translation of the wishes of the
people into efficient, effective action through the Governor It was not to be a promoter of
special interests or friends of party elites to the detriment of the general public "
In the general election for Governor in 1974, Dukakis emphasized many of the
themes he had used in the primary His image of the Governorship continued to be one
based on professionalism and good management in carrying out the will of the people
While the economy was in a downturn. Governor Sargent’s management ofgovernment
agencies was poor at best, and, according to Dukakis, spending was out of control.
Indeed, Sargent did spend very little of his time as governor managing state agencies, and
preferred to spend most of his time on “what generally might be labeled the ‘ceremonial’
functions of the governor, such as proclamation signings or public appearances.'^^ As
Martha Wagner Weinberg notes: “he did not especially enjoy the detailed work of agency
management and therefore did not accord it a favored position among his duties.
Dukakis played up his own perceived competence against Sargent’s mismanagement of
the State’s administration/^
But Dukakis offered little in the way of an agenda. While he ridiculed the way in
which Sargent ran the government and offered clean, efficient government as an antidote,
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he d.d Httie .0 address social issues « He did address the poor economic condit.on of the
state, but it was largely in terms of the need for
“productivity increases, better cash
management and reduced use of private consultants” in government « The issue of an
unconst,tutional budget deficit arose, and Dukakis issued a “lead-pipe guarantee” that he
would not ra,se taxes to balance the state's books Dukak.s was making a promise to
“save $100 million or more through better management Dukakis remained focused on
the process, on how the government should conduct its business and little concerned with
what the government should be doing
Dukakis's message resonated with Massachusetts’s voters He defeated Sargent
with margins as large as three-to-one in some areas, though in more ideologically-liberal
areas, Dukakis’s showing was not as strong as elsewhere “ Dukakis had, through the
popular-manager conception of the executive, won a major electoral victory, his first for
statewide office In doing so, he had defeated the partisan-administrator It remained to be
seen how the Progressive conception of the executive would play itself out in a leadership
role
Dukakis I
Dukakis s first term is illustrative of the nature of the Progressive-type executive
The executive was to be popular, directly linked to the people and kept in check by the
popular will. He was also a manager, insuring that programs ran efficiently and leading the
legislature in providing for the popular welfare. It was through professionalism and
efficiency in government, through the removal of corruption and waste, that the public will
could be properly attained. Dukakis made efforts to keep his Governorship popular and
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maintain direct connections to voters educatina ti,
’ them at the same time He also went to
great lengths to attain professionalism in administration i.du and make government in the
Commonwealth more efficient
According ,o Gaines and Segal,
-Dukalas entered office detemtined ,o do wha, he
though, was nght, ,n the abstract sense, w.thout reference to the poltt.ca, context,"
attempting to work apart from “politics as usual I. was not that Dukakis was
attempting to without politics Rather, wha. constituted poIit.es for him was no. what
constttuted politics for many other members of the State's government, Pol.tics, for
Dukakts, mean, the Progress,ve sense of the word, open debate and persuasion through
appeals to reason rather than appeals to interest In his first term, Dukakis consistently
rehed on h.s own reason and vtsion with full confidence that eventually others would come
to understand and follow him ’ This vision of the executive extended to his relations with
the legislature in these years
Initially, Dukakis made overtures toward connecting with the legislature. In his
inaugural address, he claimed “he understood the legislative process, and that he intended
to involve the legislators ‘deeply and actively’ in the work of his administration,”
discussing “his belief that political power had to be diffused throughout the political
system. Early in his tenure, Dukakis met with both the legislative leadership and the
House s Democratic Study Group. Dukakis had claimed that he would not rely on
rewards in his relationship with the General Court, that he would not “threaten or
cajole Rather, he would use reason to persuade the legislators to follow his course.
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Eventually, however, hts attitude, and the attitude of the administration generally
became “callous and detached Legislators felt as though they had been “treated
disdainfully," and “[a]s a pohtical force on Beacon Hill, Dukakis had 'become
irrelevant,’”" Dukakis admits that in his first term h.s attitude was one of ‘Here it is and
It’s temfic and pass if” Except formally, he did not include the legislature in the policy
making process, and legislators were understandably infuriated On a bill to reform the
court system in Massachusetts, for example, Dukakis ignored Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman ^an S.sitsky: “‘[T]he governor hasn’t even bothered to speak to me about it
He hasn't indicated a readiness to negotiate ’’” Only after making more effective efforts to
deal with the legislature was Dukakis able to win passage of the Court reform bill
Dukakis had spent much of the political capital he held with the legislature early in his first
term
Dukakis’s words about the involvement of legislators and actions early in his term
were indicative of a Progressive style of executive in the sense that the governor was to
lead the legislature rather than following its lead, or even cooperating with it as a partner.
The executive branch would take the lead in policy matters, especially regarding the
economy. There is little, if any, deference to the legislature that John Hancock or even
George Briggs evinced. For all his motions toward legislative involvement, Dukakis lost
far more friends than he made in the General Court in his first term, largely because
legislators felt they were being ignored. If the executive should be leading the legislature,
legislators should be made to feel as though they are being considered for policies to be
dealt with more effectively. Yet, Dukakis, other than nominally, expended little effort to
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involve leg.slators substantively in decisions of h,s administration If his effons at
persuasion did not work, he simply attempted to push a plan through regardless of
legislators’ wishes.
Wh,le Dukakis suffered stormy relations with the General Court almost from the
begmrang of his term, his relationship with the public was less shaky at the start He
indicated early in his first term that his government would be open and accessible to the
public Cabinet meetings, for example, were to be public affairs,” Indeed. Dukakis was
fairly popular with the public even while he was not respected by many fellow
officeholders “ Yet. by the end of his term. Dukakis had lost much of his popular appeal,
being told by one woman, “Yes, you’ve been a pretty good governor, but I’m not votin«
for you People generally considered Dukakis “self-nghteous, unfeeling,
condescending.”^^ A Progressive-type executive was to be a public leader, but Dukakis
had taken that position to the point of arrogance or alooftiess.
Dukakis entered office with the ambition of cleaning up Massachusetts’s
administration, and several of his practices as Governor reflected that fact. His practice for
filling offices was based strictly on professionalism rather than patronage. Even Joe
Grandmaison, who had run Dukakis s successful gubernatorial campaign was not part of
his administration. Individuals who had been vital to Dukakis’s election were left off of his
staff and administration so that there would be no signs of impropriety or patronage.
Indeed, Dukakis was so adamant about the maintenance of professionalism and rectitude
that personal friendships suffered. Sumner Kaplan and Fran Meaney had both been
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personally and poH.ically dose with Dukakis Both split sharply with ht„ over Dukakis's
actions surrounding their involvement in public life
Dukakts’s general criteria for appointment, especially to his cabinet, was that
public administrators should not be politically influenced
[H]e wanted his cabinet officials to have management ability
and political skills, and to be compassionate He wanted gen-
eralists, and he wanted to be sure that each cabinet post was
filled by someone who did not have ties to the constituencv
groups active in the part of society the cabinet office served “
Neutral objectivity was the key, and Dukakis went so far m this policy that “members of
Sargent or Quinn’s campaign actually got tapped for important state jobs for which
Dukakis campaign workers were turned down.”^^ Being politically uninterested often
meant pursuing a course of action perceived as beneficial, regardless of the wishes of other
members of the public Insurance Commissioner James Stone and Banking Commissioner
Carol Greenwald are indicative of this, regulating in a manner that seemed to members of
the business community to be a “knee-jerk consumer” mentality, with no regard for the
wishes of members of the business community
. The Boston Globe described Evelyn
Murphy, Dukakis’s Secretarv' for Environmental Affairs, as a “New York-based planner,”
while Dukakis noted that she was a “professional environmentalist.”^^ Further, Murphy
was an unknown quantity to the Director of Massachusetts Forests and Parks
Association. Thus, Dukakis sought professionalism, which found its embodiment in ‘“a
relevance’ between the appointees and the offices they [would] oversee,” but not to the
point where appointees were ‘“captives’ of special interest groups.”’®
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In keeping with the Progressive ideal, Dukakts desired broad power on the pan of
the executive branch to deal with matters of policy. He sought to shift some power from
the Governor’s office to the cabinet secretanes, delegating them authority to respond to
policy matters as they saw fit. while ultimate authonty would remain with the governor:
In theory, issues, matters of disputes, problems and initia-
tives would be defined and evaluated by the cabinet secre-
tanes, who, with the advice and consent of the governor
would proceed toward action according to an approved
'
list of pnonties. The governor would see to it that cabinet
initiatives were coordinated and not in conflict/'
Thus, the Progressive assumption still remained that the executive branch should be the
guiding torce in policy matters. The executive should be leading the legislature rather than
the other way around
Dukakis focused, as promised, on management practices in Massachusetts
government A commission formed, with Fran Meaney as chair, to study management
practices m Massachusetts public life and to make recommendations The report is
Progressive m its attitude toward governmental administration. It is an important function
of the “Governor, his staff and his top administrative appointees [to] manage all Executive
Branch agencies effectively.”^^ More importantly, proper management is tied directly to
carrying out the wishes of the public:
The 807 specific recommendations contained in this re-
port are based on sound business practices and general-
ly accepted industry standards and were made without
regard for political considerations. Many require funda-
mental changes in the traditional methods used by the
Commonwealth to manage its resources. However, ef-
fective implementation of these proposals is vital if your
administration is to succeed in its efforts to reduce gov-
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eminent spending and conserve the limited financial re-
sources now available.
This will not be an easy task, but the taxpayers of Mas-
sachusetts deserve efficient, economical management
01 their government.
Fundamental to achieving the public good is professional, efficient administration:
“Nearly
every citizen will, at one time or another, encounter the state’s limited capacity to carry
out Its functions Thus, the public interest was wrapped up in the efficient and effective
ftmctioning of state agencies. To carty out those ftinctions more effectively, the State’s
management capacities had to be strengthened The measurement of how well the
government, particularly the executive, functions is how well it is managed
The authors of the report note that the “climate in Massachusetts state government
is, in many important respects, antimanagerial ’’” They note that through over-regulation
m personnel and budgeting areas, the “General Court has made senous incursions into the
managerial authority and responsibility of the executive ”"* They also wrote that the
cabinet had to be strengthened, especially regarding “quasi-independent” agencies whose
members often ignored the Secretariats in attaining what they desired:""
In all cases, however, the Secretariats must be given the
authority to manage the agencies under their jurisdiction.
With this authority, they will become responsible for im-
plementing agency activities and programs The major ob-
jective is to provide the Governor with a reasonable num-
ber of individuals who will be accountable to him for the
performance of the executive branch."^
This is the Progressive notion of the executive branch The report is adamant about the
need for “cabinet government,” and Dukakis ordered that Cabinet officials or Department
heads themselves, rather than lobbyists on the department’s behalf, testify before the
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General Court. Here, again, Dukakis was concerned with the process, with keeping
government “open, rational, honest and efficient
Despite hts loss in the I97S Dentocrat.c primary, Dukakts’s first term was far from
a complete failure. He managed to win passage of many bills that were important to him.
Automobile insurance, the Court System, welfare and revitalization of certmn urban areas
all received attention from Dukakis once the State’s fiscal crisis had been brought under
control He achieved some measure of success in all these areas, though in varying
degrees As noted above, however, his success is instmctive It came mostly when he
attempted to involve others rather than attempting simply to implement his personal
Vision
This had been Dukakis’s first term as Governor, and he had tried to implement the
Progressive notion of the elected chief executive: the popular manager He had come into
office with a rational plan and attempted to persuade the legislature and the public that,
under this plan, the State could prosper. He had attempted to professionalize
administration and strengthen the managerial functions of the executive branch. Dukakis
had some success. Yet, a year into his term, he was reviled by legislators and in 1978, he
would lose the Democratic primary to Edward King. What had happened*^ Why had the
Progressive vision of the governorship been so unconvincing in this incarnation‘s Insight
into the breakdown of the Progressive governorship can be gained by examining the issue
of raising taxes.
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^^ALead,Pi^e^uarantee ” Rmir^n
The issue of taxes has been chosen as an illustration of the Progressive governor
because i, encapsulates the reasons Dukakts lost the Democratic primaty ,n 1978 Thts ts
not to say it led dtrectly to that loss, though ,t cettainly had an impact There is no single
issue which serv ed definitively as a catalyst in the mtnds of voters in 1978 The reasons
were varied, including an inept campaign on Dukakis’s part and an effective corralling of
ukakis s enemies by Edward King Budgetary issues were important in the election,
however, and the taxation issue illustrates effectively the attitudes and conceptions that
Dukakis held and acted upon that caused people to turn away ffom him in the votino
booth
As mentioned above, one of Dukakis’s most prominent campaign pledges in 1974
had been that, if elected, he would not raise taxes. Taxes were an important issue to
Massachusetts s citizens. The state had a deserved reputation for high taxes, largely
because of exorbitant local property taxes. Once voters elected him, this issue marked
the beginning of Dukakis’s often bitter relations with the General Court, setting the tenor
for his first term, and his handling of it did stir up resentment among certain citizen’s
groups. In the 1978 Democratic primary, one of Edward King’s most prominent pledges
was a tax cut, and this was certainly an issue which helped propel him to victory over
Dukakis. Dukakis admits: ‘“Some people were angry about taxes, other people didn’t like
my style Dukakis s handling of the issue of taxation was also an important illustration
of the limitations of the Progressive type of executive.
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The issue of higher taxes is linked directly to th,y ° 'he issue of balancing the budget In
projected budget deficits, Dukakis was confident th»t kthat better management would be
sufficient to close the unconstitutional budgetary gap
hon, an amount that a Dukakis supponer House Tax^ionCommittee chairman Jack Buckley, told a DukrJca^paign aide the size of the revenue shortfall would be,**
v», ,.o
« .1.
...... d„id.d ,d, i.
^ ^
worth winning!’”**^
By the time Dukakis won the governor’s seat, Massachusetts’s government was in
astonishingly bad fiscal condition A deficit which was originally thought to be $100-150
million was eventually found to be $600 million This deficit was unconstitutional, given
Massachusetts’s requirement for a balanced budget Yet, in the earliest phases of his
administration. Dukakis had no intention of reneging on his pledge not to raise taxes: ‘“He
said he was going to balance the budget by cutting programs and economizing
.We told
him we didn t think he could do that,’’’ claimed Senate President Kevin B, Harrington *'
House Speaker David M, Banley claimed that the need for new taxes “‘was common
knowledge, and offered to push through a tax increase that Dukakis could blame on the
outgoing Sargent. Dukakis refused the offer.**
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Dukakis was too adamant even u/h<in fken the situation was made reasonably plain
While others were insistent that hiaher taxation as necessary, he was insistent that it was
not Dukakis blames much of his handling of the issue on a lack of correct or complete
information and on civil servants who reported figures only reluctantly - Once everything
had been n,ade pla,n
.0 hi., he did understand the necess.ty of a tax
.crease and sent a
bill .0 the legtslature that called for raising the ,nco.e and sales taxes significantly
-
Dukalus claims that critics such as Representat.ve Barney Frank
‘m them desire to be helpflil to people, and compassion-
ate and carmg, they had paid very little attention to the
fiscal side of the ledger and somebody had to come along
and straighten the mess out, and 1 was the governor so
that was my job
Dukakts focused on process, on his “job," ,n the most technical sense of that term This
focus precluded any stands people thought Dukakis had taken or any impressions he may
have given Many liberals were disappointed that the greatest burden of Dukakis’s early
solutions fell onto the poor Dukakis, however, saw the fiscal crisis as the most important
one and therefore, his role was one of setting that crisis straight, regardless of the desires
of others. Even as he was losing political influence with the legislature, Dukakis refused to
acknowledge that his competence alone could not bring him political and budgetary
success Indeed, when Harrington called Dukakis’s competence as Governor into
question, Dukakis became livid. Harrington had to point out to him that he had alienated
others and this was not a plot on the part of old-line pols to ruin him."^
Dukakis lost much of his political capital with the members of the General Court
over the issue of whether to increase taxes Legislative leaders and members of the
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Democratic Study Group attempted to convince Dukakis of the inevitability of a tax
ncrease and the necessity of passing it as soon as possible Dukakis would have none of it:
He had been elected to reform the government, not patch it up Dukakis told the
legislative leaders that he would deal with the fiscal crisis when he was ready- Dukakis’s
base of support in the House, the D S G,, eroded as a result z"
As noted above, Dukakis retained much of his public popularity even after he lost
legislative regard Indeed, legislators would have benefitted greatly if Dukakis had
televised earlier than he did a speech urging Massachusetts voters to support the looming
legislative levy of tax increases Once Dukakis decided to raise taxes and to cut spending,
he had gone to the people, televising the announcement of his proposal ’’ Yet, once that
proposal had been submitted to the General Court, Dukakis initially refused to use popular
persuasion to provide legislators with enough political support to raise taxes as he had
proposed Dukakis was, at that point, the only person in the State with any ability to
persuade the people of the necessity of a tax increase.’* Yet, he refused to do so based on
his perception of the role he had in the political system Going to the people would have
been beneficial for the legislature, but Dukakis “continued to believe that the legislature
should work out its own problems.
Eventually, however, Dukakis did take the Progressive approach to pushing his bill
through the legislature and appeared on statewide television to persuade voters of the
necessity of a tax increase. He admitted his error in promising not to raise taxes and
defended the need for increased taxation over spending cuts. Twenty-four hours later, the
General Court had passed a bill that was sent to the Governor for his approval.^* Even
230
after Dukakis had broken his campaign promise he still hK 5 H uHi , n enjoyed a sixty percent approval
raftng ’’ As mentioned, what respect he matntatned
,n the ftrst year of his administratton
was due to the maintenance of a certain popuianty wtth Massachusetts’s cit.zens Yet it
.nterested Dukak.s His political successes came when he engaged other branches of the
Massachusetts pol.tical system The extra-const.tutional, popular support that Dukakis
enjoyed was, in the end, not even enough to car^ him to victory in the Democratic
primary of 1978
Michael Dukakis’s handling of the taxatton issue during the first years of his
administration gives insights into the problematic nature of the Progressive executive
Havtng a rational plan can be useless in the face of political reality such as incomplete
information or recalcitrant civil servants Pubhc suppon alone may not be sufficient to
sustain any effective governance in the face of a hostile legislature If the Governor is to
lead the legislature, it is easy for that leadership to become, or to seem to become,
overbearing and noninclusive If administration is to be professional, it is easy to alienate
those closest to you The Governor may have a rational plan to address an issue, and that
plan may be the “correct” one, even given the political situation However, other members
of Ihe political system need persuading of the correctness of that plan Dukakis’s sense of
his popular suppon, the sense that he was “winning converts” to his program, encouraged
his arrogance and the notion that what the Governor wanted should be enacted as it was
proposed.
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Dukakis certainly recognized that he was not the only member of the
Massachusetts governmental system. Often, however, he acted as if he were the only one
who mattered. Conceiving of the executive as the repository of the public will, and as the
harbinger of a rational plan to enact the public will regardless of political interests
involved, can too easily become arrogance and lead to exclusion, whether intentional or
not. Leadership, the enacting of policies that had been advocated electorally and the
maintenance of coalitions around those issues, has to involve inclusion Dukakis's handlint
of taxation, though it was one of several factors that led to his loss in 1978, was innicative
of why his approach to the executive office led to that loss.
Yet, as mentioned earlier, Dukakis still held a high approval rating with the public
even after he raised taxes Even as late as the Spring of 1978, following Dukakis's strong
performance in the face ofa paralyzing blizzard that winter, sixty-seven percent of 998
voters surveyed by the Boston Glohe approved of the governor '«« He also enjoyed thirty
percent leads over his potential opponents in the primaries That approval, however,
would drop far enough by September, 1978, that he would lose the Democratic primary
The case being made here is not that taxation was the only, or even the primary reason for
Dukakis s loss It is, however, emblematic of the most imponant reason Dukakis lost an
inability, or unwillingness to consider others' visions of the public good in formulating his
own. This trait is symptomatic of the Progressive conception of the executive the popular
manager.
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A^rimarv I
Michael Dukakis faced opposition from both the right and the left of the
Ideological spectrum in the 1978 Democratic primaty From the left came Barbara
Ackermann, Mayor of Cambridge, who dended DukaWs for selling out his liberalism.
Dukakis's welfare cuts, his workfare proposal and his approval of a redistricting bill that
was unfriendly to many liberal House Democrats were al, being held against him by liberal
Democrats and Ackermann embodied that anger From the nght came Edward J King,
a businessman who was a friend of Bob Quinn and had tun the Massachusetts Pot,
Authority in the late sixties and early seventies
The fact that Dukakis was attacked from both ends of the ideological spectrum
indicates that the problem may not have been so much ideological as institutional. Had he
made overtures toward either end of the ideological spec,mm, he could have placated
members of either group His role as governor, however, precluded any effort toward
pleasing “special interests ” He had come to the Governor’s chair to implement his plan,
regardless of those he perceived as cormptors of the public interest As the Governor, he
embodied that public interest and had a duty to implement it, regardless of “political”
concerns Thus, political-minded members of the polity were upset, regardless of their
political persuasion
Edward King beat Dukakis in the Democratic primary in 1978. King held a
different conception of the executive than Dukakis did, preferring the partisan-
administrator style to the public manager. As Dukakis had run against establishment
politics in 1974, King ran against Dukakis in 1978 King played up five essential issues and
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brought together groups who had been alienated hv n. l- i.- • uy ukakis s handling of those issues
He sought the executive office as mnrh tn Hicf uuc to dtstnbute rewards to his associates as he did to
concept,on of the executive office than they d.d in Duhahis's conception What does
King’s victory over Dukakis say regarding the relationship between the two concept,ons
f the executive What does the partisan conception have that the Progressive conception
lacks'^
King was not strictly a Democrattc panisan, as he would eventually become a
Republican To call Ed K,ng parttsan ,s to
.ndicate that he worked within a pany
structure ,n cooperatton with fellow party members or at least a party faction In the 1978
gubernatonal pnmary and ,n the subsequent election campaign, he aligned htmself with a
factton of the Massachusetts Democratic party, and as newly elected governor promised
to use that faction of the party to conduct bustness As indicated in the introduction of this
thes.s, Massachusetts has been a one-party state through most of its history Except for a
thirty-year span from the late 1920s until the late 1950s, the opposition party has generally
been anemtc at best As a result, confrontations that might have played out hem-een parties
elsewhere, such as the battle Dukakis faced with old-time pols in Brookline, played out
mihin a party By the time King assumed office, the Democrats had come to dominate
Massachusetts politics, especially the General Court. The legislative wing of the
Democratic party (“the old-boy political network”), issuing “a plea for party unity,” played
an important role in King’s election. Once elected, King initially made overt efforts to
align himself with the legislative wing of the party, declaring, no doubt with reference to
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Dukakis's governorship,
“‘The era of anti-politics is over a r eIS As former Senate President
King was also less hesitant than Dukakis ahrmt nt>tKaK bou patronage appointments. More
concerned with disseminating the rewards of the governor's office to his friends and dose
associates (“cronies''). King was iess concerned with the competence of his appointees
than Dukakis had been As indicated, first-term Dukakis, deeply committed to neutral
professionalism, had been concerned with avoiding any appearance of patronage in his
appointments, to the point where personal relationships suffered and political supporters
who had worked hard for him were alienated King was quite different, not afraid to
appoint his friends and loyal partisans to positions Of his first ten appointments, nine were
white, nine were male, and five were affiliated with Boston College, King's alma mater
The difference between Dukakis and King is well illustrated by their respective handling of
the Governor's Commission on the Status ofWomen While Dukakis responded to
disagreements over the annual budget through discussion. King responded to the
commission's disagreement by dismissing all its members Dukakis above all sought
competence on the part of administrators, while King sought to repay those who had
given him political support and looked for agreement with the Governor’s wing of the
Democratic party
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Initially, King evinced more of a aift rA i i •g an Dukakis had for involving people as
had a„ena.ed Tax-cu. advoca.es, death penalty hachers, nsh.-.o-,ife advocates, the
nsurance industt^, bankers, state employees and labor leaders Of the primary victor
big pot and let ,t bo, I- m one sense, thts represents the same son ofcampatgmng
D.rkak.s had done aga.nst what he perceived as cormpt Massachusetts politics four years
earlier He was reacting against Dukakis and gathering people who were against the
incumbent
"t et King also managed to campaign /or something He had five essential points
that he returned to throughout the campaign, each of which diametrically opposed
Dukakis's stands, Cutttng taxes, reinstating the death penalty, mandatory sentencing for
dmg dealers and burglars, increasing the drinking age to twenty-one and ending state-
fttnded abortions for Medicaid recipients were King's agenda, and he continually pressed
Its points. This gave people something positive to which they could attach themselves
King also asserted that Dukakis was disliked by business interests, and that King would
make the state more attractive to those interests Through his agenda, however limited.
King was able to appeal to voters on some level beyond, “I am against Dukakis,” In the
end. King was effective with his pitches, as the issues he addressed directly tapped into
sources of concern among Massachusetts's citizens: “[T]he data
. showed that the people
were desperate for tax cuts, furious about crime and desirous of a higher drinking age.”"'
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King s approach to the campaign showed why Dukakis'
e .
s suppon fell between the
^7;“-------shadahenatedma„ypuhhcgroupso.erh.ste„^^^
Ouhakts's performance m the hl.ard had faded, and once the cand,dates had acpu.red a
esree of name-recognitton, groups who resented Dukakts began to defect The taxation
issue is indicative of DukalfiQ’ci>»UKaias s actions in this regard Until thp^ u the Spnng, raising taxes had
not been that vexing on Dukald*;’? n.tKiir.5 xaKis s public support. Indeprl li'irwY’o
,
King s campaign manager
Oeorge Prattaroh satd that, as he had been prepanng hts candidate for the pnmaty, "Our
prehm,„ary polls showed [tssues such as ta.xat,on] weren't cutt.ng issues Only about 35
percent of the people we polled blamed Dukakis for those th.ngs, even the tax
increases"- In June of 1978, however, the state of Californ.a passed Proposition 13, a
strong tax-cutting measure At the time, Dukakts dismissed it, saying that
Massachusetts citizens "were ‘too sophisticated' to swallow as simplistic a solution to
thetr pocketbook problems as that," and increased local atd in the hopes that property
taxes would fall as a result - But Dukakis misread the public, one newspaper noted, and
people would not accept such a flippant remark and such an
.nsufficient solution to what
they considered an important issue. Propositton 1 3 helped persuade people that a
decrease in taxes was necessary, and could ease fiscal woes Dukakis did not pick up on
that, while King did later in the campaign.
But, again, the taxation tssue itselfwas not sufficient as an explanation Rather, as
“a Democratic source close to the governor's campaign" noted “Everyone’s blaming it on
Proposition 13, but it was his personality More broadly, Dukakis saw himself as the
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sole repository of the public will anH k
een too adamant in his stands as a result. State
oopers had not had a pay-raise in three years. In the ensuing dispute, “the Governor
[took] a hardline
.insisting that his pos.tion was correct and not negotiable Dukakis
with Gov. Michael Dukakis on how to snend S6? •p 2 million in additional state aid. The
goverrtor wanted White to use ,t to reduce the property tax The ntayor contends ntost of
the money already has been eaten up by inflat.on and other fixed costs Dukakts lost
Boston ,0 K,ng by more than 13,000 votes.- Dukakts, in a manner indicative of the
Progress,ve notion of the executive, held up the governor as the sole repos.tory of the will
of Massachusetts c.tizens As such, he “was frequently accused of arrogance and deafhess
m the presence of would-be advisors.”'^' As a result, Dukakis had alienated “State police.
State D[epartmen, oq P[ublic] W[orks workers], ami-abon.omsts, licensed technicians
and professionals, bankers, the insurance industry, state employees in general and labor
leaders— King was effective a, corralling these groups, and took the primal from
Dukakis by over 76,000 votes King's support came from expected sources, given h.s
professed alignment with anti-Dukakts groups and the “regulars” ,n the Democratic party.
Businessmen and pro-tax cut voters cast their ballots for King, as did urban residents and
Irish voters The last two groups were particularly difficult for Dukakis to take, as both
groups had supported him in 1974. Further, he had made urban development an important
part of state government’s role in his first term. Yet, Dukakis lost thirty cities in 1978 and
won only nine.
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There were other factors in Dukakis's loss According to reporters, there was a
generally anti-.ncumbent mood among voters that year - Dukakis dso lost liberal
Democrats' support on two fronts One was Ackermann's candidacy, w.ch drew 53 2^0
votes
.Ackermann represented the liberals who felt betrayed by Dukak.s's
"meat-cleaver"
approach to social programs The other was United States Senator Edward Brooke,
Brooke, a Republican and the first black Senator
and many Massachusetts liberals felt a need
was involved in a difficult primary race.
to vote Republican to help him retain office.'^*
However, as Kenney and Turner note, “[e]ven more than it
the vote was a referendum on the incumbent
n most such elections,
a rejection ot the stewardship that Dukakis
tell so good about More broadly, it was a referendum on Dukakis’s notion of the
executive the popular manager Under that concept,on, Dukak.s had not read the public
correctly H.s effons to educate the people as to the ach.evements of his administration
were ult.mately unsuccessfbl Thus, both ends of the relationshtp between the public and
the executive had failed him His relationship with the public had broken down, he had
weak suppon among members of the legislature and he had frozen the vast majority of his
administration out of his campaign. With both his popular and his institutional support
eroded, Dukakis had little chance for victory in 1978
Dukakis did not increase his chances by running a lackadaisical primary campaign.
He misinterpreted greater economic stability and what he saw as a productive term as
governor as greater satisfaction on the part of Massachusetts’s voters, and allowed himself
to become more confident than was necessary. While he did sense a negative feeling, he
did not pay close enough attention to it. Dukakis allowed himself to be outspent by King
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better than two-to-one on advertising He seemed smug and over-confident at the
debate among the cand,dates, listing what he perceived as accomplishments of Ws
administration while not responding to King’s accusations. '''
The shortcomings of Dukakis’s campaign were largely his own doing. He had
hired Richard A Giesser, a businessman with extraordinanly little political experience
Giesser, by his own admission “had no idea how to organize a statewide gubetnatonal
campaign Thus, the initial decision to spend nothing on media campaigning was
Dukakis’s.'” The decision to prohibit members of his staff and cabinet, with few
exceptions, from taking an active part in the campaign was Dukakis’s.'" As he had done
when considering appointments to office early in his term, Dukakis cut off people who had
been active and important in their support of him Even the strong, effective electoral
organization that had supported him from his days in the legislature and had vaulted him
into the Governor’s office was little in evidence
Interestingly, Dukakis’s experience before the governorship had been almost
entirely political while King’s had been almost entirely managenal, albeit as a civil serv'ant.
Dukakis had held elective office much of his adulthood while King had never run for
office. Despite this, King attempted to come off as the more traditional pol, with his
declarations about the end of “anti-politics,” for example.*"^ Ironically, as Governor, King
found himself as roundly disliked as Dukakis had found himself, and, more ironically, for
many of the same reasons. King, too, did not take advantage of political opportunities
when they arose. Unlike Dukakis, however. King was also perceived as an incompetent
manager Winning office with an anti-Dukakis base was ultimately as ineffectual as
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wmning office based on an an,i-poli,ics-as-usual message Tha, topic, along with
Dukakts-s resulting victon, over King ,n 1982, is the subject of the next chapter
Conclusion
Michael Dukakis ts an example of the Progressive-type executive, certainly the
most prominent in Massachusetts political history His early pohticd success ,n the
General Court encouraged him to pursue a political course based on techn.cal competence
and rationality His frustration was not with a political party so much as it was with the
corruption he saw eroding efforts to work for the public good in Massachusetts He
attempted to take over the Democratic party organization without working through the
traditional pany establishment Traditional party organizations such as Massachusetts’s
old-boy network were part of the corruption that had to be cleansed By the time he was
elected Governor in 1974, he had established a personal organization that worked to elect
Dukakts and in doing so to help establish a government that was not based on patronage
but on professionalism, competence and a proper expression of the public will
Dukakis s first term as Governor saw him attempt to implement the Progressive
vision of the elected executive He wanted a legislature that would follow the lead of the
executive branch, and an administration that would be professional, rather than partisan,
and devoid of corruption or conflict of interest The problems he addressed were most
often the problems of promoting a more efficient government and ensuring a corruption-
free administration When he addressed less process-oriented issues, he attempted to do so
through legislative leadership and regulation by agencies
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Dukakis's first term as Governor ended with his loss in the 1978 Democratic
pnmary to Ed King, a more partisan-type executive King was better able than Dukakis to
focus on substantive rather than procedural issues m his campaign In doing so, he took
stands that were both opposed to Dukakis’s stands and were more in line with the wishes
of Massachusetts’s citizens The popular leader had misread the public and cut much of his
support out from under him King also gave voters issues around which they could rally,
offering a notion of what government should do. rather than basing his campaign on the
way in which government should be conducted
Ironically, Dukakis’s failure as a Progressive-type executive came in an
environment which could have been conducive to the Progressive notion of the executive.
Massachusetts has historically, except for a brief period, been a one-party state. Federalists
then Whigs, essentially the same political persuasion, controlled the state until the birth of
the Republicans who held sway until the late 1920s. The late 1920s through the late 1950s
was the only period of competitive two-party politics in the State’s history Democrats
gamed control by the late 1950s and have maintained it since. A single party state is
devoid of party competition, as Massachusetts has been for most of its history. A lack of
party competition is the Progressive ideal. In the absence of party competition, with a
reasonable amount of agreement, politicians could focus on important issues and follow
the lead of the executive in implementing policies to benefit the public
As indicated above, there was substantial agreement on the need for a tax increase
in the months before Dukakis assumed office and during the period before taxes were
raised Democrats held 191 seats in the House and 33 seats in the Senate, an ample
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maionty in both houses of the Genetal Coutt - The leg.slative leadetsh.p made effotts to
convince Dukakis of the necessity of a ptotnpt tax mcrease Yet, Dukakis handled the
issue meffectively and an issue that could have run teasonably smoothly cost htm much
pohucal influence His misreading of the public in a state predominantly of h.s own
partisan persuasion helped cost him a primary in 1978 The Progressive notion of the
executive could not carry Dukakis to success in a state that, given its lack of party
competition, could have allowed success
In fact, what the Progressive notion of politics, as ideally free of party competition,
misses IS that parties often contain disparate elements, the members of which would be in
competition regardless of party affiliation. The Democrats in Massachusetts, for example,
contained both the “old-boy” Irish pols against whom Dukakis rebelled and the upper-
class, good-government reformers (the more typical Progressives), such as Dukakis
himself Thus, a lack of inter-party competition did not lead to harmony, as Progressives
would have hoped As Madison indicates in Federalist 10, “[t]he latent causes of faction
are thus sown in the nature of man,” and may be intra-party as well as inter-party. In order
to achieve success, Dukakis would have to modify his conception of the executive, as he
had by his reelection in 1982
Dukakis comments: “Losing kind of wakes you up a little bit. And when I lost...
you have to ask yourself what happened. And I think what happened.
.
. was that I had some
very clear goals and I wanted to get them done and I was one of these guys, like a lot of
first term governors...: ‘Here it is and it’s terrific and pass it.’”^^^ Dukakis’s first term had
shown the hazards of the Progressive approach to the executive challenge. Yet he went on
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.0 defeat Ed King in .he 1982 Democratic printaty, win election and achieve a substantia,
electoral v.ctoo- in 1986 Dukakts agrees that hts approach to the executive office changed
between his firs, and second tenures. The story of that change, Dukak.s's increased
success (“I was a much better governor the second time around than I was the firs, time
around and ultimate disappointment in the Presidential election of 1988 are the
subjects of the next chapter
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CHAPTER 5
DUKAKIS II
During his first term as Governor of Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis attempted to
implement the Progressive notion of the executive He sought a powerfirl executive branch
which would lead the legislature in implementing a rational vision, his rational vision, of
the public good. He sought to rid Massachusetts state government of corruption and
waste, focustng on efficient use of resources and neutral, professional administration He
won election based on an anti-incumbent campaign, and proceeded to alienate many
members of the General Court through his handling of the issue of taxation. By the time of
the primary election of 1978, he had alienated the public enough to bring about a loss to
Edward King in the Democratic primary
Yet in 1982, Dukakis was able to defeat King in a repeat of the 1978 Democratic
primary He would go on to recapture the Governorship and to achieve a resounding
reelection victory' in 1986. While it is possible that only public opinion in Massachusetts
may have changed in the eighties, Michael Dukakis won these two gubernatorial elections
easily and was able to project an image that was less arrogant and aloof than he had
previously, a change that was not lost on observers.^ Presumably, Dukakis operated under
different assumptions during his second tenure than he had held during his first term. What
had Dukakis done differently"^ How had his conception of the Governorship changed to
allow greater success as a leader"^
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Between Electirm^
Dukakis’s loss to Edward Krng was a humbling expenence. one his wife l.kened to
a “public death Yet, Dukakis would ultimately learn from his loss, at least in terms of
Massachusetts pol.tics. Eventually, he “would come to see that he needed to humble
himself as he never had before in his life - More broadly, he would come to see that he
had ,0 present a more positive and substantive vision of the nature of government and ,ts
role m society than he had m hts first term. He also would realize that his was not the only
vision and that he had to account for others’ ideas if he were going to sustain a success&l
leadership role as Governor Ultimately, Dukakis would have to make himself less of a
popular manager and more of a constitutional executive to achieve success in
Massachusetts politics Dukakis partook of various experiences between 1979 and 1982
that would facilitate a much more successful Governorship
Dukakis spent much of his time m those years teaching at Harvard University His
experiences there, as he readily acknowledges, affected the way in which Dukakis thought
of and conducted his Governorship," His teaching involved case studies which were meant
to be ambiguous and plumbed for the various answers that could be proffered. Yet,
Dukakis often was adamant that there was only one correct answer to a case study.
Student evaluations, which were not positive in the first semester or two, tended to reflect
this. [H]e pushed a right solution to case problems and did not encourage or entertain
much dissent
. . .Dukakis ‘sometimes doesn’t listen to people’s comments and questions as
carefully as he should.’”^
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Indeed, Dukakis took his position at Harvard at the time when an important debate
occurring at the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government The question was
whether traditional academics or government officials should be teaching classes in public
was
policy:
Until Dukakis s arrival the basic message at the Ken-
nedy School had been that the problem in government
was the lack of careful analysis at the top, that better
analysis resulting in optimum results was the way to
power and influence, that through analysis one would
find the answers to why cities were in flames, why the
United States was in Vietnam.^
The irony was that this had been Dukakis’s approach during his legislative career and
during his first term as governor In acquiring an experienced public policy maker,
Harvard was receiving someone who had operated under an academic mind set during his
political career In becoming an academic, Dukakis would learn to shed some of that mind
set to the benefit of his political career As Dukakis says “Teaching is a great
educational experience One of the things that trying to teach this stuff to mid-career
people at the Kennedy School did for me was to force me to kind of think through what
happened here, why were my [relations with the legislature so poor]'’”^
Dukakis s attitude during his first semesters at Harvard is indicative of his original.
Progressive notion of the executive. As the sole representative of the public will, the
public manager would not always be open to others’ notions of what constituted the
public good Dukakis’s experience at Harvard helped him open his mind to other possible
interpretations of political phenomena than his own. Thus, he would learn to discuss with
people and to make certain concessions to allow greater room within his vision. At the
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Kennedy School, Dukakis learned again that being an effeclive executive involved making
tangible and effective efforts to listen to and include other members of the political system
The most important political association Dukakis made between 1979 and 1982
was with John Sasso Sasso embodied much of the political skill that enabled Dukakis to
achieve both electoral and policy success in the 1980s. In discussing his greater success in
legislative dealings during his second term, Dukakis notes: “There’s no question that John
Sasso was very, very important in that, because Sasso had a great ability to reach out to
people and to involve them in [the activities of government] ”* In acquiring Sasso’s
services, Dukakis brought into his governorship an element that had been absent during his
first tenure
Sasso was from New Jersey and had attended Boston University He had run
campaigns for Massachusetts Congressman Gerry Studds, been manager of Studds’
district office and been a field organizer for Senator Edward Kennedy in Kennedy’s run
tor the Presidential nomination in 1980 ^ In these experiences, Sasso developed a
reputation as having a strong presence and being highly effective at bringing people
together and performing “insider” politics. Sasso would go on to run Dukakis’s successful
bid for the governor’s office in 1982 and would be named Dukakis’s Chief Secretary for
Dukakis’s second term.
An important meeting, though not the first, between Sasso and Dukakis took place
four days after Dukakis s defeat in 1978 at a whistle-stop train trip to support an
ultimately successful tax classification campaign that Sasso was managing. Dukakis’s
resilience struck Sasso while Sasso’s ability to bring together disparate groups of people
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struck Dukakis « Indeed, at the train stop where Dukakis and Sasso nret. Dukakis took
note of the w.ngs of the Democratic Party that were present. According to Games and
Segal, “It was not lost on either of them that Sasso had organized the coalition that
Dukakis would have needed to beat Ed King Members of the old guard mixed with
reformers, and Dukakis recognized that he would need to bring these groups together, as
Sasso could so effectively, if he were to taste success
That ability of Sasso's remained in Dukakis mind, and the next time they talked in
Massachusetts, two years later, Dukakis questioned Sasso at length on the tax
classification campaign Dukakis also noted his interest in running for Governor and asked
If Sasso would be interested in helping, " Sasso enlisted He would help bring Dukakis to
remarkable success not only on in winning an election, but in implementing an agenda as
well.
Edward King helped Dukakis’s position by running what may observ'ers perceived
to be an inept administration. His appointments, more partisan than Dukakis’s
appointments, were often technically incompetent or corrupt. One cabinet appointee had
augmented his resume with false degrees from prestigious European universities An
appointee to the position of insurance commissioner was forced to resign because he had
little knowledge of insurance. He had been selected because he was favorable to the
Commercial Union Insurance Company, which had donated thousands of dollars to King’s
campaign. The new Commissioner of the Metropolitan District Commission, an old friend
of King s, brought in as an associate commissioner an individual who had been named in
Congressional hearings as an associate of crime boss Raymond Patriarca. These scandals
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all occurred within weeks of King's assunting the Governorship In 1980, the Ward
Commission, a group that Dukak.s and legislat.ve leaders had estabhshed in 1978 to
investigate political corruption m the Commonwealth, noted that Massachusetts’s
historically corrupt government was continued in the Port Authority under King '=
King, despite being more partisan than first-term Dukakis, was also unable to
provide an effective Governorship The partisan administrator was as exclusive in its own
way as the public manager had been Where Dukakis had looked for technical competence
and included only those people who met that criterion, provided there was no conflict of
interest, he made those who had supported him actively in the campaign feel excluded
King, by including only those people who agreed with his wing of the Democratic party,
made those who did not feel excluded King made as little effort as Dukakis had to include
others m his policy initiatives He spurned the legislature and many public servants in much
ot the conduct of his administration His management style consisted of contacting
administrators he saw as loyal to him in order to have problems handled '“That’s how he
made policy,’ said a former associate.”’^
King came to be seen as an inept Governor, one who could not deliver on his
important promises. Having promised a tax cut. King attempted to take credit for the
passage of Proposition 2 '/2 . Yet King had vacillated on the measure when it became an
issue He had also attempted to forestall state spending by freezing the amount of aid to
cities and towns, resulting in property tax increases that were important in bringing about
passage of the large tax cut. After having portrayed himself as tough on crime, according
to Dukakis, King saw violent crime rise during his administration.'*^ Thus, under a more
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partisan conception of the executive, Edward Ktng suffered the same political fate as
Michael Dukakis had during Dukakis's first term as governor
•After hts loss to Edward King ,n 1978, Dukakis had his doubts about whether he
would return to politics ” Yet in 1982, he returned with a vengeance to defeat his nval in
the Democratic primary Dukakis notes that losing gave htm a start and forced him to
consider where he had made his mistakes.^ In addition to the sobenng and thought-
provoking experience of losing, hts teaching experience, his enlisting of John Sasso, and
King's scandal-ridden administration all moved Dukakis in a direction that would allow
him resounding victories in both 1982 and 1986
A Rematch
Dukakis beat Ed King in the Democratic primary of 1982, in another showdown
between the two wings of the Massachusetts Democratic party: the “regulars” and the
“reformers" In terms of the executive, this was another contest between the panisan
administrator and the popular manager While King would not always be a Democrat, as
indicated tn the preceding chapter, he was more partisan than Dukakis had been in that
King was fond of appointees who were close to his wing of the party, a trait Dukakis
lacked during his first term In his first term. Dukakis had made an effort to bring
professionalism to Massachusetts, avoiding any appearance of patronage Neither King
nor Dukakis had been particularly successful.
Regarding the focus of the respective campaigns, the primary campaign of 1982
mirrored the campaign of 1978 Dukakis emerged victorious in the primary by running a
campaign that stressed King s mismanagement of the State. Competence and integrity
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were his central themes, and he continued to mi<;h th... oP s them even as the campaign became
increasingly b.tter and hard-fough,.^' He nraintarned a popular-manager conception of the
executive throughout the campatgn Dukakts portrayed the recently-passed Proposition 2
'/. as an adtntnistrative challenge, claitntng that he. not Ktng, had the ability to administer
the new policy to the greatest publtc benefit.- Dukakis kept up a Progressive conception
of the executive even though that had cost htnt the Democrattc Pritnaty four years earlier.
King attempted to keep the campaign focused on the issues and away from the
candidates He felt the citizens of Massachusetts agreed with his central positions in favor
ot a tax cut, the death penalty and against drunk driving - The citizens of Massachusetts
may not have particularly cared for King himself, yet they were in agreement with his
general positions - It made sense, therefore, for him to shift the focus of the campaign
away from the candidates and toward their respective stands on important issues. King
was focused on what the government should be doing, as a partisan-type executive would,
while Dukakis focused on process, efficiency and neutrality, more along the lines of a
Progressive-type of executive.
Dukakis did not ignore issues completely, however, and King was not averse to
pointed attacks on Dukakis’s character. Dukakis attempted to cut off King’s offensive
regarding the issues of taxes and crime. As noted, Dukakis did not shy away from
Proposition 2 '/2
,
as he may have if he did not want to raise the specter of taxes from his
first term. In typical fashion, he sought to portray Proposition 2 Vz as a management issue,
claiming he could do the better job implementing the measure.^^ He also aired commercials
in which he related how crime had hit his family and how he wanted to prevent families in
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Massachusetts from experiencing the same tragedies.^ Ktng maintatned that Dukakis's
attempts to conv.nce the voters that he had become a better l.stener and less arrogant were
phony. He deplored Dukakis's relatively puntanical l.festyle, ndiculiug Dukakis's habit of
arrtving home in time for a dinner with his family every night while governor,^’ The
campaign turned bitter at several points while both camps attacked the other through the
media
Dukakis handled the campaign's debate masterfully, maintaining an aggressive
stance which forced King onto the defensive from the beginning « While King had forced
the incumbent Dukakis into that position in 1978, challenger Dukakis would not be
pushed around in the rematch Dukakis would define himself rather than letting King do it
Dukakis also took the opportunity to define King, to the extent that he was able to do so
If King wanted to focus on crime. Dukakis used allegations of a rising crime rate against
him Dukakis kept up allegations of corruption and incompetence * Determined and
aggressive, Dukakis was clearly the victor in the April debate King canceled a second
debate that had been scheduled for two weeks before the primary"
John Sasso was a most important addition to Dukakis’s electoral team, helping to
build a large, tightly knit campaign organization for Dukakis that steamrollered...Edward
J King in.
.
.
[the] Democratic primary.”" This campaign unit included both a “grassroots
‘field’ organization” and a “system of ‘issues task forces.’”" Sasso called the field
organization the campaign’s “safety net” and, indeed, the organization, led by Jack
Corrigan, w'as instrumental in the primary victory.'" The campaign spent one-million
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dollars on meticulous efforts at identifyins voters n uy 5 , especially urban voters, who were
unhappy with the King administration.''
Dukalas had displayed a gift for orgaoizing throughout hts career, and it cante to
the fore agatn ,n 1 982 Duhakis’s gift for grass-roots orga.zi„g was opposed to Krng’s
ironic lack of any particular talent in that direction The Dukakis organization was
effective at gathenng Democratic Convention delegates, gamermg more than twice as
many as IGng, 68«/o to 32%,“ One poll showed that six out often voters who had
supponed Dukakis had been contacted by the campaign, compared with three out of
twenty for King ” Where Dukakis had conducted an ineffective campaign in the 1978
primary
,
he left nothing to chance in 1982 When the campaign operatives found that Kin»
had closed the early Dukakis lead, making a race out of the campaign. Jack Corrigan
spread the word that Dukakis could lose, thus ensuring a last minute push and a Dukakis
victory
Dukakis obtained 53 4% of the vote on Primary day, to King’s 46.5%. The
campaign had heightened peoples’ interest to the point where turnout was significantly
greater than in 1978 King garnered 24% more votes than he had in 1978, Dukakis 72%
more than he had. Dukakis was partially vindicated for the crushing defeat he had
suffered at King’s hands in 1978. The nature and visibility of “the rematch” had drawn
Democrats to the polls to give Dukakis, the popular manager, a victory over King, the
partisan administrator.
If Dukakis’s hallmark as Governor was administrative competence. King’s was
incompetence. The popular manager, with a focus on neutrality, competence and
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efficiency, was more able to make himself respectable on the admln.strative side of the
executive challenge, while the partisan admtnistrator could easily be seen as
.ncompeten, If
his appcntments were ineffectual, as many of lOng's were. Competence would, of course,
win respect over incompetence, ,f Ktng presented more of a substantive vis.on of what
government should, or should not. be doing, he d.d no, show the ability to carry that ou,
once m office, Dukakis may have shown ability administratively, refomung the way in
which government was conducted to allow for greater professionalism and efficiency, but
he presented little in the way of vision The question of what this newly professionalized
gov ernment was to do remained unanswered The task remained one of combining
substantive vision with administrative capability
Dukakis achieved victory handily In November, defeating Republican candidate
John Sears nearly two-to-one With Massachusetts’s Republican Party in such a
dilapidated condition as to qualify the state as, effectively, a one-party state, Dukakis ran a
fairly safe campaign, purposely conducted that way " Capturing office as a Democrat in a
predominantly Democratic State had been fairly easy, especially for someone possessing
Dukakis’s gift for electoral organization. As Dukakis learned in his first term, however,
governing in a single-party state would not be nearly as easy. As noted in the previous
chapter, a lack of party competition would not mean a lack of factions, and Dukakis
would have to learn how to govern with divisions which did not organize themselves
along party lines.
What does Dukakis s victory say about the relationship between the partisan
administrator and the public manager as conceptions of the executive";^ It is necessary to
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present a clear agenda in order to persuade people to embrace a coherent package. King
had done that four years earlier agatnst Dukakts and beaten htnt Here Dukakts maintained
hrs tradtuonal themes ofcompetence and integnty against K.ng and achieved victo^
There was somethtng about Dukakts’s popular manager that the public preferred to King's
partisan administrator Dukakts had excluded people who were not techntcally competent
.0 hold office even if they had worked for htm tn the campaign or been personally close to
him King excluded those people who did not agree with him King had brooked
disagreement even less favorably than Dukakts had. and standards for tnclusion seemed
even more arbitrary than they had under Dukakis.
1 hough Dukakis ran his primaiy campaign based on essenttally a popular-manager
conception of the executive, he would change his notion of the executive in his second
term, Dukakis now understood that a vision of the public good has to be flexible enough
to allow for other visions. Legislators and voters alike needed to be enlisted and heard if
the executive wanted to be able to flmction as a leader, providing and implementing a clear
agenda Further, he posited a notion of the public good which moved beyond the way in
which government should be conducted and into the realm of what government should be
doing He understood, to a greater extent than he had in his first term, that people had to
be included if the executive wanted to count on their support By becoming more of a
constitutional executive, Dukakis was able to achieve the realization of an agenda and win
an election on his own substantive terms in Massachusetts
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Dukakis TT
Dukak.s-s second ,e™ was marked by a greater use of patronage and less-s.ratned
relattons with the legtsiature. In tWs incama.ton, he became more of a constitutional
executive During this term, he represented a late
Founding conception of the American
-twentieth-century incarnation of the
executive. If the elected executive was still a liaison
to the public, Dukakis recognized that the
embodied the public will. It
government as a whole, not only the Governor,
was up to the executive to ensure not that the legtsiature
passed his program, take it or leave it, but that he work with the legtsiature. and members
ot the general public, to ensure government as a whole met the public will If the
Governor still had a respons.bility to see that administration was earned out reasonably
efficiently, Dukakis was more conducive in hts appotntments to individuals who had
served m hts campatgn, and was also more tolerant of “patronage,” provided the
individuals he appointed possessed what he refers to as “political sktlls ” He recognized
that ,t often takes more than a simply a well-run government to keep people satisfied m a
democratic republic.
Dukakis’s relationship with the General Coun was far more conducive to
attending to public business than it had been in his first term Dukakis notes that legislators
such as House Mmority Leader William Robinson (R-Melrose) were dtsmayed at the lack
of debate that took place in the legislature,’'' That lack of debate would make a good
Progressive cringe. Yet, the branches of the government worked together to institute an
agenda, with Dukakis leading the way
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campaign promise Dukakis had made and
term. Members of the legislature had ii
was a core initiative toward the beginning of his
mportant concerns regarding a bill affecting water
.ssues in Massachnseus, The Me.ropoh.an D,s,n« Conan.ss.cn (M D C,), an ln,ponan.
agency and a source of patronage for certain legislators, would be affected The
M W R A would have unlinnted rate-setting power Legislators would be required to gir
up a cenatn amount of control over an important problem Lawmakers from Western
Massachusetts would see reservoirs such as the Quabbin affected While the
.Xdm,n,Stratton’S proposal would have affected many legislators greatly, if the legislature
had passed nothing regarding water-related issues in Massachusetts, the Courts would
have handled the issue “The overwhelmtng desire m the legislature was [against] pass[ing]
anything,” and thus allowing legislators to deflect the blame away from themselves
Dukakis and Senate President William Bulger objected to that They had observed
the busing problem as it was handled through the courts and did not want to see another
complex matter handled by coun order « Once it had been established that some bill
would have to be passed, difficult and lengthy negotiations ensued By this time, Dukakis
had proven that he could work effectively with the legislature, and its members were
willing to work with the administration In addition to Bulger, Representative Michael
Creedon (D-Brockton), Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and Representative
John Cusack (D-Arlington), Chairman of Housing and Urban Development which
oversaw the M.D C
,
were important legislators in moving this through the General Court.
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Neither Creedon nor Cusack were particularly liberal or devoted to Dukakis « Yet they
were willing to work with the administration and create legislation that was acceptable to
interested parties. Importantly, Dukakis had established a reputation, with the earlier
passage of right-to-know legislation and the impending passage of plant-closing
legislation, as willing to take stands on complex issues, to follow through, and to do it in
such a way as to include legislators importantly in the process
The way in which Dukakis handled the issue of the budget is instructive as to the
differences in his second term. Remember that his handling of the issue, especially the
issue of a tax increase, in first term had been ineffective due to his lack of regard for
legislators and his insistence on handling the fiscal crisis in his own manner Dunng Ins
second term. Dukakis was far more amicable in his handling of the issue Upon entering
office, Dukakis faced the same problem he had at the start of his first term: a budget that
could not be balanced Raising taxes the first year back in office was not an option, given
Ed King s portrayal of Dukakis as a Governor who would certainly do so. Cutting
spending would alienate other constituent groups and be too reminiscent of his first term.
Either obvious path would mean political death.*^^
So Dukakis and his advisors came up with another plan: Reform of the tax
collection laws. The Revenue Enforcement and Protection Act (R E A P.), with its period
of amnesty for delinquent taxpayers and stiffer penalties for tax evaders was successful in
netting the state S86 million between October of 1983 and January of 1984, the amnesty
period.^^ Over its first two years, it produced $292.8 Million.''^ Dukakis had found a
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method of dealing with the potential budget deficits which was both politically and fiscally
successful
Most importantly, the passage ofR E A P represented a new style for Michael
Dukakts as Governor He went to the people early, often and effectively as he had not
done m his handling of the budget issue in his first term. His message was that the
legislature would cut programs ifR E A.P were not passed, gamenng important and
widespread support for the measure « He handled the legislature far more graciously than
he had in the mid-1970s Early presentation of the measure to legislative leadership caused
some opposition As a result, the administration added the amnesty penod Though
Dukakis initially objected to this particular provision, he assented to its passage after
encountering the legislative opposition and being persuaded by Ira Jackson, head of the
Department of Revenue Dukakis made appearances before both branches of the General
Court and made a point of speaking to legislators in his office on the day of the scheduled
vote on R.E. A P.^‘ The bill passed both the House and the Senate easily. Here was a new
Michael Dukakis who was working with legislators to include what may be necessary for
the passage of a reasonable law and expanding the nature of the legislation that was
enacted Indeed, he was able to have that legislation enacted because he was more willing
and better able to include members of other political institutions and the public in his
efforts at governing.
Dukakis’s appointment policies were less strict in important ways than they had
been during his first term According to John Sasso, ‘“We have always said that to get a
job with this administration, you had to have competency, integrity, political skills and
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loyalty- These qualities appear s.milar to the qualities Dukakrs desired in his first-.ernt
appmntees. Yet, he was more willing to consider ft,ends and individuals who had been a
pan of hts campa,gn for posnions dur.ng hts second tern, For example,
,ra Jackson head
of the Department of Revenue, was not o.y the possessor ofimpress,ve po,ideal and
adm,„istrat.ve skrlls,” as evidenced by h,s work on the R E A P program, hut also a
longtime fftend of Dukakts's and an admimstrative dean at Harvard.” In sen,ng aside the
strict nrle against patronage which Dukakrs had enforced in his first term, Dukakis was
able to maintain greater suppon within h.s adnunistrative ranks, support wWch had eluded
him during his first term
Kenney and Turner cla.m that Dukakis hrmself assens that there was no change in
appointment pohey between h,s two terms as Governor Yet, as they also demonstrate, the
evidence against that assert.on is strongly convincing ” Yet, more recently, Dukakrs has
recognized a change in his appointment policy between terms Significantly, Dukakis made
sure to appoint individuals who had what he terms “political skills,”" Dukakis notes that
in his first term, he had appointed too many individuals who lacked significant public
sector expenence As a result, inter-institutional relations strained when executive branch
members were not properly attentive to legislators. In the second term, the basis for
appointment became not only technical competence, as it had been during his first term
Now, Dukakis looked for individuals who recognized the importance of being able to
work with other members of the government to administer the law. What Dukakis
realized, at least implicitly, was that supporters wanted to see something as a result of
their eflorts, and that did not necessarily mean that Dukakis was corrupt. Individuals who
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had worked on a political campaign, after ail were more likely to have relevant
experience.
Dukakis used his constitutional position to veto only one bill in his second tenure
as governor the Pledge-of-Mlegiance bill w.ch George Bush would use against him
dunng the Presidential campaign of 1988 The bill would have made it a criminal act if a
.eacher retdsed to lead students in the Pledge of
.^legiance, Dukakis's veto came after he
had requested a recommendation from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court The
Court adjudged that the legislation would be found unconstitutional if Dukakis signed it
.nto law and it was challenged ,n state coun ” Here was Dukakis judging the fitness of a
proposal based not on whether the proposal was rationally a good policy Rather, he based
his determination on whether or not the government should be undertaking that endeavor,
and used the Constitution to make that determination.
Certain individuals such as Barbara Anderson, who had led the fight for
Proposition 2 >/., claim that what Dukakis was doing in his second term was not, in fact,
leadership ?*^ According to some, his new style of coalition building represented a selling-
out of pnnciples. Yet Dukakis had taken stands and had accomplished legislation toward
those ends. A refusal to compromise would have jeopardized efforts toward the ends
which Dukakis had set for his administration. Governmental action in a system of
separation of powers and checks and balances necessitates compromise if measures are
going to be affected. Also, Dukakis had not backed down from certain principles, which
were broad enough to be workable and yet specific enough to be substantive. During the
general election, for example, Dukakis had run a campaign aimed mainly at people he saw
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S of economic policies associated with President Ronald Reagan » Dukakis
summarized his campaign theme hnefiy: thiidr Massachusetts has a unique opportunity
10 provide leadership in changing not oidy its own economic hiture, hut that of the rest of
the nation. He had promised measures on economic development issues during his
campaign, and he achieved those measures, including R.E A.P
,
to correct the state’s
financial woes; the Employment and Training Choices program (E.T.). to reform the
state’s welfare program, and the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, to help correct a
shortage ot affordable housing
in his second term. Michael Dukakis made greater attempts than he had to present
an agenda, some vision of the public good, beyond simply reforming the governmental
process The M W R A legislation and the iUght-to-Know law, which is discussed in
detail below, are examples of that He also recognized that his vision of the public good
had to include and account for versions that might be at odds with his or at odds with each
other Institutionally, he recognized the legislature as a coequal institution m the policy
process, one to which he had to attend if he wanted to maintain support and institute an
agenda He recognized that appointments could include individuals with whom he was
personally friendly, or people who had worked for him, and he could still maintain
standards of integrity and performance Effectively, Dukakis became more ofa
constitutional executive.
The Right to Know Rill
Dukakis’s more constitutionally-based approach to the executive office can be
illustrated through the passage of the Right-to-Know Bill in 1983 Significant and
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powerful interests were involved inm accomplishing this measure and Dukakis did not
the measure through the General Court an indication th 5,t h' n-u, d a that his willingness to establish
cordial relations with that branch would allow him
than he had possessed during his first term.
more
greater ability to pursue his program
The Right-to-Know Bill was an early and important piece of legislation to emerg,
from Dukakis’s second term It helped set the tone for Dukakis’s second four years the
way that the issue of ta.xes had help se, the tone for his first four years It would
determine early on how [several] constituencies, including the legislature itself, [saw]
Dukakis Dukakis’s handling of the tax issue in 1975 indicated an arrogant, aloof
executive, who was unwilling to accept the legislature as a full partner in the political
process By the end of 1983, with the passage of the Right-to-Know Bill, Dukakis
established himself as a Governor who was open to others’ ideas and opinions, and who
understood, and acted on, the importance of other political institutions in the political
process The result was that he was able to carry out a campaign promise and provide
substantive leadership
To help shore up labor’s support during the election, at the Democratic convention
Dukakis had promised some sort of law which would allow workers to know what
substances companies were using in and around the workplace. This seemed like a fairly
straightforward issue to Dukakis: “Nobody wants to poison workers.”^^ Yet, despite that
obvious stance, there would be problems in drafting a law
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The ngh.-.o-know issue ca„e
.0 .he forefront of Duhahis’s agenda ear, i„
, 9S3
""
^
-P-ed ,ece of ,e,s,at.on and, ,ven
.he complex and time-consunung nature of this issue, a pnonty of members of Dukahis’s
admtmstration was ,0 keep tt out of the Governor's office "Let this [bUl],
.ncubate in
Envtronmental Affatrs and dea, with it when we have to However, the Massachusetts
Senate passed a b.l., sponsored by Gerard D'Amtco (D-Worcester), which was far more
radical than the legislation Dukakis would eventuallv s,on i,ign. It was necessary to take all
steps to keep this bill off.he Governor's desk. If he signed this particular bill. Dukakis
would seem to be ant,
-bus,ness, an undesirable stance ,„ Massachusetts's grow,ng
economy If he d,d not s,g„ it, he would seem to be reneg,ng on a campaign prom,se It
was March, Dukakis had scarcely begun h.s term, and someth,ng had to be done
Dukakis would not default on his campaign prom.se Regarding a key member of
the business community, an important figure in the administration claims: “I don’t think
there was ever a day when he didn't wish that [the
.ssue] had gone away, or tha, we
d.dn’t ..simply say we were against it. that the Governor was going to veto it
.
[He was
open .0 what the administration wanted to accomplish, however, because] first of all he
was a gentleman, but secondly he was a realist who understood, because we said so, that
we were going to do something. It’s not going to go away.”"' Dukakis had made a
campaign promise, and was going to keep it.
Dukakis notes:
By the time we hit Right-to-Know, we really were [in-
cluding members of the public and the legislature open-
ly and importantly in the policy process] very, very well...
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er f
‘he Republican Minority Lead-
the t,me^^ complained that there were no debates
anymore We had done such ajob of putting the b.ll togeth-
r and mvolvtng key legislators and constituenc.es and so
That process of inclusion marks the most impottant shift from Dukakis's first term to his
second Alden Raine, Dukakis's Director of the Office of Economic Development, was
the individual who headed the drive for the legislation's passage “The strategy was,''
according to Raine, “in an intense and never-ending way [to] meet with everybody The
administration counterparts and the constituency counterparts and the legislature and get
the message out there that we were interested in some sort of legislation
Key constituencies included management and labor According to Dukakis
“Certainly we began with a very difficult, contentious issue You had business people who
claimed that they would be required to divulge business secrets and so forth
,On the other
hand you had unions who wanted to be protected They didn't want to be put out ofwork
because of environmental or public health regulations ”** Environmental interests also
possessed a stake in this issue, but their coalition was too loosely knit, and consequently
they were not involved in most of the negotiations.
Members of the General Court were involved in Right-to-Know legislation from
the earliest point in the process. Ironically, however, few of the details of the legislation
were actually handled within the legislature, largely due to the complexity of the issue
Constraints on legislators’ time and an assumption against passage of the bill led to little
legislative opposition for the bill. The result was that Raine did little negotiating with
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legislators. The administration assumed the neootiatina fi •g g function on Right-to-Know
Bargaining thus assumed a three-way stancey
,
among representatives of Business, Labor
and the Administration
If the details of R,ght-.o-Know were essentially worked ou. whhin the
administrative branch, it is also true that Dukakis
bill if he had not been on friendly terms
could not have managed passage of the
with the legislature The key legislator involved in
iHe bill's passage was Timothy Bassett (D-Tynn), Chair of the House Commerce and
Labor Committee The administration was fortunate enough to have Bassett, in addition to
D ,\mico who had proposed the original bill, in the legislature and willing to attach himself
.0 the legislation to help maneuver it through the General Court Legislators had to be
willing to work with Dukakis They could campaign in their districts and take a certain
amount of credit for the passage of the Right-to-Know Bill, but, “they
..understood
•hat in the political community that they [inhabit] when they're not living in their distnct,
the lion's share of the credit was going to go to Dukakis. If that had been unacceptable
to them," they never would have worked for passage of the bill » Dukakis was now
working much harder at creating an atmosphere in which that attitude was feasible and
desirable for legislators
In working to pass Right-to-Know, Dukakis handled many business interests who
never forgave him for favoring the regulations Raine notes: “It was inevitable that
something early in the administration, would become the first issue to pose that level of
symbolism."™ More broadly, Dukakis presented a vision of something he felt the
government should be doing and why it should be doing it It was a vision broad enough
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to be inclusive ye, narrow enough ,o be reasonably substantive and intelligible. Rather
than the Progressive-like focus on the process and the way tn which government
conducted itself, Dukakis focused on the acivtties government should undertake for the
public good
Raine scoffs at the notion that Dukakis
learned to include various interests. Not only is
ends, but Dukakis did not compromise
was no longer a leader because he had
compromise necessary to achieve political
on certain ends which may be called principles:
The environmental community not only never had a
better friend in the Governor’s office than Dukakis but
when you compare the magnitude of issues he took on
in his first administration with the magnitude of issues
he took on and won in his second administration,. I’m
sure It IS not an exaggeration to say there has probably
never been in any state in the modern history of environ-
mental politics a gubernatorial administration that [took]
more good, sweeping [measures] than Dukakis’s second
and third administrations. On something like [Right-to-
Know] there was no principle compromised This was
‘you’re going to take something that affects every work-
place, could negatively affect every business if done badly,
and if you think you’re working with something that can
poison you, there ought to be some [structured] way [in
which] you can find that out through your boss.
.
. that princ-
iple was never compromised/'
The problem was finding a way of dealing with the right-to-know problem through
politics, and Dukakis was able to do that in his second term
Not onl> did Right-to-Know establish Dukakis’s ability to listen, but it opened up
other members of the government to working with him. In his first term, Dukakis had
alienated certain members of the General Court to the point that they literally did not want
to be in the same room with him. Here, Dukakis established a firm working relationship
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W.th the legislature, facilitating passage of future legrslation Regarding Rtght-to-KnoWs
influence on the passage of fature legislation, Alden Raine notes:
m Ho'rh™' 1
" W R.A. and said. ‘We’re going
o d ths, there was a reasonable expectation in the[State House] that, the guy did Right-to-Know PlantUostng [a bill regulating companies’ handling of plant
closings] was on the way
,Let’s work with him We real-
ly expect we’re going to get a bill on this and we need
to be involved too [Dukakis’s] willingness to do veiy
complicated legislative things, but equally and symmet-
ncally important, the legislature’s willingness to embrace
me fact that he was going to take that role, to a very oreat
degree, sprang from Right-to-Know, because it was the first
Thus, Right-to-Know established a different kind of leadersWp under Dukakis than the
public had seen in 1975
“It isn’t, that you’re going to get unanimity on this stuff. But you certainly can
achieve substantial consensus around good policies and good legislation; but it does take
work and effort and sensitivity and we had a lot more of that the second time around.”^''
Through this work, effort and sensitivity, Dukakis showed more of the characteristics of a
constitutional executive Respect for the opinions of various public constituencies in a
public dialogue, and recognition that other governmental institutions than the executive
had a responsibility to interpret and protect the public good came with Dukakis’s changed
perception of the executive. As the Right-to-Know bill illustrates, he was much more
successful at promoting a substantive agenda based on what the government should be
doing, and thus providing leadership, as a result.
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The Guberrmtorial Election of 1QR6
Even given his triumph over Edward King in 1982, Dukakis had not fulfilled his
pohtical ambition. Total vindication required that he win a Gubernatorial election that was
based on his own positive message rather than simply an anti-incumbent stance. He needed
to present some vision of what government should do rather than simply how government
should work. He held that opportunity in the election of 1986 and took advantage of it.
Dukakis combined his gift for organization with a philosophy of government that stressed
its relationship with society rather than solely government's methods of conducting itself.
Dukakis effectively had no choice but to run a campaign based on something other
than an anti-incumbency stance. As journalist Robert Healy noted: “perhaps as important
as anything, Dukakis in 1986 ran a campaign with a message.”™ The theme of Dukakis's
1986 campaign was “opportunity for aU” Massachusetts citizens. Dukakis built a case that,
through programs such as E.T.(a welfare reform proposal that received much praise),
more effective tax collection and the promotion of a thriving economy, he had fostered an
environment in which “[njo state in the country stands for opportunity like Massachusetts
stands for opportunity.”^^
The actual campaign saw Dukakis acting both more and less intense than may have
been necessary. During the campaign, he hardly seemed to notice his opponent George
Kariotis. Dukakis consented to only two debates, one of which had been scheduled for the
night of the seventh game of the World Series, in which the Boston Red Sox were playing
for the title. The Governor’s race received surprisingly little coverage in The Boston
Globe, most likely because the Republicans had been so careless and Dukakis so effective
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in preparations for the election that itc
,ts outcome was considered a foregone conclusion
Yet, Dukakis was still campaisnino hard nn ^P g , o election day, to insure that none of his hard
won support would slip away/^
In 1986, Dukakis went out of his way to run a campaign based on substant.ve
issues. In late September and early October, he conducted four
-.heme weeks - In turn, he
focused on the economy, educat.on, housing and the environment, discussing specfic
proposals for each area - In the area of housing, for example. Dukakts offered a plan to
require compames bu.Id.ng luxury hous.ng on waterffont property to make a certain
percentage of ,t affordable to the middle class. He also discussed plans to build more
moderately priced housing on state-owned land On the issue of dealing with Federal
cutbacks, Dukakis offered a state-level version of the earlier Urban Development Action
Grants/* Yet, while Dukakis himself offered solutions to problems, he was willing to
listen to others’ opinions and include them in the discussion, a trademark notably different
from much of his first term.
Yet Dukakis did more than simply offer specific solutions. He also placed those
solutions m a social and historical context. In doing so, he offered reasons why
government should be undertaking these activities in the first place. On the affordable
housing issue, for example, he noted that one consequence of Massachusetts’s booming
economy was a rise in the cost of housing. This was driving many people out of
Massachusetts, according to Dukakis. Massachusetts residents who were not particularly
well-off would only suffer under these conditions: “T want my kids and their families and
the children of all families in the state to live in Massachusetts... The purpose ...is to keep
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Massachusetts number one when it cnm^c nnn o es to commitment for support for affordable
housing Dukakis was not only “moving intog to the next generation of finding solutions,”
bu, he was also more capable of giving mean.ng ,o those solutions beyond the current,
technical meaning as well
Given hrs posit,on as the
.ncumbent, Dukakis may have had little cho.ce about
what son of a campaign to He did not, however, merely repeat past accomphshment:
in an effort to coast to an easy victooi Rather, he conducted talks involving detailed
efforts to deal with problems facing Massachusetts His campaign, while conducted
against an ineffectual opponent during an economic boom, nonetheless was well-run and
offered stands on issues Here was a constitutional executive on the campaign trail He
was adv ocating specific, though reasonably flexible, means of addressing problems
affecting Massachusetts He articulated a vision of what Massachusetts government should
be doing, not simply how it should be doing it.
There were factors other than simply Dukakis’s conception of the executive which
contributed to his resounding victory in 1986. The Republican Party was mired in
circumstances which made victory relatively easier for Dukakis than it might have been
otherwise. The Republicans offered a candidate who was smart, but an inexperienced
campaigner. George Kariotis was also standard-bearer of one of the most disheveled
Republican state party organizations in the United States. Republican party elites chose
Kariotis to run for the Governorship only after two previous potential candidates.
including the candidate who had emerged from the convention with the nomination, had
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quit the race Kariotis essentially conceded the race to Dukakis from the beginning, hoping
for nothing more than a good showing,
Nonetheless. Dukakis had lost the 1978 primary to an individual who had no
experience running for elective office It is conceivable that Dukakrs could have repeated
that feat if he had not changed hrs conception of the way to conduct his Govemorshrp
Respecng the positrons of others rn the political system allowed Wm to gamer suppon
that he had squandered hrs first term He maintained his organization^ skills and worked
fervently toward a reelection that as even hrs opponent conceded, was secure Ifom the
Stan of the campaign. Even with that security, Dukakis understood the importance of
winning the election based on his own record, rather than tunning against someone else,
and he succeeded in that regard
The economy was thnving in the mid-1980s in Massachusetts, another external
factor that helped Dukakis to a substantial degree Certainly, the economy to a certain
extent is beyond the control of the incumbent. Yet an upturn in the economy had not
helped Dukakis in 1978,* The larger point is that Dukakis had created a support system
which allowed him to take advantage of externalities such as a strong economy. He had
not created such a system in his first term. Indeed, many of his actions at that time had
worked against the creation of such a system. In 1986, Dukakis turned a thriving economy
*The unemployment rate in Massachusetts was 1 1.2% in 1975, Dukakis’s first year as
governor. By the Democratic Primary year of 1978, it was 6.2%. While this is not an
admirable number in absolute terms, it is certainly a substantial reduction from one
election period to the next. Cf Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1978 (99‘^
Edition) (Washington DC.: U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1978), p. 409, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1979 (lOU^ Edition), p 406.
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« th, *.*„ 5....,„„„
among the legislature and the public and an electoral
necessarily ensure
success a thriving economy could not
Dukakis won with 69% of the vote in the Gubernatorial election of 1986. wtth
1,140,125 votes to Kariotis’ 31% or 520.261 votes “ Words such as “redetnpt.on- and
“mandate” were popular among Massachusetts political pundits that fall. Even as Dukabs
entered his thtrd term, he was more substantive than a good government reformer, wtth
atdes noting that “Dukakis plans to focus in the third term on four key areas: economic
development, improvements tn public education, affordable housing and an anti-dmg
program for schools
Michael Dukakis was able to achieve a substantial victory because he had
rethought his image of the executive Conducting his administration along the lines of a
constitutional executive allowed him to shore up support for a program and to win
election based on that program Heading into Dukakis’s third term, however, doubt
existed as to Dukakis’s future in Massachusetts state politics In addition to themes of
redemption and mandate, speculation on whether Dukakis would choose to run for
national office was also popular among Massachusetts political pundits His success in
Massachusetts and his position as head of the National Governor’s Association made him
an important potential candidate for the Democrats’ consideration
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The Presidential Campaign of IQSS
Dukakis ,s best known nationally for having lost the 1988 Presidential election to
George Bush, The campaign Dukakis ran was one based on the Progressive conception of
the executive as a popular manager. Yet Dukakis was unsuccessful and unconvinc.ng tn
his efforts Much of his lack of success has to do with the image of the executive that
Dukakts projected dunng the campaign. The weaknesses of the public manager concept.on
of the executive are d.splayed clearly tn the events of the Summer and Fall of 1988
A development before the primary season that would hurt the Dukakis campaign
was the loss of John Sasso Sasso resigned after admitting his part in the downfall of
presidential hopeful Senator Joe Biden Biden had withdrawn from the race after
revelations that he had plagiarized the conclusion of a speech in Iowa from Bntish
politician Neil Kinnock These original allegations led to ftmher investigations which
eventually drove Biden out of the primaries Speculation on who had distributed the
videotape which served to alert the media first focused on the campaign staff of
Representative Richard Gephardt, but eventually settled on Dukakis campaign and John
Sasso In September of 1987, recognizing Dukakis could not accept what had been labeled
a dirty tnck, ’ Sasso confessed his role in the incident and resigned from the Dukakis
O I
campaign.
Sasso’s absence affected the campaign in numerous ways. Most directly, Sasso
was the individual closest to Dukakis, seemingly the only campaign worker whose advice
Dukakis would readily accept. More broadly, Sasso had brought to Dukakis’s political
operations both an ability to create a substantive image and the “political skills” Dukakis
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adn..ts were so i.ponan. Re.e.ber
.ha. Sasso was v..a, in shaping Duka^s’s campaign
organiza.,on in 1982 when he cap.ured
.he gubema.onal nomina.ion from Edward J
King Sasso had pu. togerher a campaign comprised of a se. of “issues
.ask forces” and a
s.rong grassroots organization Sasso thus helped ensure tha, Dukakis was able to
establish an image while including others actively and impo^an.ly Without Sasso, under
new campaign manager Susan Es.nch, Dukakis and his organization displayed many of the
characteristics tha. had hurt him in his firs, gubernatorial term and the 1978 Massachusetts
Democratic primary
In Sasso’s absence, Dukakis's campaign could no. decide on a compelling theme, a
problem tha. came back to haunt Dukakis once George Bush began his campaign in
earnest A strong advertising campaign was ail but nonexistent *’ Also, without Sasso,
the Dukakis’s campaign was less inclined to show as much respect to other members of
the various Democratic state party organizations As Susan Estrich notes: “[The campaign
organization] had existed from when we started through June with about eight or nine
state campaign managers. We moved them around the countiy thj-oughout the pnmary
process The organization ultimately obtained a reputation for “insularity,” specifically
the insularity of Boston,” due to the location of the campaign’s headquarters, as a result
of which. It “was never able to harness the best and brightest of its party’s trained
campaign professionals in Washington and elsewhere.”*^ Effective communication with
lower-level party officials, for example, might possessor of “impressive political and
administrative skills, as evidenced by his work on the R.E.A.P program have prevented
Dukakis from recommending that Iowa’s local farmers grow Belgian endive (As
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Congressman and fellow office-seeker Richard Gephardt’s later advertisement intoned:
Belgian endive? Jesse Jackson also took offense at the Dukakis organization’s
unwillingness to utilize individuals who had been important organizers for Jackson, such
as Richard Hatcher, former Mayor of Gary, Indiana Jackson notes that rather than
absorbing his people or his structure, Dukakis simply worked around them, ignoring
them Tellingly, Sasso was the individual who spoke to Jesse Jackson dunng the general
election in an attempt to smooth relations between the two camps.
Sasso did return to the campaign one year after he had left, in September of 1988
.
By that time, however, it was too late Dukakis appointed him vice-chairman of the
campaign, but he w'as de facto manger given that he had the most influence with the
candidate. Friction between workers with loyalties to Sasso and workers with loyalties to
Estrich made working together difficult. Lines ot command that managers should have
established at the beginning of the campaign were only being delineated two months from
the end. The fact that, despite Sasso’s efforts, Jesse Jackson never quite felt comfortable
after Dukakis’s initial rebuff of him also indicates that Sasso’s return was too late to help
extensively.^'’ Had Sasso been in the campaign all along, perhaps Jackson would have been
included from the stan, and his animosity quelled.
The Primary Elections saw Dukakis rise to the top of a field of Democrats after a
series of scandals and challenges mainly from Jesse Jackson and Albert Gore. As Wilson
Carey McWilliams notes, the primary was a preview of the strategies Dukakis would
employ in the general election. McWilliams notes: “Part of Dukakis’s primary success
derived from his refusal to be drawn into intraparty conflict, his reliance on vague, liberal.
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but relatively unprogrammatic appeals, and his rejection of negat.ve campaigning While
Dukakts again displayed a talent for raising money and bu.lding a w,de base of support in
the pnmanes, these factors would come back to haunt him in the presidential campaign
The presidential campaign of 1988 is known as the most vitnolic in modem
political history. Bush attacked what he perceived as Dukakis's weaknesses with the
voters and stuck to those themes throughout the campaign. Bush accused Dukakis of
being unpatriotic due to Dukakis's veto of the Pledge-of-Allegiance bill The soon-to-be-
infamous Willie Honon was used to portray Dukakis as “soft-on-crime ” Bush used the
pollution in Boston Harbor to illustrate Dukakis's supposed lack of concern with the
environment The trouble here, of course, is that Bush is defining Dukakis and the
election's agenda when Dukakis should have been defimng himself and maintaining a share
in defining the agenda for the campaign
Yet Dukakis’s conception of the executive office during the campaign effectively
precluded his establishing himself as anything but anti-Reagan/Bush, He asserted
repeatedly that the election “was not about ideology,” but about competence Reagan
had been a poor manager and the country could not afford to have a managerial bumbler
in its highest office. Dukakis criticized Reagan’s handling of the War on Drugs and his
handling of the military budget. Typically, criticisms were in managerial terms:
‘We’ve got to put our defense dollars where our defense
needs are greatest, we’ve got to use those dollars to buy
weapons that work, and we’ve got to manage those dol-
lars to strengthen our military forces, not to line the pock-
ets of dishonest contractors and wheeler-dealer consultants.’^^
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Cnticisms also came in the form ofvague generalities such as: ‘It’s time to exchange
voodoo economics for can-do econonucs," or “a fish rots from the head first,-
The latter comment was an indictment of Reagan himself as the individual who
should be held responstble for the ethtcal transgressions of members of his administration
Indeed, Dukakis spent much of hts earliest efforts in the campaign criticizing Reagan’s
management of his administration, what one reporter called “a full-throated assault on the
ethical lapses of the Reagan Administration,” to the exclusion of offering any substantive
program. This was to the frustration of many observers who responded to Dukakis’s
generalities with Andrew Rosenthal’s question: “Yes, but how^”'^ E J. Dionne, Jr.
criticized Dukakis for “being too vague and unspecific..
.Ail along, Mr. Dukakis has
presented himself not as a messenger carrying words of protest or promise, but as a
manager who could get things done.”‘°" Dukakis’s failure to articulate a positive, detailed
program, a bane for his allies, would prove a blessing for his enemies.
•After spending the early part of the campaign criticizing the current administration
rather than outlining a positive program, Dukakis spent much of the rest of the campaign
responding, or not responding, to George Bush’s allegations. Dukakis’s mental health was
called into question at one point. Bush called him “soft-on-crime” and “weak-on-defense.”
His campaign used attack advertisements to demean Dukakis's abilities, most famously a
television commercial involving convicted criminal Willie Horton who had terrorized a
couple in their own home while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison.
Dukakis’s failure to respond to Bush’s negative campaigning played an important
role in his loss. He maintained his early refusal to answer Bush’s attack ads in popular
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tern^s: 'He said he did no. think Antericans [were]
'interested in a da„y diet of this sort of
th.ng -« Yet the ads were effec.ve in conveytng an intage of Dukakts that was beneficial
.0 George Bush, an .mage that apparently resonated with voters Once again, Dukak.s
misread the public, and it cost him an election If he criticized Reagan and Bush’s
competence without folly persuading the public that he was fit for the office, the public
would most likely be willing to maintain the status quo, as they did
Dukakis performed well in the first debate between the two candidates, not as well
m the second The best known instance from either debate is Dukakis’s response to the
opening question of the second contest, asked by television’s Bernard Shaw "Governor, if
[your wife] were raped and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for
the killer’’”'® Given an opportunity to answer a seemingly inflammatory question with fire
in his voice. Dukakis responded in a cool manner and with a technician’s answer leavino
many ot his supporters in stunned silence:
No, I don’t, Bernard, and I think you know that I’ve op-
posed the death penalty during all of my life. I don’t see
any evidence that it’s a deterrent, and I think there are bet-
ter and more effective ways to deal with violent crime We’ve
done so in my own state, and it’s one of the reasons why we
have had the biggest drop in crime of any industrial state in
America, why we have the lowest murder rate of any industrial
State in .Ajnerica,'”'’
In attempting to be objective, Dukakis missed an opportunity to display his humanity. In
keeping his cool, he failed to seem anything other than a bright individual who was
wedded to the culture of competence, as he had been at the time of his early political
victories in Massachusetts.
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Dukakis’s perception of the role of the executive as a manager, and hence his
focus on competence, prevented him from defining hts agenda. Indeed,
,t prevented him
from establishing much of an agenda at all beyond several broad, oft-repeated
generalizations. This allowed George Bush to step in and define Dukakis to the voters
before Dukakis himself could In taking advantage of Dukakis’s lack of specificity. Bush
managed to instill voters with a sense of unease about Dukakis’s patriotism, hts toughness
m the areas of crime and foreign policy and even h.s competence. Had Dukakis made an
effort to be more substantive. Bush would not have had the chance to create Dukakis’s
electoral image
Even more than a coherent program, Dukakis’s campaign lacked any substantive
vision of what government should be doing and any reason it should be doing it It
presented little in the way of meaningful interpretation and reasoning on American
government s functions in society. Dukakis seemed to be little more than a neutral
mediator among competing interests, a manager. Dukakis admits that he could have
been more philosophically responsive to Bush’s allegations. Regarding the allegation of
being unpatriotic, which stemmed from Dukakis’s veto of the Pledge-of-Allegiance bill, an
action he had taken because of its dubious constitutionality, Dukakis claims:
Had I had my wits about me during the campaign. I’d
have turned to Bush during one of those debates and
said, ‘Let me ask you something.
. . If you’re the Pres-
ident of the United States and the Supreme Court tells
you something is unconstitutional, you’ll do it anyway'’
Is that what you’re telling us'’ That you’re the rule of
law ..Do you think a President ought to be a law-break-
er ..that the Governor ought to be a law-breaker'’’ But
I was trying to keep it positive.
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Actually, this is a striking example of where Dukaki. rn. mer U s could have moved beyond simply
neutral competence and mto the realm of a more substantive notion of government’s role
in society, bu, he chose no, to do so There ,s a philosophy of government, and
governmental responsibility in Dukakts’s above assert.on. bu, hts conception of the
executive the 19SB Prestdential election precluded Ins capttaltatng on ,, and using it to
his advantage Thts was an electton about competence rather than ideology, after all
For hts pan. George Bush was no, panicularly substantive either As a response to
Dukakis’s repeated tndictments of Ronald Reagan’s competence. Bush cenainly cnticized
Dukakts for focusing on the managerial aspects of the executive office. However. Bush
was as general and vague as Dukakis for the most pan. and tended to speak in similarly
amorphous terms when he was not impugning Dukakis’s assenions of character and
competence Bush’s conception of the executive was as managenal as Dukakis’s and he
sough, little beyond maintaining the status quo and not upsetting the ship-of-state
Dukakis’s use of the Progressive conception of the executive led to his loss in the
Presidential Election of 1988 His focus on competence rather than ideology led to a
campaign strategy m which he criticized the incumbent but failed to offer very much in the
way of a substantive program. Due to this, the public had little detailed evidence on which
to evaluate Dukakis beyond that offered by his opponent. Given the disparaging nature of
that evidence, and Dukakis’s failure to respond to much of it, the public received a less
than ideal picture of him. Had Dukakis thought of the executive as something more than a
manager, as having to be more than neutral and competent, had he presented a substantive
program, his campaign would have been a more effective one.
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The question ofwhy M.ehae, Dukahis employed the popu.at-ntanager conception
of the executtve in ,988. and seennngly forgot evetythtng he had learned after his loss to
Edward Kmg in 1978, ,s a perplexing one. One possibility is simply that Dukakis had not
as governor in the 1980s, and certainly seemed to realize what he needed to do to be a
successfol chief executive In interviews, Dukakis recognizes his first-term’s mistakes and
IS at least aware of a possible remedy. So what happened’’
.Another possibility, suggested above, is that, while Dukakis knew what he had to
do, he had not internalized it fiilly. Without an individual or individuals such as John Sasso
nearby to remind him what was necessary, Dukakis reverted to the institutional behavior
of his first gubernatorial term A similar, though distinct, argument is that Dukakis had
learned what was necessary in the context of Massachusetts politics, but once the terrain
changed with the move up to national politics, he was lost, unable to translate his success
in the Bay State to a different setting.
Another persuasive argument is that Dukakis took the tack he did in the wake of
the Iran-Contra scandal and Ronald Reagan’s seeming administrative ineptitude. In 1987,
in the face of a presumably incompetent, irresponsible executive, the stage was apparently
set for the national emergence of Dukakis, who conversely seemed competent and
responsible. Yet, by 1988, Reagan’s political credibility with the public had returned,
and attacks on him no longer had the effect they were thought to have had one year
earlier. Thus, an image that had seemed to be appropriate prior to the primary season,
became inappropriate and ultimately helped lead to Dukakis’s loss.‘°^
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The issue ofwhy Dukalos chose
.he popular-manager co„cep,,on of .he execu.ive
n .he
.988 pres.den.iai can.pa.gn is a complex one For
.he purposes of.h.s
.hesis.
however, why Dukakis chose that
and that he failed when he did
conception is less important than the fact that he did
Conclusion
Michael Dukakis had wea.hered defeat in 1978 and returned in 1982 to vanquish
Edward K.ng, Dunng Ws second term as governor, he established himself as more of a
consututional execu.ive than a popular manager He was able to see the legislature as a
coequal partner ,n governing He was able to incorporate politics into his polit.cal
appointments. As the Rtght-to-Know b.li aptly illustrates, he used this conception of the
off.ce to promote an agenda and oversee its passage through the General Court. In 1986,
he ran a substantive campaign in which h.s .mage of a constitutional executive held sway
He presented more of a vision and was more concerned with what government should be
doing than with how it should be conducted.
Dukakis, especially after the loss of John Sasso, returned to a Progressive
conception of the executive in the Presidential election of 1988 Under that conception, he
presented little substantive vision of what America should be and little reasoning behind
what government’s role in Amencan society should be This led to his defeat at the hands
of George Bush. Dukakis’s success in 1982 and 1986 had wound up in defeat at the
national level in 1988, in much the way his success in 1974 (and previously) had wound up
in defeat in 1978, He showed a gift for building a base of support, yet he had trouble
moving beyond that base when he maintained the Progressive conception of the executive.
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While the focus of this work is on Diil-aHc’ukakis s conception of the executive office,
another poss.ble explanar.on of h.s pohtical fortunes would be his personality Although it
.s not central to t.s thesis, Duhahis's personality cannot be contpletely
.gnored as a factor
and should be mentioned in an analysis of hts political activities. As indicated in the
introduction, this work focuses on the roles of the office because a psychological approach
might lead too easily to the notion that an executive’s fortunes depend on having the
charactenstics of a cenatn tndiv.dual, which makes generalizatton difficult and possibly
limits too greatly individuals who could achieve success as a chief executive
Those objections notwithstanding, Dukakis’s personality certainly played a notable
role in his political expenence Dukakis has a, not entirely undeserved, reputation for
being frugal and almost puritanical in his habits As illustrated in chapter four, he has at
times placed a value on integrity and principle to the point where personal and political
relationships have suffered He is very bright and sure of himself and his own intelligence
to the point where can seem aloof and arrogant. Certainly, these qualities did not endear
him to legislators, many other members of Massachusetts government, or the electorate,
especially during his first term.
Yet Dukakis came back to experience both a successful second term and a
resounding reelection in the 1980s, Kenney and Turner note that many individuals,
including Dukakis s own father-in-law, do not believe Dukakis’s personality changed
between his first and second administrations.'" By the 1980s, Francis Bellotti had known
Dukakis since the 1960s and claimed that Dukakis ‘“probably thinks more about
communication with groups that would have an opposite position than he would have, but
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that's a pragmatic change, not a change in Knd. he [still] has the same ngid values-
Finally, Fran Meaney. a close friend of Dukakis's, notes:
••‘Intellectually he's learned a
good lesson Whether he's changed internally,
. don't know "'- xhus, Mtchael Dukakis
governorshtp in Massachusetts Accordingly, this thesis has focused on the latter rather
than on the former.
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CHAPTER 6
leadership through the constitution.al executive
™. .h»i. h.
^
““““' “—
- E«
these conceptions represents responses to pressures that the ai the president or the governor
faces. These pressures arise from the fact that thet the executtve must be both a political figure
and an administrative figure, not roles that necessarilv fi, ,u ,y fit together easily If the executive
,„E,
t.
trom these roles are reconciled toward the end of providing leadership, defined here as an
ability to win elections based on a stable, coherent program of governance, which the
executtve pursues and, ideally, implements after attaining office. The key to executive
adership is that it must be simultaneously vigorous and restrained Executives in the
American political system are expected to provide leadership, and without it, the polity
may wind up with the institutional gridlock observers often bemoan Yet tha, leadership
cannot be too strong, as the American public does not readily tolerate tyrannical political
figures
This typology of the Amencan elected executive serves two fttnctions First, it is
historical The development of various types of executives has followed a historical
progression that is outlined below Yet previously dominant historical types have not
passed from the scene so completely that they are no longer available for use. Indeed, each
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Wstoncal type can be translated Into a broader political culture, so that the typology also
lends itself to the establishment of analytic categories wh.ch can be used to evaluate
present-day executives. As summarized below, this thesis has traced these histoncal types
in Massachusetts polit.cs It then applied the analytic categor.es to the political
experiences of Michael Dukakis, three-time governor of Massachusetts and 1988
Democratic presidential nominee
The Constitutional F.yerntivp
In Massachusetts, the constitutional executive developed as a result of colonial
experiences with early, tyrannical governors and after the rejection of a proposed
constitution that contained a weak executive. Colonists chastised early governors such as
John Winthrop and royal governors such as Thomas Hutchinson for what colonists
perceived as attempts to deprive them of their rights, especially by dominating the various
branches of government. Yet, both governors made the legitimate point that the
government had a responsibility to keep the peace and to enforce laws that were beneficial
for the community as a whole. Thus, the executive challenge emerged: the executive
needed to execute the law, and simultaneously address political pressures from other
members of the polity.
The executive under the proposed constitution of 1 778 was quite weak. The
officeholder was a member of the Senate and, though popularly elected, was potentially
chosen governor by the members of the legislature, making the officeholder even more a
tool of that body Separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances were all but nonexistent
in the proposed constitution. The governorship possessed no veto power, and politics was
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community.
The executive m the constitution of 1780 was powerful by eighteenth-centurv
standards Popularly elected, the officeholder possessed a qualified veto. Popular election
and possession of the negative positioned the governor squarely within a political system.
Popular election, rather than appointment by the legislature, gave the office legitimacy
whrle the veto made the governor’s approval necessary for the passage of leg.sla.ion,
gtvtng the officeholder the power to say “no” if necessary Separation of powers was
clearly and d.stinctly wntten tnto the constitut.on, buttressing the governor’s pos.tion as
chtef executive Popular election and other constitutional
.nstitutions also setved to check
the governor The legislature, the courts and the executive council all ensured that the
governor would not overstep his constitutional authority. This institutionalized the
executive challenge. Here was a chief executive with sufficient power to carry out his
duties while voters and members of other constitutional institutions ensured that the
officeholder did not exercise power in too heavy-handed a manner. Politics in this era took
place within and among constitutional institutions, while judgement of the rightness of a
policy or an action was based on its constitutionality.
Early executives such as John Hancock and Caleb Strong were models of the
constitutional executive. Hancock was the first governor under the new constitution, while
Strong served early in the nineteenth century as well-organized political parties began to
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take shape in .he Commonweahh, though unde, a non-pan.san ideal. Each of these
governors reconcied the pressures facing the executive through the constitutional-
executive nodel of leadership Both were vet, successful electorally, wtth each holding
office for eleven years in an era of annual elections Neither provided substantive policy
leadership, but this was a time when chief executives were not expected to do so
During their tenures. Hancock and Strong recognized and acted upon the
legitimacy of other institutions, maintaining a respect for the system of separation of
powers They saw the popular will as embodied in the government as a whole, and treated
members of other institutions with the respect they were due as constitutional
officeholders Hancock and Strong exercised the veto rarely, if at all. and considered the
legislature the preeminent policy-making branch, at least coequal to the executive Affer
the passage of the United States Constitution, they urged and maintained a respect for the
federal government while also recognizing their duty toward Massachusetts
Administratively. Hancock and Strong recognized that the law was not solely the domain
of the executive and that other members of the political system had as much of a
responsibility toward the law as the executive did. Strong indicated the nature of his
administrative appointments were men of proper character and due respect for the law
,
regardless of their political persuasion.
Under current conditions, a constitutional executive emphasizes a constitutional
political culture. Under this model, the chief executive respects others who follow a
community s laws and its constitution. Members of the government expect that citizens
will follow the laws and the constitution and that other members of government will
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conduct themselves with a respect for istitutional provisions. Citizens expect that the
government will protect peoples’ riehts a? Hf^finoriP P gms, s defined in the constitution, and that members
of the govemmen. wll, conduct themselves accord,ng.y Thus, ,n a const,tutional political
culture, the way to judge behavior is through the constituuon, and members of the polity
hold themselves to that standard
The Partisan Administratnr
By the 1840s, panies had come to dominate political life in the Bay State. They
served both to facilitate and to direct political careers, as party elites approved candidates
for office. Partisan machines, such as that of Democrat David Henshaw and his cronies,
maintained a firm hold on both office seekers and voters. By assunng that only approved
candidates ran for office, and by controlling the open voting procedure, party officials
were able to choose candidates and attempt to deliver them to office. When exceptions
occurred, when a candidate whom the party elites did not necessarily favor ran for office
under the party s label, the disputants buried differences for the sake of the party. Further,
appointments to lower administrative offices came to be based on partisan affiliation. The
party s leaders controlled appointments to office and used promises of patronage to win
voters and as rewards for loyal party workers and supporters.
The partisan thought of political life in terms of party, an individual was judged
based on his partisan affiliation. Particularly in elections, where language was often harsh
and demeaning, party meant everything. Politics at this time was an electoral activity.
Debate over policy was public, taking place through partisan rhetoric in front of the
voters. A party’s members felt the party worked for the public good, while the opposition
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was a
ostensibly based on principle, were
mere faction, working to the detriment of the people’s interests Efforts to splinter
the party based on individual differences, even those
ultimately evU, as they cost precious votes and potentially denied the party a vctoty Once
in office, the proper policy was judged by partisan standards. Official act.on, too, came to
be judged based on partisanship If i, was nght according to the party, it was right
Yet this did not mean that parties were so divided as to be unable to conduct
business once elections were over A focus on the rewards of the office, rather than policy,
and respect for the opposition limited politics within constitutional institutions, so that
parties often buried vital issues As noted in chapter two, the Massachusetts Whigs free-
soil stand on slavery exemplified this Parties were far from monolithic groups, and the
Whigs had no desire to break up the pariy over one question, no matter how vital a
question it might have been. Further, as Whig governor in the 1840s George Briggs
indicated regarding the slavery question, party stands did not have to split the parties
completely. Members of other parties in the government could keep each other in check
by remembering that the other party’s members had rights as well, and conducting
business accordingly while still maintaining the well-being of the party.
Briggs was the first self-consciously partisan governor, serving from 1844 until
1851 Briggs represented the end of an era in which governors were more hesitant about
using the veto than they would become, Briggs did not veto any bills, deferring to the
judgement of legislators regarding proper policy. Governors after Briggs began using the
veto more frequently. While Briggs appreciated political parties, he did not think they
needed to be radically divisive in the government and he sought harmony both within his
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pany and between
.He WHigs and
.He Oe.oc.a.s Appoin.nten.s were
.a..e.s of
pan.sa„s.p for Br,ggs WHHe He d.d no.
.H.nH ad„,n.s.ra.ive of^cers sHon.d He removed
because of
.He.r partisan affiliation, he saw no problem with fiir^ Di W lling vacant offices with
individuals of his own partisan persuasion.
utler faced divided-party government during his gubernatorial term in
.1. mo. B*
^ ^
» .b,* ,.n,
... .h. Sb.,„b,p „ „„
__
He berated the General Court rather than according i, respect as a coequal constitutional
.nstitution and called for reforms that would give the governor greater control over
administration Butler used his veto frequently, judging policies on his own perception of
their soundness.
Frederic Greenhalge is indicative of the partisan administrator by the end of the
nineteenth century Greenhalge was even more up front about his partisanship in elections
than Briggs had been, and he respected members of the legislature in a way Butler did not
Further, Greenhalge used the veto more frequently than any other governor m the
nineteenth century despite the fact that, like Briggs, he never faced divided government
Greenhalge based his vetoes not solely on the constitutionality of the proposed legislation,
but also on whether they were responsible policy Greenhalge also indicated tendencies
toward a merit-based civil service, but was reined in by members of his party.
As an ideal type, the partisan administrator stresses a group-based political culture.
Adherents of a given group, in this case a political party, are seen as the key members of
306
the wMe members of opposing groups are often relegated to an •outsider'^
status inclusion is based on how well the individual
political party Members of the
conforms to the standards of a
government expect that citizens and other members of
government will behave according to the strictures of panisan behavior
place the well-being of the party above all else i
and that they will
expect that, if they toe the party line, they will
n their conduct Members of the electorate
receive benefits, including patronage
appointments and partisan public policy action, once their party has won office
The Popular Managpr
A reaction against the domination of political life by parties began in
Massachusetts as early as the 1850s Reforms that followed, such as the civil service
system and the direct primary were supposed to take away the hold of the party on the
electoral process and administrative appointments Parties, reformers claimed, were too
focused on the rewards of holding office rather than substantive issues of governance The
patronage system, they asserted, led to corrupt and inefficient administration The General
Court also frustrated reformers who saw it
,
too, as inefficient and corrupt and looked to
empower the governor to lead the legislature which, they claimed, was too fragmented to
lead with a unified voice.
Electoral reforms included the institution of the secret ballot permanently in 1888
and regulation of the electoral process. A direct primary system, for example, was in place
by 1911 Many substantive administrative reforms were slower in coming, but the civil
service system, calling for merit-based appointments and instituted in 1884, was a start.
Advocates of these reforms claimed that they took away the power of political parties and
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governor
a budget and being
clean, efficient administration.
The Constitutional Convention of 1 9 1 7 initiatPHtiated many reforms which would give
the governor greater power. The two-year term th^y a m, e power to return a bill with
recommendations and the executive budget all am., tv u-g ^^ose from this convention. The
would be able to play a greater role in policy affairs, imt.ating
constituttonally empowered to make substanttve suggest,ons on legislat.on. Further the
two-year term perm.tted the Cefexecut.ve to focus on mst.tuting agenda rather than on
campatgmng as under the s.ngle-year term The officeholder did not ga.„ d.rect control
over adm.n.strat.on, however Desp.te lim.t.ng the number of executive departments, the
General Court rema,ned in charge of reorgan,zation of the executive branch, and the
execut,ve councl mainta,ned its approval power over adm.ntstrat,ve appointments and
removals.
James
.Mtchael Curley, elected governor ,n 1934
, represented trends in
Massachusetts that paralleled those at the national level Curley advocated the intervention
of the government to provide rehef for the problems ansing from the Great Depression
He campaigned apart from his party, seeking to elect himself rather standing firmly with
Democratic party leaders Curley saw the governorship alone as representative of the
popular w,ll. Using radio to reach the public, he brought his legislative program to the
people dtrectly, over the heads of lawmakers Curley derided the General Court calling it
mefficient, and therefore harmful to the public. If legislators would enact the governor’s
program of relief, he claimed, they would be acting for the good of the people. He used
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h.s own judgement ofwha. was proper policy
.0 w,eld the veto Further, Curley sough,
greater control over administration, attempting
,0 appoint individuals who
were loyal .0 the governor above all Ultimately, Curley left office in disgrace, his
legislative program only partly achieved
Foster Furcolo was indicative of the Massachusetts governorship as it had
developed by the 1960s, on the eve of reforms that would strengthen it administratively
Furcolo-s election indicated the secondaiy role parties had taken on in gubernatorial
elections Once in office, he continued many trends toward the solidification of the
executive as a popular manager I, had become the governor’s job to lead the legislature in
the name of the people Furcolo maintained the image of the executive as acting directly
for the public good, used his veto without regard to party concerns, and viewed the
legislature as mimical to the public interest if lawmakers did not act on his program
Where Curley had used radio to reach the public directly, Furcolo used television,
Furcolo, too, complained of the nature of the administrative system under the
Massachusetts governor A report made ,0 him called for greater efficiency in the state’s
administrative branch, and he sought to institute reforms to make that possible
In the 1960s, the governor received the direct admimstrative control that reformers
had been calling for since Benjamin Butler. Through constitutional amendment, the
governor acquired control over reorganizations of the executive branch. Through
statutory reform, the governor acquired direct control over appointment and removal of
administrative officials. The gubernatorial term became four years instead of two, and
governors received more time in which to return a bill with recommendations The
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governor thus acquired greater ability to
administrative control i
act on a legislative agenda, and greater
n executing it.
Further, the election of 1960 demonstrated that gubernatorial politics had
developed a quite personal, rather than partisan, nature Joseph Ward, the Democrat.c
candidate was his party’s endorsee and called for
It, losing in a state dominated by Democrats, but
party unity. Not only did he not receive
many other members of the party
spurned htm as a result of a nasty pnmaty battle John Volpe, the Republican candidate,
received h.s party's nomtnation wtth out a struggle He then went about disassociating
htmself from ,t, urgtng the
.Massachusetts electorate to “Vote the man, vote Volpe '
Though parties still dominated the General Court, gubernatorial politics had developed a
personal flavor by the 1960s
This model of the executive represents a bureaucratic or managerial political
culture The focus is on conducting government properly, meaning openly, honestly, and
efficiently Inclusion is based on professionalism, re. honesty, openness and ability, rather
than partisan affiliation Members of the government expect that voters will follow them
personally and that other officials will advocate for their own constituents, while following
standards of honesty and efficiency. Citizens expect that government will address any
pressing public problem through proper administration, and that government will be
conducted openly, honestly and efficiently.
The Executive Cycles of Michael Diilcalcis
Under current expectations of the officeholder, employing the Progressive
conception of the office, Michael Dukakis experienced cycles of success and failure.*
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Employing the Progressive conception of politics, and especially of the executive, Dukakis
expenenced two cycles of victory and defeat His first cycle began with his success in the
General Court in the 1960's and ended with his defeat at the hands of Edward King in
1978 Hts second cycle started with his victory over King in 1982 and finished with his
loss to George Bush in the Presidential election of 1988 Dukakis broke the cycle with the
Gubernatorial election of 1986 These cycles of victory and defeat, and the breaking of the
second cycle, can be traced to Dukakis’s conceptions of the executive
At the beginning of each cycle, Dukakis was tremendously successful at gamering
support He possessed strong organizational skills and his campaign organizations proved
to be aggressive and productive at raising money An active and effective grass-roots
campaigner, he had little trouble convincing individuals that something was wrong with
the incumbent, and thus little trouble winning elections Dukakis achieved his early
victories emphasizing the managerial political culture and, more specifically, under the
guise ot the Progressive executive the popular manager Dukakis first shot through the
ranks of local politics in his hometow n of Brookline As a reformer representing a desire
for a cleaner, more responsive government, Dukakis battled traditional Irish pols whom he
thought conducted government unprofessionally and therefore irresponsibly. Dukakis
helped to bring together a group of individuals who sought to replace the dominant
partisan political culture with a managerial one.
During his experience in the General Court, Dukakis succeeded admirably in using
the Progressive mind set. He sought procedural reforms that would allow for a cleaner,
more efficient government as well as reforms that would strengthen the governor. His
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biggest success came with the passage of no-fault automobile insurance, which he saw as a
reform for the good of consumers in their battles against powerftrl special interests
Dukakis was successfol because he had advocated a rational solution to a public problem,
maintained a firm dedication to that solution and successfully debated its ments in the
General Court, As a legislator, Dukakis established his focus on matters of governmental
process and sought to convince others of the nghtness of his cause, regardless of the
political interests that were at stake. He would carry these attitudes into the governor’s
office
From early in his political career, Dukakis’s ambition had directed him toward the
governorship, which he saw as the office truly representative of the people’s interests. In
the gubernatorial campaign of 1974, Dukakis further employed the strategy he had been
using all along The message was that the incumbent was not administenng the
government correctly Competence was in shot! supply while corruption and inefficiency
were rampant If they were cleaned up, the candidate could introduce neutral
professionalism and greater efficiency, t.e., greater competence Only then could the
popular will, embodied in the executive, be carried out properly
The 1974 primary campaign against Bob Quinn paralleled the political fight
Dukakis had been conducting throughout his career. Quinn represented the “old-boy
network” that Dukakis saw as corrupt and as needing reform. Dukakis called Quinn’s
competence into question and lambasted the corruption and inefficiency Quinn
represented. Voters could only expect more of the same if Quinn were in the governor’s
chair, Dukakis told the electorate.
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The general election campaign featured more of the same from Dukakis. Governor
Francis Sargent did not focus heavily on the administrat.ve aspects of the offrce, and
spending m state government had spiraled upward Dukakis took advantage of these
attributes and based hts campaign on a prom.se for better management if voters elected
him governor He offered management reforms as the solution to the state's fiscal woes
and staunchly insisted that he would not raise taxes. This campaign against the allegedly
.ncompetent Sargent worked, and Dukakts began h.s first term as governor in Januaty
1975
In h.s first term as governor, Dukakis’s conduct alienated many members of the
General Court While he indicated rhetorically that he understood the importance of the
legislature, Dukakis did not act as if he did He handled many issues, taxation for example,
with an arrogance that did not endear him to legislators Dukakis consistently relied solely
on his own intelligence and competence to try to push his personal vision through the
legislature This eventually resulted in his simply presenting bills to the legislature with
little or no negotiation on their behalf Regarding a court-reform bill, for example, Dukakis
did not even contact Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman .lUan Sisitsky about the
proposal It only became law after Dukakis worked more closely with legislators to ensure
its passage. While legislators attempted to work with him and support him, they found
themselves spurned, and ultimately they rebuffed Dukakis in return.
Dukakis also alienated potential supporters because of his administrative policies.
His no-patronage appointments rule caused campaign workers and friends, presumably
supporters, to be frozen out of potential administrative jobs. Instead, Dukakis turned to
j 1 j
nd,
.duals he felt could conduct adnti„stta.io„
,n a profess,onal, open, and efficient
— with no appearance of political
.nfluence. Even foe Grandma,son, who had tun
Ouhahts's successffil cantpa,„, was not a „e.her of the ad.in.strat.on Ouhahts sought
.0 g.ve hts adntin, Stratton, patt.cularly his cab.net, broad pohcy-.ah.ng power, w.th the
ch.ef executive a. the top of the Inerarchy, and the legislature following their lead This
lirther alienated lawmakers when members of the administrat.on treated legislators
poorly Conceivtng of the elected execut.ve as a public manager, as the sole representative
of the public will with a duty to carry out that will through efficiently run programs, made
maintaining institutional support difficult
The taxation issue amply illustrates Dukakis's institutional behavior during his first
term Dukakis's campaign promise not to raise taxes was an important one in voters'
minds, given Massachusetts's high local property-tax rates Rather, as a means of
tmproving the state's ternble fiscal condition, Dukakis preferred better management and
cutting back of government resources Initial efforts a, persuasion by leaders of the
General Court were unsuccessftil Once he had decided to raise taxes, Dukakis continued
to balk in his relations with the legislature, delaying a speech that would have helped
lawmakers by raising public support for the tax increase. Dukakis had come into office
with a rational plan and sought to implement that plan, even at the expense ofgood
legislative relations When he had no choice but to abandon that plan, Dukakis still treated
legislators arrogantly, so that his political capital with members of that body fell heavily.
Despite Dukakis’s popularity with the electorate even after he raised taxes, his
behavior was not lost on voters. There was a general perception of Dukakis’s arrogance
314
on their part
.^so, the taxation issue came back to haunt Dukakis after the passage of
Proposit.on
. 3 in Califorma, Voters saw that state as an example of one tn which the
government d.d no, have to ratse taxes to conduct bus,ness and wondered why
Massachusetts could not be run ,n the same manner Duhah.s scoffed a, the measure and
ciatmed that Massachusetts citizens would never fall for what he considered a simplist.c
soluuon to a complex problem. However, Dukakts mrsread the public on this issue, and
they turned him out of office.
The flaws in this approach became especially apparent after Dukakis had been in
the governor’s office for a term and ran for reelection Elecorally, much of his support
evaporated and he lost the 1978 Democrat,
c pnmary Dukakis lost for many reasons ,n
1978, including voters’ percept,ons of h,m as arrogant and the tepid campatgn he ran
More broadly, Dukakts’s use of the popular-manager conception of the executive did not
allow for shonng up and building on immediate electoral support whtle in office In 1974,
voters may have agreed with Dukakts for various reasons that Frank Sargent should no
longer have held the Governor’s office, Dukakis’s message of costly inefficiency and
corruptton in the state’s administration certainly resonated with many voters, but it was
not enough to sustam a coalition Those individuals who were for Dukakis largely because
they were against Sargent easily deserted Dukakis when he failed to live up to their
expectations, as he gave them little substantive reason to remain supportive. Indeed, by
1978, he had lost much support that he had carried in 1974. Advocates of human services,
ethnic voters, and residents of cities such as Pittsfield and Lowell, all ofwhom Dukakis
had carried in 1974, voted against him in 1978.^
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Edward J Kmg, Dukakis’s opponent ,n the 1978 Democratic primary, represented
.he more trad.tiona, pol, a partisan-admtnistrator mode, of the executwe, agatnst whom
Dukakts had been battling h.s entire career Dunng the primary h,ng aligned htmself wtth
.he ieg.siat.ve w.ng of the Democratic pany, the wing of the party Dukak.s had spumed
King ran a campaign based on substantive, as opposed to procedural, issues, thus
galvanizing groups Dukakis had alienated King’s stands on issues such as taxation, the
death penalty and abortion were opposed to Dukakis’s and King combined these stands
with an appeal to the business community that Dukakis did not possess. King’s stands
gave v oters something beyond an image of competence on which they could focus Kin»
won the primary and ultimately the general election, promising that politics would be
conducted in a friendlier manner than it had been under the Dukakis administration.
Between 1978 and his return to public life in 1982. three factors worked in
Dukakis’s favor The nature of Edward King’s governorship was the first In marked
contrast to Dukakis’s neutral competence. King was unable to grasp the intricacies of the
managerial function of the governorship By basing his appointments largely on loyalty to
his own wing of the Democratic party. King attempted to conduct administration in a
more partisan manner than Dukakis had. When many of those appointments turned out to
be incompetent, this reflected badly on Kmg, and his reputation as an administrator
suffered as a result
The other two factors working in Dukakis’s favor were his teaching experiences at
Harvard University and his befriending John Sasso. His years at Harvard helped push
Dukakis toward recognition of the legitimacy of other points of view. Having to work
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w..h students, and be evaluated by thetn, helped open Dukakis's eyes to the possibility that
there were points of v.ew other than his own that he might have wanted to consider, John
Sasso displayed what Dukakis terms
“political skills an ability to bring together disparate
groups into a meaning&l coalition, that Dukakis would find vitally important in his
reeiection and his second term Sasso would eventually become Dukakis's Chief Secretary
after running his 1982 gubernatorial campaign.
Dukakis and Edward King squared off again in the 1982 Democratic primary
Dukakis once more ran as a popular manager, pitting his competence against JGng's
managerial weakness Competence and integrity were Dukakis’s central themes, while
King attempted to keep the election focused on substantive issues Again, King felt voters
agreed with his stands for lower taxes, a higher dnnking age and institution of the death
penalty, and attempted to move the terms of debate in that direction and away from the
competence of the respective candidates Given Dukakis's victory, the Progressive
conception of the executive seemed to be most effective for winning elections, especially if
there were an incumbent who was vulnerable from an admimstrative standpoint, giving the
challenger an opportunity to display his managerial talents.
Dukakis thus capitalized on King’s shoddy administrative record, and the popular
manager defeated the partisan administrator Despite a late surge by King, Dukakis had
developed a strong, effective grassroots campaign organization that rolled to victory.
Dukakis went on to defeat Republican candidate handily in the general election. Thus,
despite his presenting a more issue-oriented program than Dukakis, King’s administrative
incompetence was his undoing. But administrative competence had not been enough for
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Michael Dukakis after his first term It was necessan/ that h u-ry that he combine administrative
competence with a substantive program of governance.
After Ms v,ctory in the ertise of a popular manager, when Dukakis entered office in
1983, h,s conception of the govemorsMp took on the charactenst.es of a constitutional
executive He recogntzed, and acted upon, the value of the other branches of government
Regarding the General Court, for example, Dukakis was much more respect&l of the
opinions of lawmakers than he had been dunng Ms firs, term, and much more willing to
bargain regarding legislation Both the i^ght-to-Know and Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority bills affected many legislative interests, yet Dukakis was able to
manage their passage through the General Court quite well R E A.P., a tax collection
entorcement program, also indicated that Dukakis was more willing to listen to legislators
and heed their advice As a result, legislators were open to working with Dukakis because
he was open to working with them.
Admimstratively, Dukakis lost his prior aversion to patronage, and, as a result, was
closer to his admimstration. His administration, in turn, worked more closely with the
legislature. In this term, Dukakis focused his efforts on obtaining appointees with political
skills rather than general competence. Too many appointees in his first term had not
possessed appropriate public sector experience, and Dukakis looked to correct what he
saw as an important flaw. Now, Dukakis looked for appointees who understood, and
acted upon, the value of working with other members of government in implementing the
law. Here was a way m which Dukakis could appoint individuals who had worked for him
and who agreed with him without seeming corrupt. Administrative competence did not
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have to mean poHtical neutrality Indeed, competent admimstration, as Dukakis had
discovered, often requ.red effect,ve pol.t.cal action, and he sought appointees such as John
Sasso, Ira Jackson and Alden Raine who understood that
Further, in his second term, Dukakis presented a more substantive program
regarding what government should be doing and why it should be doing it, Cntics charged
that Dukakis's willingness to compromise with legislators represented a selling out, that,
in focusing on building coalitions, Dukakis was no longer a leader Yet Dukakis stood firm
on issues such as environmental protection and affordable housing and passed measures
such as the M W R A and the Massachusetts Housing Partnership to deal with those
issues These measures were possible because Dukakis was now taking other points of
view into account rather than attempting to act unilaterally to implement policies If he
were indeed selling out, it was leading to greater, and more substantive, results than he
had accomplished in his first term
In the general election of 1986, Dukakis based his campaign on his program,
presenting it clearly and openly to citizens The campaign had a theme, ^opporturnty for
all, and Dukakis pressed that theme, while also promoting discussion among members of
the electorate as he campaigned. Despite the seemingly foregone conclusion of the
election, and while the incumbent essentially ignored his opponent, Dukakis campaigned
vigorously to present both his record of achievement and future proposals to
Massachusetts voters. He won with the largest margin of victory in a gubernatorial
election in modern Massachusetts
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By 1988, Dukakis had decided to move on to national politics and he captured the
Democra.,c no^na.ion for the Presidency, facing off aga.ns, George Bush, inhen.or of
the legacy of Ronald Reagan Dukakis again based his at
Progressive conception of the
general election campaign on the
executive: The issue was competence, not ideology.
Dukakis spent the first portion of the campaign railing against what he saw as the
administrative ineptitude of the Reagan adimnistration. Because of the focus on
competence, Dukakis's never found any sort of effective program By failing to present a
coherent theme or a compelling and substantive vision, Dukakis left the door open for
George Bush to define the terms on which the election operated Bush, naturally,
presented the electorate with an unflattering picture of Dukakis. Dukakis failed to react to
this portrayal and misread the public, declaring, incorrectly, that Bush’s tactics would be
ineffective.
Dukakis completed his second cycle with a defeat at Bush’s hands. The
Progressive conception of the executive, which Dukakis had employed so effectively in
electoral politics previously, failed against a candidate associated with a popular
incumbent who wielded a strong ideological message. As he had in 1978, Dukakis had
suffered defeat employing the Progressive conception of the executive.
Michael Dukakis experienced cycles of victory and defeat when he employed the
Progressive conception of the elected executive. As a challenger, Dukakis managed to
defeat an incumbent, but he was unable to hold together any sort of long-term coalition of
support Both electorally and institutionally, using the Progressive model of the elected
executive, Dukakis left himself nothing in the way of maintaining a solid base of support
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for the institution of a program, thus inhibiting his efforts at providing leadership Yet
Dukakis was able to break the cycle in 1986 by becoming more of a constitutional
executive
Comparing the Conceptions of the FxpmtivP
The important question at this point is whether one of the three conceptions of the
executive is better suited for reconciling the pressures of the executive challenge than the
others are Given the pressures of being both a political figure and a chief executive, can a
governor or a president increase the chances of successful leadership by choosing from
among the constitutional executive, the partisan administrator and the popular manager‘s
One conclusion that this study demonstrates is the necessity that a chief executive
understand the nature of others conceptions of the executive office and recognize the
legitimacy of competing political cultures." As Benjamin Butler, James Michael Curley and
Michael Dukakis learned, timing and the appropriateness of a given course of action do
matter in attempts at exercising executive leadership. Butler, employing essentially a
Progressive conception of the executive, was reviled by partisan- oriented legislators and
saw the vast majority of his program rejected by the General Court despite the fact that
parts of it would be implemented one year later. Curley served during the Great
Depression and presided over a flood, emergencies that would seem tailor-made for the
emergence of a strong figure. Yet, he, too, over-emphasized the popular manager in the
midst of a more partisan-based government and left office in disgrace as a result. Dukakis
suffered a similar fate for similar reasons in 1978
Governors such as Caleb Strong, Fredenc Greenhalge and Michael Dukakis in his
second term recognized the need to conduct the governorship with an eye on what others
expected from the officeholder Strong noted the anti-partisan ideal of his era, witnessed
the failure of governors who attached themselves to burgeoning political parties, and
succeeded, as a constitutional executive, by keeping himself above the partisan fray
Frederic Greenhalge, while displaying tendencies toward a popular-manager conception of
the executive, kept these proclivities largely in check. By conducting himself mainly as a
partisan admimstrator, Greenhalge succeeded in a partisan political culture Dukakis, in his
second term, recognized the potential if he conducted himself along the lines of a
constitutional executive while acknowledging and respecting the more partisan tendencies
of other members of the polity
Indeed, Dukakis’s successes in gubernatorial elections came when he was most
willing and able to acknowledge and act on the legitimacy of competing political cultures.
Despite his anti-establishment campaign in 1974, Dukakis was still able to unite the
regular and reformer wings of the Democratic party, if only for the election. In 1978,
Dukakis lost because he had acted in such a way as to prevent his bringing those factions
together In 1982 and 1986, Dukakis was able to win back the support he had lost, and
flourished as a result. In the 1988 presidential campaign, Dukakis was less willing to
acknowledge a popular competing conception of the executive, in outgoing president
Ronald Reagan, and lost as a result. Taking into account the legitimacy of other
conceptions of the executive and other political cultures is important in an elected
executive’s attempts to provide leadership.
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The Need to Enoag;e
•Another way of stating this is to note that, of the executives portrayed in this
thesis, the ones most successful at providing leadership were able to engage other
members of the political system effectively, both politically and administratively.
Governors acting as partisan administrators and as popular managers were least successful
when they did not engage other members of the system in a respectful manner. The
governors who acted as constitutional executives generally did engage other members of
the political system in an effective manner, considering them as equally important and
working their viewpoints into the discussion as vital and necessary How do the various
conceptions of the executive office and the various political cultures, as illustrated here,
compare in this regard'’
The Partisan Administrator George Briggs illustrates the potential for, and some
of the limitations in, leadership by a partisan administrator Briggs was effective as a
partisan because he was able to join factions of his party His appropriateness as a
“compromise candidate” repeatedly won him election While in office, Briggs urged not
only the maintenance of his own party against faction, but also respect for the rights and
viewpoints of members of other parties. His party’s agenda, by association his own, saw
implementation in Massachusetts allowing Briggs to claim success in policy matters if he
so desired. Yet, Briggs’s desire not to alienate members of either party while in office led
to his avoiding stands on important issues and acting in what may be considered too
passive a manner on the issue of slavery, for example. The partisan administrator can lead
to the burying of important issues in a desire to maintain institutional harmony.
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The behavior of legislators during the tenure of Benjamin Butler illustrates further
problems with a partisan political culture As noted, the Republican-dominated General
Coun would act on many of Democrat Butler’s proposals in subsequent years, generally
under Republican governors. Admittedly, Butler acted in a rather imperious and insulting
manner The Republicans in the legislature, however, could have chosen to engage Butler,
despite partisan differences They did not, indicating the possibility of an unwillingness to
engage others on the part of these adherents of a partisan political culture
Edward J King, Michael Dukakis’s nemesis in 1978 and 1982, illustrates the
pitfalls of the panisan administrator regarding the administrative role of the governor. In
1978, King campaigned with a substantive agenda, and was successful against Dukakis’s
cool competence Voters reacted positively to King’s stands on specific issues. The
presentation of a agenda based on substantive issues, as opposed to an image campaign
based around the candidates’ characters and competence, was effective for King. Yet,
once in office, he proved himself inept at handling the administrative aspects of the
governorship. Many of King’s appointments, based on his partisan preferences, proved to
be incompetent. King evinced no gift for recognizing different views and engaging them.
In aligning himself with his preferred wing of the Democratic partv, by employing the
partisan-administrator conception of the office. King succeeded in alienating those whose
views did not match his. King may have presented an agenda as a partisan administrator,
but he could not demonstrate administrative competence given his use of patronage.
The Popular Manager. Despite James Michael Curley’s ultimate failure as
governor, in his first year of office he was able to persuade the General Court to
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implement relief measures in the face of the Great Depression However, Curley ultimately
fatled because he cons.dered h.s vision of the popular will the only legitimate one.
Employing the Progressive conception of the executive, Curley did not mmntain a sense of
the legitimacy of other constitutional institutions, he did not engage others well, of at all
Hts believing that the executive alone represented what was good for the people caused
him to denigrate legislators and their place in Massachusetts’s constitutional system As a
result, his second year as governor was an unsuccessllil one, and he left office in disgrace.
In hts first term. Michael Dukakis was able to project an image of competence as a
manager. Yet, he had failed politically His competence and efforts at reform of state
government had come without much of a substantive agenda Further, Dukakis was
unwilling to consider other points of view, for example those of legislators, in
implementing his reform agenda. Dukakis’s appointments, based on a neutral
professionalism, alienated many supporters who were not given positions in his
administration. Electorally, Dukakis misread the public regarding issues such as taxes, and
he had no support left. Ultimately, voters found Ed King’s presentation of substantive
issues more attractive than Dukakis s displays of competence. Dukakis had similar
experiences in the 1988 presidential campaign, in which focusing on administrative
competence at the expense of a substantive agenda helped cost him the election by
allowing George Bush to define the terms of debate. Employing the popular-manager
conception of the executive, Dukakis had seemed competent as an executive, but was
unable to conduct the political aspects of the office effectively. He did not engage others
in an effective manner
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Xhe Constitutional Executive. During his second gubernatorial term, Michael
Dukakis was able to overcome the flaws in the popular-manager conception of the
executive. Gaines and Segal note about Dukakis’s second administration:
Dukakis’s intent was the same as it had been in the flrst
administration, the creation of a reform government that
fairly brokered the competing legitimate needs, require-
ments and demands of the people. This time, however,
the debate about what was fair balance would take place
within the administration, among advocates closely asso-
ciated with the various interests and in private — not on the
floor of the House or Senate, or on the nightly news broad-
casts and in the next day’s newspapers.
This is an accurate assessment as far as it goes, but it misses the point that Dukakis was
able to do this within a fragmented institutional environment. Dukakis needed the
cooperation of the General Court to accomphsh any agenda. Accomphshing an agenda
made it easier for Dukakis to inspire voters and attain electoral victory. During his first
term, he demonstrated that he was capable of acting in such a way as to alienate members
of other institutions and members of the electorate. During his second term, he
demonstrated a gift for effectively involving members of other institutions to the point
where he was able to implement a program of governance which helped him win
reelection. It was not just that he had brought pohcy capacity under the domain of the
executive. It was that he had acted in such a way as to make doing so possible. He had
done so by becoming more of a constitutional executive, by engaging members of the
Massachusetts community in discussion inclusively and effectively.
The executives presented here have been most successful when they have acted to
spur debate and discussion, when they engage others most effectively. This is the key
326
feature of the constitutiona, execuuve ntode, of executive leadershrp, wh.ch the
executive seeks to engage all members of a constitutional polity. Dukakis, for example,
ated this dunng his second gubematonal term, when he accomplished much of
.s environmental agenda, and a much greater percentage of hts agenda than he had dunng
h.s first term, through the use of debate and deliberation among political instttutions and
the public Whereas he had been seeimngly indifferent to members of other institutions
during his first term, he was more open to working with them in his second term. He
seemed to understand the potential inherent in involving members of other institutions in
deliberation As a result, he honed his ability to have policies instituted that he advocated
as beneficial,
Dukakis also involved various members of the public in policy debates to a greater
degree Having representatives of both labor and business at the table in negotiating the
Right-to-Know bill was an example. He appeared to recognize that he needed to persuade
people of the value of his program and present them with a substantive vision, something
they could grasp. Once he did that, the public’s perception of him as arrogant began to
dissipate, as evidence by a resounding reelection in 1986
.
If the elected executive is most successful when acting as a catalyst for discussion,
that officeholder must recognize the legitimacy and importance of other constitutional
institutions. As the Declaration of Independence reminds citizens and officeholders, the
public good IS embodied in the government as a whole, provided that the government is
legitimated by the people. It is the institutions established in the Massachusetts
Constitution taken together, not the office of the governor alone, that represent the will of
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the Massachusetts public. As Alden Raine notes, Dukakis’s position as Governor allowed
him 10 receive the greatest share of the credit for passage of the ngh,-to-know b,ll. Yet,
Dukakts at ,h.s pent was astute enough to reahze that he needed to include legislators in
deliberations, otherwise political cred.t with members of the General Court would be thin
and accomplishing any future projects would be that much more difficult. Even if the
government is embodied in a single officeholder in the mind of the public, that officeholder
IS nonetheless part of a constitutional system. Other institutions are as legitimate and
important to that system as he is, and he must recognize that fact.
Dukakis seemed to recognize this by his second administration. During his first
administration, he had been least successful when he was most arrogant toward members
ot other institutions, when he failed to give sufficient justification for his proposals. The
success he did have came when he both recogmzed the importance of the General Court
and acted on its legitimacy as a part of the policy process. By his second term, he was
including the members of the General Coun in discussions over policy proposals. He had
come to understand the importance of other constitutional institutions.
Indeed, Dukakis went so far as to insist that his administrative appointees have a
similar understanding, that they possess “political skills.” This meant a willingness and a
capability to deal effectively with members of other institutions in the policy process.
Inherent in this is the notion that administration of the law requires astute political action
on the part of public administrators, Dukakis’s experiences with the budget illustrate this.
During his first term, Dukakis handled the budget issue, specifically taxation, in a manner
that bespoke an unwillingness to negotiate with legislators and treat them as equals. By his
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second administration, through passage of the REAP program, Dukakis dealt with the
budget (Broadly speaking, he executed the law.) in a politically capable manner, that took
account of the interests and concerns of members of other governmental institutions
Political and administrative effectiveness had come to be linked for Dukakis. This
understanding on the pan of his administration led to hts acWeving much greater
effectiveness as a chief executive during his second gubernatorial term
The Necessity of a Vi<;inn
As a means of motivating and guiding discussion, as a context for the reasons
behind a given policy, and as a means of avoiding the pitfalls of neutrality seen in the
popular manager, the constitutional executive must present a vision. Michael Genovese
notes that “A vision is an idea, a dream of the future, a dream that is realistic enough to
appear attainable, different enough to inspire, attractive enough to gain consent and
commitment.”^ Genovese’s definition of a vision is rather amorphous and imprecise,
however Part of the project here is to give “vision” a more specific, detailed definition.
Part of that definition is certainly, as Genovese later indicates, the meaning of
America or, more generally, of a community.® .Any vision is normative in that it offers one
course of action over another The meaning of “vision” offered here is normative in two
senses First, it requires offering a definition of a community, of what that community
should and should not be. Second, it necessitates defining the government’s role within
that community in terms of what the government should and should not be doing.
This is not solely agenda setting. To a certain extent the power of the executive to
set the agenda for the government is limited. Dukakis became aware of this when he
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mhented a huge budget deficit at the beg.nmng of his first term. Similarly, acting on the
Rtght-to-Know issue became a necessity tn Dukakis’s second term only after the General
Court had passed its own version of that law The power to set a governmental agenda
depends on many factors including the tmportance of an issue and an indivtdual's position
tn the debate. A massive budget deficit, for example, is going to be more important than
most other issues in a State in which budget deficits are unconstitutional. If the General
Court passes a bill and that becomes public knowledge, that issue may become part of the
agenda despite the wishes of the Governor Despite the importance of setting an agenda,
the executive must realize he cannot always do so to the fullest extent desirable.
Though It is not limited to agenda-setting, a vision certainly involves establishing
some son of program If that ability is incomplete, as ,t must be, then vision involves
defining and interpreting. Defining problems or areas of interest within a community are of
course important aspects of providing a vision." The important follow-up is why these
areas are important and why the government should or should not address these issues,
beyond an abstract public interest. Also, as Maty Stuckey has pointed out, the executive is
the “interpreter-in-chief ”* He must interpret what occurs in light of his ideas of a proper
community and his notion of what government should and should not do.
This definition of vision also involves a recognition of the necessity of institutional
debate and deliberation, even within its presentation by the executive. Indeed, presentation
of a vision on the part of a president or a governor can instigate and promote institutional
politics In the managerial political culture, under the Progressive notion of the executive,
the public manager merely has to manage as a mediator among different interests. Further,
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when the executive does present a program, it is alone representative of the public good
The constitutional executive does not remain neutral, and would give members of the
other institutions something to consider and something to which they can respond, while
at the same time, the executive considers their responses as legitimate and important.
This defimtion of “vision” connects directly to the notion of a constitutional leader
The constitution embodies the community for which it is created.^ Thus, any effort to lead
constitutionally is going to involve defimng that community, creating a vison of what it
should and should not be. Massachusetts is embodied in its constitution, and that
constitution is still interpretable." The meaning of the constitution, and thus the meamng
of Massachusetts as a community is far from settled Dukakis engaged in offering this sort
of vision to a much greater extent his second term than he did his first term. His vision of
Massachusetts as “number one when it comes to affordable housing,” and his proposals
m that direction are examples of the substantive concerns that Dukakis employed in his
second term He turned from a focus on the character and competence of the participants
in politics to the meaning of the Massachusetts community. He proposed specific policies,
such as the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, which fit into his notion of Massachusetts
as a community and he led discussions, both institutional and public, regarding those
policies One purpose of a constitutional leader is to engage a substantive debate over the
meaning of the community. This is one sense in which the definition of “vision” offered
here is normative.
This model of an executive vision is also normative in the institutional sense. A
constitution instructs members of the government not merely how they should conduct
themselves procedurally, but also as to what government as an entity should and should
not do Constitutional leadership is therefore institutionally normative leadership It
involves directly addressing questions of what the government should and should not do,
guided by the framework of the law embodied in the constitution. Predominantly,
however, constitutions are negative They limit governmental power Therefore, if a
member of the polity proposes that the government should undenake an action, the most
important question should be “Why- This can ensure effective debate by forcing political
pamcipants to give reasons for their proposals, to which other members of the polity can
respond
Under the Progressive notion of executive, as evidenced by Dukakis’s first term,
there is little opportunity for the giving of reasons for what the government should do
because the focus is on how the government should conduct itself If the focus is on how
the government is conducted, openly and efficiently for example, the issues Q^what the
government should do and, more importantly, why it should do it, along with the giving of
reasons behind proposals, become less central. Under the constitutional executive, the
main question shifts from how the government is to conduct itself or how it is to
accomplish something to whether it should undertake an enterprise at all, and why it
should do so.
Under this sort of politics, the potential for stalemate certainly exists. Genovese
bemoans that institutional deadlock and advocates the executive’s use of a vision to help
break the deadlock which he claims is so perilous for American government." Yet,
hesitant government may not be as threatening as many observers believe. If institutions
332
are frozen, their members can be forced to give reasons for the policies they wish to
pursue ,n order to work out some policy to address a given concern As Dukakis indicates
about the Right-to-Know bill, he became far more aware of management’s position, when
representatives of business gave him reasons against the policy As he notes, however,
nobody wants to poison workers, so that some sort of compromise needed to be reached
This giving of reasons is the starting point for the working out of public issues through
institutional politics rather than through administration. Dukakis saw his greatest
successes when he encouraged debate and discussion regarding why policies such as the
R-ight-to-Know bill should be passed.
Whereas politics in the Progressive sense involves appeals to the people on great
moral issues, politics in the constitutional political culture involves members of the
constitutional institutions giving reasons why the government should undertake a given
project Morality comes through the interaction of members of political institutions rather
than directly from the popular will If both constitutional leadership and popular leadership
are moral leadership, the morality for each has a different source, and a different shape.
Popular leadership uses the will of the people as its’ sole justification. If the constitution is
negative, if it limits government, specific reasons must be given as to why the government
should be undertaking proposed policies. Morality thus arises not from the people directly,
but from the interaction of institutions. The public good is not an abstraction represented
by the executive, but something which emerges from the constitutional process.
Michael Dukakis’s career illustrates this well When he sought to address public
problems through a rational, efficient administration, he faltered. His abstract notion of the
public good, which was often disconnected from what much of the public actually favored,
led to charges of arrogance, left him politically weak and cost him an election. When he
allowed for the legitimacy of other members of the government and the public, when he
allowed policies to be shaped through the interaction of members of the polity within
political institutions, he was markedly more successful.
Conclusion
Institutionally, the notion of the constitutional executive would allow the elected
executive greater latitude in moving a program through the legislature. As Michael
Dukakis’s career proved, legislators are more conducive to considenng a program if
members of the executive branch show them some respect. If the executive has something
to present to the legislature, he can act as the starting point for discussion and debate The
program must allow room for discussion and debate, remembering that the importance of
executiv e power is that the holder of the office can become the catalyst for institutional
politics If the executive maintains the discussion and treats legislators as legitimate
participants, rather than as individuals frustrating the will of the people, they will be far
more willing to engage the executive’s plan and follow up on it as a result.
Administratively, acting as a constitutional executive allows appointments that can
be politically intelligent, without appearing to be exclusive or corrupt. Part of Dukakis’s
concern with appointments, especially in his first term, was the propriety of appointing
individuals personally close to the newly elected executive. In his first administration,
Dukakis carried neutrality to the point where having a relationship with the Governor
nearly guaranteed that an appointment would not be forthcoming. In his second term, by
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ensuring political skills” on the part of his appointees, Dukakis found a means of making
appointments that rewarded those who agreed with him or were close to him, without
appearing corrupt or exclusive If the executive bases his program on an interpretation of
the constitutional community and interpretations of which activities government should
undertake, this allows a broad agreement on the part of which seems far more noble than
simple partisan affiliation or personal association as a basis of appointment If the
executive bases his administration on the notion of promoting conversation within and
about his vision, admimstrative appointments can be justified as able to contnbute to that
discussion, whether they are close to the executive personally or not. Looking for the
ability to engage others, what Dukakis called “political skills,” on the part of
administrators can help ensure their effectiveness and relevance in that discussion.
Electorally, acting as a constitutional executive would give the candidate both a
strong platform and a record on which to run. Presenting a vision can capture people’s
imaginations and their votes If the executive has an easier time moving an agenda through
the legislature, he has something substantial on which to base his campaign afterward.
Thus, as Michael Dukakis demonstrated, the executive can break the Progressive cycle
through the use of the constitutional model of the executive. By including others in a
discussion of the public good, the executive can take greater account of their needs and
desires. Rather than a record of limited substance, rather than misreading a public, and
rather than alienating members of other institutions, the executive can present both the
public and members of the legislature with a program of reasonable substance and inspire
confidence rather than lose respect Indeed, Dukakis’s second term combined with the
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g^bematonai election of 1986 dentonstrate tha, ,t ,s possible that electoral politics may
become less of a strain on the executive if
.nstitutional polit.cs are conducted in a certain
manner Granted, Dukakts had fallen out of favor by the next gubematonal election, but
1986 was as non-competit.ve an election as Massachusetts has seen in the modern
electoral era In a time when both electoral and
.nstitutional politics must be conducted
with equal vigor, the constitutional model of the executive lends itself to the most
successfitl combination of these and to the most effective efforts toward fruitful executive
leadership
The partisan-administrator model of the elected executive produces
administratively weak executives and appears corrupt by excluding those of other parties,
or those individuals not exactly in line with the views of the party Edward King
demonstrated this in Massachusetts politics during his gubernatorial term. The public-
manager model produces an isolated executive who seems powerful, but has little
substantial guaranteed support when attempting to institute a program, as Benjamin
Butler, James Michael Curley and Michael Dukakis all demonstrated. The constitutional-
executive model corrects for these defects by restoring awareness of both the limitations
and the possibilities of the elected executive. The executive can seem at once panisan, in
the broad sense of presenting a program or a vision, and inclusive, by recognizing the
necessity for inter-institutional and popular discussion within that vision. At the same time,
the executive can seem powerful by virtue of being able to carry out a program and by
relating himself to a constitution, thus recognizing, and making use of, the possibilities and
limitations surrounding that document.
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Michael Dukakis still puzzles over why he treated members of the General Court
so poorly during his first term as governor; “Why did Michael Dukakis, a four-term state
legislator, ignore the legislature^”^^ He does not have a specific answer. Rather, he lists
other governors who met with the same trouble: Bill Clinton in .Arkansas, Jimmy Carter in
Georgia, D Robert Graham m Florida Dukakis muses, “Do we think
, finally we’re in a
place where, by God, we can get things done'’”*' Too often, .American elected executives
seem to think that they are, ex officio, in a position to accomplish something when that is
not the case This work has attributed that frame of mind in Dukakis’s case to the
dominant conception of the executive in .America, the public manager. By conducting the
office as a constitutional executive, by stressing a constitutional political culture rather
than a group-based or a managerial one, the president or the governor can begin to
overcome problems inherent in the latter conceptions of the executive office
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Notes
Stephen Skowronek has proposed a similar set of cycles regarding the presidency
in The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership From John Adams to George Bush
(Cambridge: Belknap, 1993). The cycles noted here are not meant to parallel
Skowronek’ s. Nor is this to suggest that every chief executive who employs the
Progressive conception of the office must necessarily go through these cycles. It is simply
to note that Dukakis did.
^ In fact Dukakis only won nine cities in 1978 and lost thirty. Charles Kenney and
Robert L. Turner, Dukakis: An American Odyssey (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1988), pp.
133-134.
’ Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky in Dilemmas of Presidential Leadershipfrom
Washington to Lincoln: A Cultural Theory (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989) make the
argument that Presidents must balance political cultures, though using a different set of
political cultures than this work does.
‘‘Games And Segal, p 218
’ For an incisive critique of the model of public administration Dukakis followed in
his first term, see John A Rohr, To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the
Administrative State (Lawrence; University Press of Kansas, 1986).
^
Michael Genovese, The Presidential Dilemma: Leadership in the American
System (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 60.
^Genovese, pp 59-60.
** Genovese, p. 60.
'^Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief (Chatham, New Jersey:
Chatham House, 1991).
Graham Walker, “The Constitutional Good; Constitutionalism’s Equivocal
Moral Imperative,” Polity’ XXVI (fall 1993): p. 96.
" Dennis J. Goldford, “The Political Character of Constitutional Interpretation,”
Polity XXIII (winter 1990): pp. 255-281,
Genovese, pp. 15-21; James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock ofDemocracy:
Four Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963).
'^Michael Dukakis, interview by author, Boston, MA, 27 September 1996.
338

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and Articles
Abbott PMip. The Exemplary Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American
olitical Tradition Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press,
Abrams, Richard M Conservatism in a Progressive Era: Massachusetts Politics, 1900-
1912. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964,
Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldnch and David W. Rhode. Change and Continuity in the
1988^ Elections, revised edition, Washington D C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,
Mian, Herbert S John Hancock: Patriot in Purple New York: Macmillan, 1948
Arnold, Pen E Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization
Planning, 1905-1996. Princeton, Pnnceton University Press, 1986. 2"^* edition,
revised Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998
Arnold, R Douglas Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1979.
Bailyn, Bernard. The Origins ofAmerican Politics. New York Vintage, 1968
The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, 1974
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarged edition.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, 1992.
Banner, Jr., James M. To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of
Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970.
Barber, James David The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White
House, edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985.
Barber, Sotirios A. On What the Constitution Means. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 1984.
Bardach, Eugene, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a
Lem’. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M. I, T. Press, 1977.
340
Beatty, Jack. The Rascal King: The Life and Times ofJames Michael Curley 1874-1958.
Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1992
Behn. Robert D Leadership Counts: Lessonsfor Public Managersfrom the
Massachusetts Welfare, Training, and Employment Program
.
Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991
Benson, George C .S . The Administration of the Civil Service in Massachusetts with
Special Reference to State Control of City Civil Service. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935
Benson, Lee The Concept ofJacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961
Bessette, Joseph M. and Jeffrey Tulis The Presidency in the Constitutional Order. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981
Beyle, Thad, ed Governors and Hard Times Washington D C : Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1992
“Being Governor ” In 7he State of the States, ed Carl E Van Horn Washington
D C : Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993
and Lynn R. Muchmore, eds Being Governor: The Viewfrom the Office. Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983
Bird, Francis W Review of Governor Banks Veto of the Revised Code Boston J P
Jewett, 1860
Black, Christine M. and Thomas Oliphant. All By Myself: The Unmaking ofa Presidential
Campaign Chester, Connecticut: Globe Pequot Press, 1989
Bland, T A Life ofBenjamin Butler
.
Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1879.
Blodgett, Geoffrey. The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland
Era Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966.
Brace, Paul and Barbara Hinckley. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern
Presidents. New York: Basic Books, 1992
Brandes, Paul. John Hancock 's Life and Speeches: A Personalized Vision of the
American Revolution
.
Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 1996
341
Brennan, Ellen E. Plural Office-Holding m Massachusetts 1760-1780: Its Relation to the
"Separation” ofDepartments of Government Chapel Hill: University ofNorth
Carolina Press, 1945.
Bridges, Amy A. A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of
Machine Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
Bridgman, Raymond L The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917 Boston:
Raymond L. Bridgman, 1923
Brown, Abram English. John Hancock: His Book. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1898
Brown, Richard D Massachusetts: A History^ New York: W W. Norton and Company
1978
Bulger, William M. While the Music Lasts: My Life in Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
1996
Buchanan, Bruce. Electing a President: The Markle Commission Research on Campaign
’88 Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991
Burns, James MacGregor The Deadlock ofDemocracy: Four-Party Politics in America
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
Leadership New York: Harper and Row, 1978
“Bush and Dukakis, Face to Face on Key Issues.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Reports, 1 October 1988, pp 2743-2753.
“Bush and Dukakis: Few Sparks in Final Clash.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
15 October 1988, pp. 3005-3015.
Butler, Benjamin F Butler 's Book: A Review ofHis Legal, Political andMilitary Career
Boston: A. M. Thayer and Company, 1892
Caldwell, Lynton K. The Administrative Theories ofHamilton and Jefferson, second
edition. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988
Candidates '88. Washington D C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988.
Ceaser, James W Presidential Selection: Theory and Development. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979.
342
Chandler, Peleg W Memoir ofGovernor Andrew with Personal Reminiscences Boston
Roberts Brothers, 1880
Chapman, Philip C. and Lawrence A Scaff. “The Use and Abuse of Politics ” Polity VIII
no. 4 (summer, 1976): 529-557.
Coohdge, Calvin. Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge New York: Cosmopolitan Book
Corporation, 1929.
Corwin, Edward S The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, 5'*’ revised edition
Revised by Randall W Bland, Theodore T Hindson and Jack W Peltason. New
York: New York University Press, 1984.
Crick, Defence ofPolitics, 2"*^ edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Croly, Herbert The Promise ofAmerican Life Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1989 Originally published 1909.
Progressive DemocracyCAqvj York. Macmillan, 1914
Cronin, Thomas E, ed Inventing the American Presidency
.
Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1989
Curley, James Michael I’d Do It Again: A Record ofAllMy Uproarious Years
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1957 New York: Amo Press, 1976
Dalton, Cornelius, John Wirkkala and Anne Thomas. Leading the Way’: A History of the
Massachusetts General Court 1629-1980
.
Boston: Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 1984
Darling, Arthur B. Political Changes in Massachusetts: A Study ofLiberalMovements in
Politics. Cos Cob, Connecticut: John E. Edwards, 1968. Originally published
1925.
Davis, James W The President as Party Leader. New York. Praeger, 1992.
Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 1917-1918, 4 vols. Boston:
Wright and Potter, 1918-1920.
Denhardt, Robert B and William H, Stewart. Executive Leadership in the Public Service.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992
343
Dineen, Joseph F, The Purple Shamrock: The Hon. James M.chael Curley ofBostonNew York: W W. Norton, 1949
Dodd, Lawrence C and Richard L. Schott.
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
Congress and the Administrative State. New
Dukakis Meets the Press, Concedes Defeat.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
12 November 1988, pp. 3312-3314.
Dukakis, Michael S. and Rosabeth Moss Kanter. Creating the Future: The Massachusetts
Comeback and Its Promisefor America. New York: Summit Books, 1988
Dunn, Richard S. Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop Dynasty ofNew England 1630-
1717. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. New York: W W Norton and
Company, 1971
Edwards III, George C The Public Presidency: The Pursuit ofPopular Support. New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983.
the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989
and Stephen J. Wayne. Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making. New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985
Ehrenhalt, Alan. The United States ofAmbition: Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of
Office. New York: Times Books, 1991.
Ellis, Richard J. American Political Cultures. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
,
ed. Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective
Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998.
and Aaron Wildavsky. Dilemmas ofPresidential Leadershipfrom Washington
through Lincoln: A Cultural Theory. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers, 1989.
Eisenach, Eldon J. The Lost Promise ofProgressivism. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994.
Erie, Steven P. Rainbow ’s End: Irish Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine
Politics, 1840-1985. Berkeley: University of California, 1988.
344
Farrand, Max and James H, Hutson, eds. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787
revised edition in tour volumes. New Haven; Yale University Press, 1966.
Feller, Darnel The Jacksonian Promise: America 1815-1840 Baltimore Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995
Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1985
Ihe Politics ofShared Power: Congress and the Executive, 3'^* edition. Washington
D C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993.
Formisano, Ronald P The Transformation ofPolitical Culture: Massachusetts Parties,
1790s-1840s New York: Oxford University Press, 1983
Fowler, Jr
,
William M Ihe Baron ofBeacon Hill: A Biography ofJohn Hancock
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980
Frothingham, Louis Adams A BriefHistory of the Constitution and Government of
Massachusetts with a Chapter on Legislative Procedure Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1916
Gaebler, Ted and David Osborne. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector Reading, Massachusetts; Addison-
Wesley, 1992
Gaines, Richard and Segal, Michael. Dukakis and the Reform Impulse. Boston; Quinlan
Press, 1987
Galvin, Tom. Personal Incidents in Over 40 Years with James Michael Curley. Boston:
Thomas F Galvin, 1975
Germond, Jack and Jules Witcover. Whose Broad Stripes and Bright Stars: The Trivial
Pursuit of the Presidency. New York; Warner Books, 1989.
Ginsberg, Benjamin and Martin Shefter. Politics by Other Means: The Declining
Importance ofElections in America New York: Basic Books, 1990.
Goldford, Dennis J. “The Political Character of Constitutional Interpretation.” Polity
XXIII, no. 2 (winter 1990): 255-281
345
Goldings, Morris M. ConstUuUonal Conventions in the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts
Co_i™onwealth of Massachusetts: Special Commission on Audit of State Needs,
Goldman, Peter, Tom Mathews and the Newsweek Special Election Team The Quest for
r/K Pres;*«c>- /9SS New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989
Gore, Al. Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less: The Report of the
National Performance Review Washington D C.: National Performance Review
1994.
Greenstein, Fred I. “Change and Continuity in the Modem Presidency.” In The New
American Political System, ed. Anthony King, 45-85 Washington D. C.;
•American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978
The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader New York Basic Books
1982
,
ed. Leadership in the Modern Presidency. Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard
University Press, 1988
Griffin, Solomon B. W. Murray Crane: A Man and a Brother. Boston Little Brown
1926
Gulick, Luther H. Evolution of the Budget in Massachusetts New York: Macmillan
1920.
Hall, Van Beck Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791 Pittsburgh
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Edited by
Clinton Rossiter. New York; Mentor, 1961
Handlin, Oscar. Boston’s Immigrants, 1790-1880: A Study in Acculturation, revised
edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, 1991.
and Mary Handlin, ed The Popular Sources ofPolitical Authority: Documents on
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap,
1966.
Commoim’ealth, a Study of the Role ofGovernment in the American Economy:
Massachusetts, 1774-1861, revised edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1969.
346
Hargrove, Erwin. The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels ofOur
Nature. Lawrence University of Kansas Press, 1998.
and Michael Nelson Presidents, Politics and Policy. New York; Alfred A Knopf
1984 ^ ’
Hamngton, Fred Harvey Fighting Politician: Major General N. P. Banks Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970
Hennessy, Michael E. Four Decades ofMassachusetts Politics 1890-1935 Norwood,
Massachusetts: Norwood Press, 1935
Herzik, Eric B and Brent W Brown. Gubernatorial Leadership and State Policy
Westport, Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 1991
Hess, Stephen. Organizing the Presidency, revised edition. Washington D C ; Brookings
Institution, 1988
Hinckley, Barbara. The Symbolic Presidency: How Presidents Portray Themselves. New
York; Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1990
Hotstafter, Richard. The Idea ofa Party System: The Rise ofLegitimate Opposition in the
United States, 1780-1840 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
Hosmer, James K. The Life of Thomas Hutchinson: Royal Governor of the Province of
Massachusetts Bay. New York: Da Capo Press, 1972 Originally published 1896
Huber, Richard G
,
ed Boston College Law School Annual Survey ofMassachusetts Law.
Boston: Little Brown, 1964
Hutchinson, Thomas. History of the Colony ofMassachusetts Bay, 3 vols Boston. T. & J
Fleet 1764-1828 New York: Arno, 1972.
Hutchinson, Thomas Diary and Letters ofHis Excellency Thomas Hutchinson, 2 vols
Edited by Peter Orlando Hutchinson Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1884
Huthmacher, J. Joseph. Massachusetts People and Politics 1919-1933: The Transition
from Republican to Democratic Dominance and its National Implications.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959.
‘Tn Commemoration of the Life and Public Service of Frederic T. Greenhalge, the Late
Governor of the Commonwealth. [Boston]: Printed by order of the General Court,
[1896].
347
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Eloquence m an Electronic Age: The Transformation of
Political Speechmaking. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism ofPresidential Campaign
Advertising, Z"'* edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Johnson, Carolyn W Winthrop Murray Crane: A Study in Republican Leadership.
Northampton, Massachusetts: Smith College, 1967
Jones, Charles O The Separated Presidency— Making it Work in Contemporary
Politics. In The New American Political System, Second Version, ed. Anthony
King, 1-28. Washington D C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1990.
Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress. Baton
Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 1988
I he Presidency in a Separated System Washington D C. Brookings Institution,
1994
Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts 1917.
Boston Wright and Potter, 1917
Kaplan, Marshall and Sue O’Brien The Governors and the New Federalism. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1991
Kaufman, Herbert The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960.
Kemell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies ofPresidential Leadership Washington
D C Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986
Ketcham, Ralph. Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829.
Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1984.
Kellerman, Barbara. The Political Presidency: Practice ofLeadershipfrom Kennedy
through Reagan New York: Oxford University Press, 1984
Kenney Charles and Robert L. Turner Dukakis: An American Odyssey. Boston.
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988.
Kessel, John H, Presidential Campaign Politics, 4*^ edition Pacific Grove, California:
Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1992
348
Kilgore, Kathleen. John Volpe: The Life ofan Immigrant's Son Dublin, New Hampshire
Yankee Books, 1987.
Korn, Jessica The Power ofSeparation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the
Legislative Veto Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette 's Autobiography: A Personal Narrative ofPolitical
Experiences. Madison
. Umversity of Wisconsin Press, 1963. Originally published
Lasswell, Harold. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, with postscript (1958)
New York: Meridian, 1958.
Lawrence, William Roger Wolcott. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1902.
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts The Merit System in Massachusetts: A Study
ofPublic Personnel Administration in the Commonwealth n. p League of
Women Voters of Massachusetts, 1961
Levin, Murray B The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1960
with George Blackwood. The Compleat Politician: Political Strategy in
Massachusetts Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962
Lipson, Leslie. The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1939.
Litt, Edgar. The Political Cultures ofMassachusetts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M. I. T
Press, 1965.
Lodge, Henry Cabot. An Address Commemorative of the Life and Services of George D.
Robinson, Governor of the Commonwealth 1884-1886 Boston: George H. Ellis,
1896
Lowi, Theodore J The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985
Lukas, J. Anthony. Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three
American Families. New York: Vintage Books, 1986
Luthin, Reinhard H. “James M. Curley: The Boston Brahmin-Baiter ” \n American
Demagogues — Twentieth Century. Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1959.
349
Lutz, Donald S. The Origins ofAmerican Constitutionalism. Baton Rouge; Louisiana
State University, 1988
Maloney, Gary, ed. The Almanac of 1988 Presidential Politics. Falls Church, Virginia;
.American Political Network and L. T V Corporation, 1989.
Mansfield, Jr., Harvey C Taming the Prince: the Ambivalence ofModem Executive
Power New York; Free Press, 1989.
Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations The Proposed Organization of the
Executive Office for Administration and Finance: An Appraisal and
Recommendations Preparedfor the Joint Committee on State Administration
Boston; Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations, 1960.
McCormick, Richard P The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the
Jacksonian Era Chapel Hill; University ofNonh Carolina, 1966.
t'he Presidential Game: The Origins ofAmerican Presidential Politics. New
York Oxford University Press, 1982
McFarland, Gerald Mugwumps, Morals and Politics 1884-1920. Amherst,
Massachusetts; University of Massachusetts Press, 1975
McFarland, Philip The Brave Bostonians: Hutchinson, Quincy, Franklin, and the Coming
of the American Revolution Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1998
McGerr, Michael E. The Decline ofPopular Politics: The American North, 1865-1928.
New York; Oxford University Press, 1986
Mileur, Jerome M. “Party Politics in the Bay State. The Dominion of Democracy .” In
Party Politics in the New England States, ed. Jerome M Mileur, 76-94 Amherst,
Massachusetts; Polity Publications, 1997.
.
“Massachusetts.” In State Party Profiles, ed. Andrew M. Appleton and Daniel S.
Ward. Washington D C.; Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997.
and George T. Sulzner Campaigningfor the Massachusetts Senate
.
Amherst,
Massachusetts; University of Massachusetts Press, 1974.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. The Politics ofDisappointment: American Elections 1976-94.
Chatham, New Jersey; Chatham House Press, 1995.
350
Meyers, Marvin. The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief Stanford, California;
Stanford University, 1957
Milkis, Sidney The Presidency, Policy Reform, and the Rise of Administrative Politics ”
In Remaking American Politics, ed. Richard A. Harris and Sidney M Milkis, 146-
187 Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1989
The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System
Since the New Deal. New York; Oxford University Press, 1993
Mmot, George Richards The History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts in the Year
Seventeen Hundred and Eighty-six and the Rebellion Consequent Thereon,
second edition. Freeport, New York; Books for Libraries Press, 1970 Originally
published, 1810.
Morehouse, Sarah McCally The Governor as Party Leader: Campaigning and
Governing Ann .Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1998
Morgan, Edmund S Ihe Puritan Dilemma: The Story ofJohn Winthrop New York;
Harper Collins, 1958.
Puritan Political Ideas 1558-1794. Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
Mosher, Frederick. Democracy and the Public Service, edition New York; Oxford
University Press, 1982.
Nardulli, Peter F The Constitution and American Political Development: An Institutional
Perspective. Urbana University of Illinois Press, 1992
Nash, Howard P. Stormy Petrel: The Life and Times of General Benjamin F. Butler
1818-1893. Rutherford, New Jersey Fairleigh Dickinson Uriiversity Press, 1969
Nathan, Richard. The Administrative Presidency. New York; Wiley, 1983.
Nelson, Michael, ed. The Elections of 1988. Washington D. C.; Congressional Quarterly
Press, 1989.
Ihe Presidency in the Political System, 4^ edition. Washington D C.;
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995
Nesmith, James E. The Life and Work ofFrederic Thomas Greenhalge, Governor of
Massachusetts Boston; Roberts Brothers, 1897.
351
Neustadt, Richard E Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of
Leadershipfrom Roosevelt to Reagan. New York; Free Press, 1990
Nichols, David K The Myth of the Modern Presidency. University Park, Pennsylvania:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994.
Nolan, Dick. Benjamin Franklin Butler: The Damnedest Yankee Novato, California;
Presidio, 1991.
Nomination in Hand, Dukakis Pledges ‘Era of Greatness Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, 23 July 1988, pp. 2052-2054.
O’Connor, Thomas H. The Boston Irish. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995,
Ostrom, Vincent. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, 2"‘* edition.
Tuscaloosa; University of Alabama Press, 1989
Parsons, Theophilus Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, ChiefJustice of the Supreme
Judicial Court ofMassachusetts; with Notices ofsome of his Contemporaries
Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1859
Peters, Jr., Richard M The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact.
Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.
Peterson, Mark A. Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill From
Eisenhower to Reagan Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press,
1990
Pfiffher, James P., ed. The Managerial Presidency Ocean Grove, California: Brooks/
Cove, 1991.
Pierce, Neal R. “Massachusetts: A Golden Age'’” In The Megastates ofAmerica: People,
Politics, and Power in the Ten Great States. New York: W. W Norton, 1972.
Polsby, Nelson and Aaron Wildavsky. Presidential Elections: Contemporary Strategies of
American Electoral Politics, 8^ edition. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Pomper, Gerald M, ed. The Election of 1988: Reports and Interpretations. Chatham, New
Jersey; Chatham House Publishers, 1989.
President’s Committee on Administrative Management. Report. Washington D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1937
352
Public Services m Memory ofRoger Wolcott [Boston]: Printed by order of the General
Court, n. d.
Ransone, Jr Coleman B The American Governorship. Westport, Connecticut;
Greenwood Press, 1982.
Raymer, Robert George. John Winthrop: Governor of The Company ofMassachusetts
Bay in New England. New York; Vantage Press, 1963
Redford, Emmette S. and Marian Blissett. Organizing the Executive Branch: The Johnson
Presidency Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981
Remini, Robert V The Election ofAndrew Jackson Philadelphia; J B Lippincott, 1963.
Renshon, Stanley A. The Psychological Assessment ofPresidential Candidates. New
York: New York University Press, 1996
Riccards, Michael P The Ferocious Engine ofDemocracy: A History of the American
Presidency, 2 vols Lanham, Maryland Madison Books, 1995
Richards, William C Greatness in Goodness: A Memoir of George N. Briggs, Governor
of the Commoirwealth ofMassachusettsfrom 1844-1851. Boston; Gould and
Lincoln, 1866
Riordon, William L Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very
Practical Politics New York E P Dutton, 1963
Robbins, Robert R, ed Volume III: State Government and Public Responsibility 1961,
The Role of the Governor in Massachusetts. Papers of the 1961 Tufts Assembly
on Massachusetts Government Medford, Massachusetts Lincoln Filene Center for
Citizenship and Public Affairs Tufts University, 1961.
Robinson, Donald L '‘To the Best ofMy Ability: ” The Presidency and the Constitution
New York; W. W. Norton, 1987
Rockman, Bert A. The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American System.
New York; Praeger, 1984.
Rohr, John A. To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.
Roosevelt, Theodore. The New Nationalism. Gloucester, Massachusetts. Peter Smith,
1971 Originally published, 1910
353
Rossiter, Clinton. The American Presidency. New York; Harcourt, Brace and World,
1956. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
Runkel, David R., ed. Campaignfor President: The Managers Look at '88. Dover,
Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1989
Sabato, Larry Goodbye to Good-time Charlie: The American Governorship
Transformed., second edition. Washington D C : Congressional Quarterly Press
1983
Salmore, Stephen A. and Barbara G. Salmore. “Candidate-Centered Parties. Politics
Without Intermediaries.” In Remaking American Politics, ed. Richard A. Harris
and Sidney M. Milkis, 215-238. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989
Saltonstall, Leverett as told to Edward Weeks. Salty: Recollections ofa Yankee in
Politics Boston: Boston Globe, 1976
Schiesl, Martin J The Politics ofEfficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in
America, 1880-1920 Berkeley : University of California Press, 1977.
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M The Age ofJackson Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1945
Schweninger, Lee. John Wmthrop Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990.
Sears, Lorenzo John Hancock: The Picturesque Patriot. Boston; Little, Brown, and
Company, 1912 Boston: Gregg Press, 1972
Sedgwick, Jeffrey Leigh. “Of Centennials and Bicentennials: Reflections on the
Foundations of American Public Administration ” Administration and Society 19,
no. 3 (November 1987); 285-308.
.
“James Madison and the Problem of Executive Character.” Polity XXI, no. 1 (fall
1988): 3-23.
Sheehy, Gail. Character: America 's Searchfor Leadership. New York; William Morrow
and Company, 1988.
Shribman, David M. “The Disappearing Bully Pulpit.” Boston Globe Magazine, 20 April
1997, 17.
Silbey, Joel H. The American Political Nation, 1838-1893. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1991.
354
Sketch of the Official Life ofGovernor Andrew; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside
Press, 1868.
Skowrenek, Stephen. Building a New American State: the Expansion ofNational
Administrative Capacities 1887-1920. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press
1982
The Politics Presidents Make: Leadershipfrom John Adams to George Bush.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993
Spicer, Michael W The Founders, The Constitution, and Public Administration: A
Conflict in World dews. Washington D C : Georgetown University Press, 1995
Spitzer, Robert J The Presidential Veto Albany: State University ofNew York Press,
1988
Sproat, John G ‘‘The Best Men: ” Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968
Stein, Herbert Presidential Economics: The Making ofEconomic Policy From Roosevelt
to Clinton. Washington D C American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1994
Stid, Daniel D The President as Statesman: Woodrow Wilson and the Constitution.
Lawrence University Press of Kansas, 1998
Stuckey, Mary E. The President as Interpreter-m-Chief Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham
House, 1991.
Sturm, Albert L. The Constitution ofMassachusetts: A Critical Study Boston, 1953
Summers, Mark W The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics, 1865-1878. Chapel Hill:
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1994.
Sundquist, James L. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. Washington D C :
Brookings Institution, 1981
Tager, Jack and John W Ifkovic. Massachusetts in the Gilded Age: Selected Essays.
.Amherst; University of Massachusetts Press, 1985.
Taylor, Paul. See How They Run: Electing a President in an Age ofMediaocracy
.
New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990.
355
Taylor, Robert J., ed. Massachusetts, Colony to Commonwealth: Documents on the
Formation ofIts Constitution, 1775-1780. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth
Carolina Press, 1961.
Thach, Charles C The Creation of the Presidency 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional
History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969 Originally published 1923
Thomas Talbot: A Memorial, n. p : 1886.
Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky. Cultural Theory Boulder,
Colorado Westview Press, 1990
Trefousse, Hans L. Ben Butler: The South Called Him BEAST. New York: Octagon
Books, 1974
Tulis, Jeffrey K. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987
United States Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
The Hoover Commission Report on the Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government Westport, Connecticut Greenwood Press, 1970 Originally
published, 1949
Walker, Graham. “The Constitutional Good: Constitutionalism’s Equivocal Moral
Imperative ” Polity XXVI, no 1 (fall 1993): 91-111
Watson, Harry L. Liberty and Power: The Politics ofJacksonian America. New York:
Hill and Wang, 1990.
Wattenberg, Martin P. “From a Partisan to a Candidate-Centered Election.” In The New
American Political System, Second Version, ed. Anthony King, 139-174.
Washington D C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990.
The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential Elections of the 1980s.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991.
.
The Decline ofAmerican Political Parties 1952-1992. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Harvard University Press, 1994.
Wayne, Stephen J. The Legislative Presidency: New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
Weber, Max. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Edited by Hans H. Gerth and
C Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
356
Weinberg, Martha Wagner Managing the State Cambridge, Massachusetts: M. I. T
Press, 1977,
Werlich, Robert. Beast Butler: The Incredible Career ofMajor General Benjamin
Franklin Butler Washington D C.; Quaker Press, 1962.
West, Richard S. Lincoln 's Scapegoat General: A Life ofBenjamin Butler 1818-1893
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965
White, Leonard D The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History. New York.
Macmillan, 1948
The Jeffersonicms: A Study in Administrative History 1801-1829 New York:
Macmillan, 1951
The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History 1829-1861 New York:
Macmillan, 1954
The Republican Era: A Study in Administrative History 1869-1901 New York:
Macmillan, 1958
Williams, Walter Mismanaging America: The Rise of the Anti-Analytic Presidency
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990
Wilson, Woodrow “Cabinet Government in the United States ” Originally published
1879 In The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed Ray Stannard Baker and
William E. Dodd, vol. 1, i, 19-42. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1925
“Committee or Cabinet Government ” Originally published 1884. In The Public
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, vol. 1,
i, 95-129. New York. Harper and Brothers, 1925.
.
Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. Gloucester,
Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1973. Originally published 1885.
. “The Study of Administration.” Originally published 1887. In The Public Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, ed Ray Stannard Baker and William E Dodd, vol. 1, i, 130-
158. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1925.
.
An Old Master and Other Political Essays. Freeport, New York: Books For
Libraries Press, 1973. Originally published 1893.
357
Constitutional Government in the United States New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961. Originally published 1908
Government m Relation to Business,” Originally published 1912. In The Public
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, vol. 1,
ii, 430-451. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1925
The New Freedom: A Callfor the Emancipation of the Generous Energies ofa
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961. Originally published
Wiebe, Robert H. Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement
Chicago: Elephant, 1989 Originally published, 1962.
Searchfor Order 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.
Wilson, James Q The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Winthrop, John The Journal ofJohn Wmthrop 1630-1649, abridged edition Edited by
Richard S Dunn and Laetitia Yeandle Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap, 1996
Young, James Sterling. The Washington Community 1800-1828. New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1966.
Archival Documents
“Address Adopted by the Whig State Convention, at Worcester, September 13, 1848
Together with the Resolutions and Proceedings.” n. p., 1848. Special Collections
and Archives, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
“Address and Resolutions Adopted at the Whig State Convention, Worcester, October 3,
1849 ” Boston: Eastbum’s Press, 1849. Special Collections and Archives,
University of Massachusetts, .Amherst.
“An Address of the Convention for Framing a New Constitution of Government for the
State of Massachusetts Bay, to their Constituents.” Boston: White and Adams,
1780. Massachusetts State Archives, Boston.
Howie, Wendell D. The Reign ofJames the First: A Historical Record ofJames M.
Curley as Governor ofMassachusetts
.
n. p., 1936. Special Collections and
Archives, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
358
Memoir of the Hon. Caleb Strong, LL.D Governor of Massachusetts.” Boston: n. p.,1840 Special Collections and Archives, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Government Document.s
Massachusetts. Acts and Resolves of the Massachusetts General Court Boston Wrieht
and Potter, 1780-1997
Massachusetts “Address of His Excellency to the Two Branches of the Legislature of
Massachusetts.” Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1852. Boston: White and Potter,
1853. Boston: White, 1854-1862. Boston: Wright and Potter, 1863-1915
Massachusetts. Addresses andMessages to the General Court, Public and Official
Statements, and Correspondence of General Interest ofHis Excellency,
Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1916-1969
Massachusetts Commission on Administration and Finance Report to His Excellency the
Governor Poster Furcolo Concerning the Reorganization of the Central
Administrative andManagement Functions of the Executive Branch Boston:
Commission on Administration and Finance, 1960
Massachusetts General Court. Index ofExecutive Orders. Boston: House of
Representatives, 1985
Massachusetts Governor’s Management Task Force 1976 A Management Planfor
Massachusetts Boston: Governor’s Management Task Force, 1976.
A Management Planfor Massachusetts Final Report: Implementation Progress.
Boston: Governor’s Management Task Force, 1978
Massachusetts. Governor’s Management Task Force ’79. Massachusetts: The 80's and
Beyond Boston: Governor’s Management Task Force ’79, 1979
Massachusetts. Special Commission Concerning State and County Buildings. Final Report
to the General Court of the Special Commission Concerning State and County
Buildings. Boston: The Commission, 1980
United States. House and Senate. Joint Committee on the Operation of Congress.
Interhranch Relations: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress. 103'^'* Cong., sess., 22, 24, 29 June 1993.
359
Interviews
Dukakis Michael Interview by author, 27 September 1996, Boston. Tape recording
Northeastern University, Boston.
Dukakis, Michael Interview by author, 7 May 1998, Boston. Tape recording.
Northeastern University, Boston.
Dukakis, Michael. Interview by author, 16 July 1998, Boston. Tape recording.
Northeastern University, Boston.
Raine, Alden. Interview by author, 24 June 1998, Boston. Tape recording.
Newspapers
Boston Globe 1 November 1956-25 April 1999
Boston Herald and Boston Herald American 1 September 1 974-20 March 1995.
\e\e York Times 1 January 1987-30 November 1988.
Papers and Correspondence
Davenport, Henry to L M. Weld, Boston, 24 January 1853 Massachusetts State
•Archives, Boston
Eaton, VIr., Unknown, to Levi Lincoln, Jr., 11 March 1828 Massachusetts State
•Archives, Boston.
Hancock, John. Microfilm Edition of Hancock Family Papers. University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
Strong, Caleb. Microfilm Edition of the Caleb Strong Papers. University of Massachusetts,
•Amherst.
Unknown, Whately, to James Sullivan, Boston, 24 August 1808. Massachusetts State
•Archives, Boston.
Unknown, to David Mack, Jr., Boston, 14 February 1834. Massachusetts State Archives,
Boston.
Unknown to John Davis, Boston, 24 March 1834. Massachusetts State Archives, Boston.
360
Unknown to John Clifford, Boston, 19 January 1853, Massachusetts State Archives
Boston.
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations
Fmkelstem, Robert Z. Merchant. Revolutionary and Statesman: A Reappraisal of the Life
and Public Services ofJohn Hancock Ph. D diss,. University of Massachusetts
Amherst, 1981.
Harmond, Richard P “Tradition and Change in the Gilded Age: Political History of
Massachusetts, 1878-1893.” Ph. D diss., Columbia University, 1966.
Mullen, James H. “Executive Leadership and Political Decision Making: A Case Study of
the Development and Evolution of the Community College System in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1957-1962.” Ed D thesis. University of
Massachusetts Amherst, 1994
361


